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ABSTRACT 
 
Differences in cross-country economic performance have been attributed to differences 
in the quantity and quality of capital and labour stocks over time and space and cross-
country differences in the productivity of these factors. Furthermore, institutional 
infrastructures have been considered deep determinants of the allocation and 
productivity of the factors of production.  Despite the persistently low economic 
performance of middle- and low-income economies, there is a paucity of research into 
the dynamics of the relationship between institutions, productivity and economic 
performance in middle- and low-income economies. There is much research on these 
relationships among advanced and OECD economies, but no clear perspective of the 
dynamics of these relationships in middle- and low-income economies. This thesis 
extends the discussion of the relationship between institutions as deep determinants, 
productivity and the factors of production and their influence on long-run economic 
performance in middle- and low-income economies.  
This thesis takes a positivist-deductivist approach. A representative sample of 
17 developing economies for which relevant data is publicly available is used to test for 
the fixed and random effect of institutions and productivity on long-run economic 
performance. Using growth-accounting, this thesis decomposes aggregate output to 
calculate national levels of productivity, measured as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  Then using factor analysis, 
publicly available data is used to calculate an aggregate institutional index and four 
institutional factors.  Using fixed and random effects models, this thesis tests for the 
influence of the aggregate institutional index and four institutional factors on levels of 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, capital and labour stock.   
There is evidence that in the long run, levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 drive how efficiently and 
intensely the factors of input are converted in the production process in the sample of 17 
developing economies. The results suggest that cross-country differences in economic 
performance amongst these developing economies may be due to differences in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. 
Further that in the long run, institutions indirectly affect economic performance in these 
17 developing economies through their direct influence on levels of  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  Levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
are directly influenced by the quality of national institutions, thereby impacting the 
efficiency and intensity of converting labour and capital stocks in the production 
process.   
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... i 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ... ………………………………………………………………………X 
LIST OF APPENDICES .......................................................................................... XI 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ........................................................................................... XII 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................... XIII 
DECLARATION................................................................................................... XIV 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 1 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THIS RESEARCH ....................................................................... 1 
1.2 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES ....................................................................... 5 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ................................................................................. 9 
 
CHAPTER 2 DECOMPOSING ECONOMIC GROWTH ....................................... 13 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 13 
2.2 MARKETS AND THE FACTORS OF PRODUCTION .................................................... 14 
2.3 THEORETICAL ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH .................................................. 16 
2.3.1 The theoretical origins of endogenous economic growth ...................... 17 
2.3.2 The theoretical origins of exogenous growth ........................................ 20 
2.4 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DECOMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ... 23 
2.4.1 Theoretical approaches to measuring GDP .......................................... 24 
2.4.2 The determinants of economic growth .................................................. 26 
2.5 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH .......................................................................................................... 27 
2.5.1 Implications of labour accumulation as a proximate determinant of 
economic growth ................................................................................. 28 
2.5.2 Implications of capital accumulation as a proximate determinant of 
economic growth ................................................................................. 29 
2.5.3 Implication of productivity as a proximate determinant of economic ..... 29 
iii 
 
2.6 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL AND ‘DEEP’ DETERMINANTS OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH .......................................................................................... 31 
2.6.1 Theoretical perspectives on luck and culture as fundamental 
determinants of economic growth ........................................................ 31 
2.6.2 Theoretical perspectives on integration with world markets (trade 
openness) as a fundamental determinant of economic growth ............ 32 
2.6.3 Theoretical perspectives on geography as a fundamental determinant of 
economic growth ................................................................................. 33 
2.6.4 Theoretical perspectives on institutions as fundamental determinants of 
economic growth ................................................................................. 34 
2.7 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 35 
 
CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUALISING INSTITUTIONS ............................................ 38 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 38 
3.2 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO DEFINING INSTITUTIONS ...................................... 38 
3.2.1 Rational choice and historical approaches of defining institutions ........ 39 
3.2.2 New institutional economics and neoclassical approaches of institutions
 ............................................................................................................ 40 
3.3 THEORETICAL DEFINITIONS OF INSTITUTIONS ...................................................... 41 
3.3.1 What are institutions? ........................................................................... 41 
3.3.2 Defining institutions as formal rules or informal norms ......................... 42 
3.4 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CATEGORISING INSTITUTIONS ............................. 44 
3.4.1 The Macrosystemic approach to categorising institutions ..................... 44 
3.4.1.1 Institutions categorised as ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘weak’ ....................... 45 
3.4.1.2 Institutions categorised as either ‘inclusive’ or ‘extractive’........... 46 
3.4.2 The functional approach to categorising institutions ............................. 47 
3.4.2.1 Institutions categorised as either political and economic ............. 48 
3.5 THE ROLE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE ECONOMIC 
SYSTEM............................................................................................................ 50 
3.5.1 Market-creating political and economic institutions ............................... 50 
3.5.2 Market-deepening political and economic institutions ........................... 51 
3.5.3 Rodrik’s categorisation of market-deepening and market-creating 
institutions ........................................................................................... 52 
3.6 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 53 
iv 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY AND INSTITUTIONS ..... 56 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 56 
4.2 COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS FOR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH .......................................................................................... 58 
4.2.1 Comparative empirical studies on the relationship between productivity 
and economic growth........................................................................... 60 
4.2.2 Comparative empirical studies on the relationship between the factors of 
production and economic growth ......................................................... 63 
4.3 COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH .......................................................................................... 65 
4.3.1 How do institutions relate to economic growth? .................................... 66 
4.3.2 The relationship between institutions and the factors of production ...... 72 
4.3.3 The relationship between institutions and productivity .......................... 76 
4.4 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 80 
 
CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS .... 85 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 85 
5.2 PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS ....................................................................... 85 
5.2.1 Ontological underpinnings .................................................................... 87 
5.2.2 Epistemological underpinnings ............................................................. 88 
5.3 EMPIRICAL MODELS AND DATA .......................................................................... 90 
5.3.1 Growth accounting exercise to calculate total factor productivity (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 90 
5.3.1.1 Dealing with heterogeneity of cross-country fixed effects............ 92 
5.3.1.2 Empirical model and data for calculating productivity .................. 94 
5.3.1.3 Calculating capital stock ............................................................. 97 
5.3.1.4 Calculating TFP .......................................................................... 98 
5.3.2 Calculating the aggregate institutional index ........................................ 99 
5.3.2.1 Data used to estimate institutional factor .................................. 100 
5.3.2.2 Calculating four institutional factor indicators ............................ 101 
5.3.3 Investigating the relationship between institutions and the factors of 
production and productivity ................................................................ 103 
v 
 
5.3.4 Robustness checks using 2 stage least squares, including instrumental 
variables ............................................................................................ 108 
5.4 SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... 108 
 
CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ................................................................. 110 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 110 
6.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF GROWTH ACCOUNTING EXERCISE TO CALCULATE 𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓 IN 
SELECTED DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ................................................................ 110 
6.3 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF CALCULATING THE AGGREGATE INSTITUTIONAL INDEX 
AND FOUR INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS ................................................................. 117 
6.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF INVESTIGATING THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS ON THE 
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION ............................................................................... 126 
6.4.1 Results of investigating the influence of institutions on capital stock .. 127 
6.4.2 Results of investigating the influence of institutions on labour stock ... 130 
6.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF TESTING THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS ON 
PRODUCTIVITY ................................................................................................ 131 
6.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES .................................. 134 
6.6.1 2SLS results ....................................................................................... 135 
6.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
THEIR RESULTS ............................................................................................... 137 
 
CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS .................................... 139 
7.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 139 
7.2 DISCUSSION OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SELECTED 17 DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES .................................................................................................... 139 
7.2.1 The relationship between 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and capital stock and labour stock 
accumulation ..................................................................................... 140 
7.2.2 Possible determinants of productivity for selected developing economies
 .......................................................................................................... 145 
7.2.2.1 Research and development as a determinants of productivity for 
developing economies ................................................................ 147 
7.2.2.2 Competition as a determinant of productivity in developing 
economies .................................................................................. 147 
vi 
 
7.2.2.3 Education as a determinant of productivity in developing 
economies .................................................................................. 148 
7.3 DISCUSSION OF THE AGGREGATE INSTITUTIONAL INDEX AND FOUR INSTITUTIONAL 
FACTORS IN THE SAMPLE OF 17 SELECTED DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ................. 149 
7.3.1 Aggregate institutional index .............................................................. 149 
7.3.2 Market-legitimising institutional factor ................................................. 151 
7.3.3 Market-creating institutional factor ...................................................... 152 
7.3.4 Market-stabilising institutional factor ................................................... 153 
7.3.5 Market-regulating institutional factor ................................................... 154 
7.4 DISCUSSION OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE INSTITUTIONAL INDEX AND FOUR 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS ON CHANGES IN CAPITAL AND LABOUR STOCK .............. 156 
7.4.1 Discussion of the association between institutions and capital stock .. 156 
7.4.1.1 Accumulation of physical capital ............................................... 157 
7.4.1.2 Significant year effect ............................................................... 158 
7.4.2 Discussion of the relationship between institutions and labour stock .. 159 
7.4.2.1 Accumulation of labour stock .................................................... 160 
7.5 DISCUSSION OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN 
THE SELECTED 17 DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ..................................................... 162 
7.5.1 Institutions and R&D .......................................................................... 162 
7.5.2 The relationship between institutions and capital investment and 
productivity ........................................................................................ 165 
7.6 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE ....................................................................... 167 
7.6.1 Total factor productivity in the 17 selected developing economies ..... 167 
7.6.2 The aggregate institutional index and four institutional factors in the 17 
selected developing economies ......................................................... 169 
7.6.3 The association between the institutions and capital stock and labour 
stock in the selected 17 developing economies ................................. 170 
7.6.4 The association between institutions and productivity in the selected 17 
developing economies ....................................................................... 171 
 
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 173 
8.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 173 
8.2 KEY FINDINGS ................................................................................................. 174 
vii 
 
8.2.1 The association between productivity and economic performance in 
developing economies ....................................................................... 174 
8.2.2 The role of institutions in economic performance in developing 
economies ......................................................................................... 175 
8.3 CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE AND POLICY ........................................................ 177 
8.3.1 Contribution to practice ...................................................................... 179 
8.3.2 Contribution to policy .......................................................................... 180 
8.4 LIMITATIONS TO RESEARCH ............................................................................. 183 
8.5 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ..................................................................... 185 
 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................... 187 
APPENDICES ..................................................................................................... 212 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1: Approached to categorisation of institutions in empirical studies ........... 49 
Table 4.1: Comparative empirical studies decomposing long-run economic growth59 
Table 4.2: Empirical studies investigating the direct association between institutions 
and economic performance. ................................................................... 72 
Table 4.3: Empirical studies investigating the association between institutions and 
the accumulation of capital stocks and labour stocks ............................. 75 
Table 4.4: Empirical studies investigating the association between institutions and 
productivity ............................................................................................ 79 
Table 5.1: Sample economies: middle- and low-income ........................................ 95 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of data used to calculate productivity .................... 96 
Table 5.3: Institutional quality indicators taken from the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World Index ................................................................. 103 
Table 5.4: Tests of endogeneity ........................................................................... 104 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used to calculate TFP ..................... 110 
Table 6.2: Results of Pearson correlation analysis of the relationship between GDP 
(log), capital stock (log), labour stock (log) and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (log)  ................... 111 
Table 6.3: Results of least square regression of GDP, capital stock, labour stock 
and TFP for the period 1990 to 2015 ................................................... 112 
Table 6.4: Average percentage change (log) of sources of growth of 17 selected 
developing economies 1990 to 2015 .................................................... 115 
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics of 24 EFW institutional indicators for the 17 selected 
developing economies. ........................................................................ 119 
Table 6.6: Average market-legitimising, market-creating, market-stabilising and 
market-regulating institutional factor indicators, by economy for the 
period, 1991 to 2015 ............................................................................ 122 
Table 6.7: Details of factor loadings after varimax rotation of Market-Legitimising, 
Market-Creating, Market-Stabilising and Market-Regulating Institutions
 ............................................................................................................ 125 
Table 6.8: Pearson correlation analysis of full panel data (GDPper capita, capital 
stock, labour stock, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and aggregate institutional index) .................. 126 
ix 
 
Table 6.9: Descriptive statistics of variables used to test the influence of institutions 
on the factors of production. ................................................................. 127 
Table 6.10: Results of fixed effect estimation of the influence of institutions on 
capital stock ......................................................................................... 129 
Table 6.11: Results of fixed effect estimation of the influence of institutions on 
labour stock ......................................................................................... 131 
Table 6.12: Pearson correlation matrix of institutional index and the GDP, capital 
stock, labour stock and TFP ................................................................. 133 
Table 6.13: Descriptive statistics of variables used to assess the relationship 
between of institutions and  productivity. .............................................. 133 
Table 6.14: Results of random effect estimation of the relationship between 
institutions and productivity .................................................................. 134 
Table 6.15: Pearson correlation matrix of institutional index and the various 
instrumental variables .......................................................................... 136 
Table 6.16: Results of instrumental variables estimation of the influence of 
institutions on the factors of production, productivity and economic 
performance. ....................................................................................... 136 
Table 7.1: Correlation of Institutional Index, Institutional Factors and World 
Governance Indicators ......................................................................... 151 
Table 8.1: Key findings on the association between productivity and economic 
performance in the sample of selected developing economies ............ 175 
Table 8.2: Key findings on the role of institutions for economic performance in the 
sample of selected developing economies ........................................... 177 
 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1: Thesis structure ................................................................................... 11 
Figure 6.1: Scatter plot of predicted line of the association between GDP and 
productivity for the period 1990 to 2015 ............................................. 113 
Figure 6.2: Productivity and real GDP in 1990 for the sample of 17 selected 
developing economies ....................................................................... 116 
Figure 6.3: Productivity and real GDP in 2000 for the sample of 17 selected 
developing economies ....................................................................... 116 
Figure 6.4: Productivity and real GDP in 2015 for the sample of 17 selected 
developing economies ....................................................................... 117 
Figure 6.5: Institutional index and real GDP per capita in 1991 for the sample of 17 
selected developing economies ......................................................... 123 
Figure 6.6: Institutional index and real GDP per capita in 2015 for the sample of 17 
selected developing economies ......................................................... 123 
Figure 6.7: Scree plot of eigenvalues of factor loadings after rotation. ................. 124 
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Index of institutional indicators used ................................................ 213 
 
Appendix B: Decomposition (in logs) of GDP by Capital Stock, Labour Stock and 
TFP for 17 selected developing economies ..................................... 218 
 
Appendix C: Trend of market-legitimising, market-creating, market-stabilising and 
market-regulating institutional factors .............................................. 223 
 
Appendix D: Capital Stock - Full fixed effect estimation results with time-dummies
 ............................................................................................................................ 228 
 
Appendix E: Labour Stock - Full fixed effect estimation results with time-dummies
 ............................................................................................................................ 230 
 
Appendix F: TFP - Full random effect estimation results with time-dummies ........ 232 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
2SLS 2 Stage Least Squares 
BGD Bangladesh 
BWA Botswana 
EFW Economic Freedom of the World Index 
EGY Arab Republic of Egypt 
FA Factor Analysis 
FE Fixed Effects Estimation 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GFK Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
GHA Ghana 
GMM Generalised Method of Moments 
ICRG International Country Risk Guide 
IND India 
INST Aggregate Institutional Index Calculated in this thesis 
IPD Institutional Profiles Database 
JAM Jamaica 
KEN Kenya 
LKA Sri Lanka 
MC Market-Creating Institutions 
ML Market-Legitimising Institutions 
MR Market-Regulating Institutions 
MS Market-Stabilising Institutions 
MUS Mauritius 
MWI Malawi 
MYS Malaysia 
NGA Nigeria 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PAK Pakistan 
PMG Pooled Mean Group 
PWT Penn World Tables  
R&D Research and Development 
RE Random Effects Estimation 
SLE Sierra Leone 
TFP Total Factor Productivity 
TZA Tanzania 
WDI World Bank's Development Indicators 
WEF World Economic Forum 
WGI World Governance Indicators 
ZMB Zambia 
ZWE Zimbabwe 
xiii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors through this journey, Assoc. Prof. Dr. 
Roseline Wanjiru and Dr. Jinghai Zheng, for their guidance and recommendations. 
 Thank you to my dear friends and fellow PGRs, it takes a village to complete 
a PhD; Paolo, Princess, Rebecca, Emmanuel, Moses, Laure-Elise and Giuseppe for 
their motivation and support, brightening my PhD life.   
 Thank you to office mates Dr. Franklin Nakpodia, Dr. Pankaj Chandorkar 
and Dr. Peter Sproat for the laughter and encouragement. 
 Special thanks to my parents Joyce and Desmond for always checking in on 
me and their unconditional love and support. To my sisters, Mary and Claire and 
brother, Brian for the laughs and being there to thrash out ideas and earlier versions 
of the thesis. 
 Most importantly, thank you to my Lord Jesus Christ for His grace and mercy 
through it all and bringing me out the other side a stronger person, a better 
researcher and writer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other 
award and that it is all my own work.  I also confirm that this work fully 
acknowledges opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others.   
Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this thesis has been approved. 
Approval has been sought and granted by the Faculty Ethics Committee on 4th July, 
2017.  
Part of the empirical results has been published in the following chapter: 
Roseline W. & Prime, K.S. (2018).  Institutions, economic growth and international 
competitiveness: A regional study. In D. Castellani, R. Narula, Q.T.K. Nguyen, I. 
Surdu, & J.T. Walker (Eds.), Contemporary Issues in International Business: 
Institutions, Strategy and Performance (99-124). Cham: Springer International 
Publishing 
 
I declare that the Word Count of this thesis is 67,515 words.  
 
Name: Karla Simone Prime 
 
Signature:  
 
Date: 15th March, 2019. 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to this research 
Burgeoning literature seeks to investigate the extent to which the quality and rate of 
economic performance in middle- and low-income economies is determined by 
either productivity or their institutional infrastructure. They entertain the hypothesis 
that cross-country differences in economic performance tends to be dependent on 
differences in labour productivity and the productivity of capital. Productivity is 
accounted for by total factor productivity (“𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇”) (Solow, 1957). Although research 
has been conducted on the association between productivity and economic 
performance, there is still little agreement on the association between the deeper 
determinants and productivity. In the argument on the importance of the deeper 
determinants that have been identified, the institutional hypothesis argues that 
institutions are a more robust explanation than geography and trade openness, of 
national decisions behind the accumulation of capital and labour stocks and 
investment in productivity (Akobeng, 2016; Bennett & Nikolaev, 2016; Góes, 2016; 
Guerriero, 2016; Schein, 2016; Aguiar, Costa, & Silva, 2017; Mullings, 2017). 
Institutions are defined as the formal rules and informal norms that form the 
infrastructure of social relationships within the economic system. The purpose of 
this research is to investigate the association amongst capital, labour, productivity, 
institutions and economic performance in middle- and low-income economies.   
The literature agrees that institutions and productivity are multidimensional.  
It is dangerous to make a categorical claim that rich economies have better quality 
institutions than economies in the developing world (Chang, 2011).  Institutional 
quality is generally exemplified as the rules, regulations, laws and policies that 
influence economic incentives to invest in technology, physical capital and human 
capital (Savoia & Sen, 2016). For the most part literature that explores the influence 
of institutions on economic performance suggest that for the most part, differences 
in institutional quality explains cross-country differences in per capita income.  They 
agree that institutions matter for the level and rate of economic performance of 
economies. There is cogent empirical groundwork for the hypothesis that 
institutions, rather than luck, geography or culture cause cross-country differences 
in incomes per capita (Acemoglu, 2009). However, there are fewer studies that have 
investigated this association in developing (middle- and low-income) economies. 
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Developing economies in this study include middle and low income economies as 
defined by the World Bank for 2018 fiscal year; i) middle income are those 
economies with a GNI per capita between $1,006 and $12,235; and ii) low income 
economies are those with a GNI per capita of $1,005 or less. Integral to explaining 
the influence of institutions on economic performance is identifying the mechanisms 
through which it impacts levels and rates of production and output.  
Neoclassical economic growth theory assumes that labour and the product 
markets are perfectly competitive (Solow, 1956). Invariably economic growth varies 
across economies not only because of differences in the quantity and quality of the 
factors of production over time and space, but also differences in how these factors 
of production are combined to produce goods and services.  The quantity and 
quality of the labour supply may be reliant on educational attainment of workers, 
working preferences and demographics.  Physical capital may be dependent on 
investment growth and the rate of depreciation.  Levels of output depend on the 
level of competition within the product and resource markets and barriers to 
investment can reduce the efficiency with which capital is used (Barrell, Holland, & 
Liadze, 2010).  Similarly, an economies level of integration with the global economy 
can affect access to technology, innovation, new processes and impact the 
aggregate rate of economic growth (Barrell et al., 2010).  Research on the 
contribution of capital and nation specific factors on economic growth in many 
developing countries have yielded results that undoubtedly differ from the related 
research and empirical results in relation to economically developed countries, for 
example the United States. For example, the calculations for seven leading Latin 
American economies for the period from 1960 to 1996 suggest that the 
accumulation of capital significantly accounts for a larger portion of their economic 
development compared to other factors, including the complex concept of 
technological change (Alfaro, Kalemh-Ozcan, & Volosovych, 2008; Abad, 2013; 
Abad & van Zanden, 2016). 
Capital itself, has been identified as a significant factor for the economic 
growth in underdeveloped economies. National levels of productivity growth have 
usually be considered important for increasing levels of production in developed 
economies. Yet the influence of global productivity factors cannot be ignored when 
examining the cause of higher rates of economic growth. Alternatively, the World 
Bank has unequivocally confirmed that the increase of the factors of production, 
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particularly capital accumulation, have an increasingly significant influence on 
economic growth in developing economies. The accumulation of capital has been 
identified as far more important for economic growth in economically less developed 
economies as it is for economic growth in economically developed economies.   
With so many potential factors that can impact an economies’ ability to not 
only accumulate but distribute and efficiently use its factors of production, there 
have been several empirical studies that have investigated the efficiency of 
production and drivers of productivity.  However, many of these studies focus on 
developed economies and there is a paucity of studies that have specifically 
focused on what has hindered economic growth in developing economies.  There is 
little empirical consensus on what is most important for increasing levels of 
productivity in developing economies, whether investment in the labour force, or 
increased investment in physical capital, or investment in new processes for the 
efficient combination of both towards higher levels of output.  
Traditional growth accounting exercises are grounded on an aggregate 
production function and expressed in growth rates.  The results of a growth 
accounting exercise will depend on how the production function is specified (Dreher, 
Méon, & Schneider, 2014).  Growth accounting estimates an economies’ output as 
a function of their factors of production and compares these estimates with actual 
output figures.  The difference between the estimates and actual output figures 
provides the levels of total factor productivity (‘TFP’), or the Solow residual (Solow, 
1962b). The vast majority of empirical literature examining cross-country economic 
growth comparison use the Cobb-Douglas production function.  Dreher et al. (2014) 
contend that the Cobb-Douglas production function provides a good comparative for 
cross-country economic growth accounting.  This neoclassical approach will be 
used in this thesis to decompose the long-run output by differences in factors of 
production and productivity.   
Decomposition of the aggregate output in this manner enables the 
comparison of experiences amongst different economies.  This can help provide a 
framework for allocating changes within an economies’ observed output into the 
contributions from changes in its factors of production. Neoclassicism assumes that 
for any given combination of factors of production a shift in the production frontier is 
brought about by improvements in productivity or efficiency. By treating the factors 
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of production as substitutionary and not complementary, neoclassical fundamental 
presumptions and assumptions are based on the notion of equilibrium and 
marginalism (Havik et al., 2014). The standard neoclassical model assumes that the 
output-capital ratio is an endogenous variable.  This would mean that as the levels 
of capital increase, so should the productivity of labour.  However, developing 
economies are principally characterised as capital-scarce, but low-cost labour 
abundant. This raises the question of whether neoclassical assumptions can be 
applied to developing economies. 
Different economies face different constraints to achieving economic growth, 
based on their political and economic institutions, which can affect the efficiency of 
their production processes. Institutions impact economic actor’s decisions to invest 
in either productive activities or divert resources away from production to protection 
and security. The competitive structure of efficient markets can only result in 
economic actors making optimal decisions if the institutional infrastructure can 
provide a means to reduce the cost of transactions and make up for an imbalance of 
information availability to parties in exchange transactions.  Any shift in incentives or 
resources can quickly lead to a shift in the behaviour of economic actors.  Where 
transaction costs are significant, market institutions can provide incentives for actors 
to acquire essential information that will lead them to engage in productive activities. 
By implications, institutions should be designed to achieve efficient outcomes, but 
are they sufficient to play an independent role in economic outcomes? 
Institutions can become the building blocks of social, political and economic 
life.  The inclinations, competence, proficiency and basic characters of individual 
actors within the economy may be conditioned by institutional structures. When 
choices are being made, institutions can constrain the possible outcomes.   The 
differences in cross-country economic outcomes suggests that there may be some 
disparity in the quality of institutions that have been adopted by economies at 
different levels of development.  The analysis of the role of institutions in explaining 
cross-country variations in economic growth must now be extended to address the 
question of ‘which institutions matter’ for economic growth. The classification of 
institutions under broad socio-political categories, can cloud the different channels 
through which institutions can impact output levels (Das & Quirk, 2016).  Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) and Rodrik (2005) add another dimension to the 
measurement spectrum by conceptualising their taxonomy on the basis of ‘the 
5 
 
cumulative outcome of past policy actions’ (p.156).  This definition does bring into 
question how they measure institutions in their investigation.  There can be a 
blurred line between policy and institution and often in empirical research no explicit 
distinction is made between the two (Voigt, 2013).   
This chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 1.2 discusses the relevance of this research topic and the aims and 
objectives of this thesis.  
Section 1.3 outlines the thesis structure.  
 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
The principal aim of this thesis is to build upon the understanding of the association 
between productivity, institutions and national output in developing economies. To 
achieve this aim, this thesis will: 
1) Investigate whether differences in levels of national output of a sample of 
17 developing economies is associated with different levels of 
productivity; 
2) Investigate whether different levels of national output in a sample of 17 
developing economies is associated with different categories of 
institutions. 
This thesis will try to understand the persistently low economic performance 
of developing economies.  More particularly, it will try to understand why developing 
economies have been unable to maximise the combination of the factors of 
production to attain higher levels of productivity and the role of their institutional 
infrastructure to support productive activities. This thesis will achieve this through 
the conceptual framework predicated upon the neoclassical economic growth theory 
as set out in Section 2.3. 
The decomposition of output using the Cobb-Douglas production function is 
to highlight how efficiently developing economies combine their factors of 
production.  This will provide some measure of the productivity of capital and labour 
in developing economies. This will provide some understanding of how developing 
economies may optimally choose from a menu of methods of production dependent 
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on the endowment of its labour force and access to physical and financial capital.  
Discerning the determinants of aggregate economic performance is critical in 
explaining how to increase levels of productivity and output in middle- and low-
income economies.  While the endogenous economic schools of thought put the 
focus on investments in accumulating skills, knowledge and technical progress, 
exogenous economic schools of thought focus on the consequence of the 
accumulation of capital and labour stocks.  
These processes of accumulation occur within the resource markets. The 
resource market is where firms, governments and individuals meet to engage in 
mutually beneficial exchanges (Ostrom, 2010).  Within these resource markets, 
economic decisions are guided by aggregate interactions amongst these economic 
actors.  The markets facilitate trade (Kranton, 1996).  Economic agents in search of 
trading partners in the resource market, may be subject to information asymmetry, 
where they either do not have information or have limited information about other 
economic agents within the market.  As these markets emerge spontaneously or are 
deliberately constructed based on human interaction, to enable exchange of goods 
and services, they require some measure of structure or regulation to ensure that 
asymmetry of information does not adversely affect trading partners’ decisions.  
There has been an absence of empirical consensus on how productivity 
affects economic performance of developing economies. The disparity in empirical 
results occur partially because of disparity in variables used to calculate productivity 
and the definition of productivity. Growth of productive capacity is driven by 
conditions that either improve the quality of outputs or the efficacy of the conversion 
of the factors of production in the production process (Syverson, 2011).  This thesis 
augments the existing literature by providing further evidence of the role of 
productivity, specifically in developing economies. Some empirical studies have 
focused only on investment in research and development (“R&D”) as a measure of 
productivity (Griliches, 1980, 1987; Comin, 2004; Lipsey & Carlaw, 2004; Cameron, 
Proudman, & Redding, 2005; Coe, Helpman, & Hoffmaister, 2009; Samimi & 
Alerasoul, 2009; Criscuolo, Squicciarini, & Lehtoranta, 2010; Teixeira & Fortuna, 
2010; Hu, Yang, & Chen, 2014; Gomleksiz, Sahbaz, & Mercan, 2017). Other studies 
focus on improving the quality of labour, through investment in acquiring skills and 
knowledge (Easterly & Levine, 2001; Yamarik, 2011; Chatzimichael & Tzouvelekas, 
2014; Jones, 2014; Pelinescu, 2015; Yilmazer & Cinar, 2015; Angelopoulos, Malley, 
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& Philippopoulos, 2017; Benos, Mylonidis, & Zotou, 2017; Sequeira, Santos, & 
Ferreira-Lopes, 2017; Kocourek & Nedomlelova, 2018). This thesis will rely on the 
exogenous neoclassical economic school of thought to determine the effect of 
productivity on economic performance.  Neoclassical growth models make two 
assumptions about productivity: i) ideas are a public good; and ii) growth in ideas is 
exogenous (Solow, 1957). It juxtaposes productivity as any component of increasing 
productive capacity that is not otherwise explained by capital and labour, for 
example technological progress.   
This thesis will extend the analyses of the inclination, intensity and 
productivity of the resource market, to the influence of institutions as a deeper 
determinant of the structure and efficiency of the market, towards increasing levels 
of productivity and national output.  Well-functioning markets are critical for the 
allocative efficiency of capital and labour stocks towards their most productive uses. 
This thesis will argue that institutions are the most robust mechanism for solving the 
problem of inefficient markets arising from costly and imperfect information between 
economic agents within the market. This thesis will evaluate the influence of 
institutions on capital and labour stocks and productivity in selected developing 
economies.  The institutional infrastructure may influence economic actors’ 
decisions to invest in more capital or labour stocks.  Similarly, the institutional 
infrastructure may influence the choice of methods of production to make optimal 
use of the factors of production.  Institutions can affect the quality of the labour 
force, from unskilled to skilled workers; incentives to invest in more efficient capital; 
and incentives to invest in more efficient processes.  
Levels of competition within the economy, quality and access to education 
and levels of integration into the global economy may be determined by the quality 
of institutions and the opportunities that institutions can create. Institutions are 
integral in the interaction between the government and firms within the economy, 
ensuring public-private collaboration that is in the best interest of the economy. 
Without the appropriate institutional infrastructure, progress on the efficient 
allocation and use of the factors of production cannot be easy; for example, the 
quality of the labour force, the structure of the resource and product markets.  
Existing literature agrees that institutions play an essential role for economic growth, 
but do not agree on the mechanism through which institutions encourage productive 
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activities or the category of institutions that matter the most, particularly for 
developing economies.  
This thesis will augment the existing literature on the interaction between 
endogenous institutions and economic growth in developing economies by using 
alternative estimation methods. Empirical studies by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shliefer, and Vishny (1998); La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1999); La Porta (2007), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001); Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005); Acemoglu (2006), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) and 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) are most similar to this work.  However, for the most 
part, these studies have used reduced-form models to focus on the role of 
institutions in influencing economic performance in developed economies. Much of 
the extant empirical literature on the interaction between institutions and economic 
performance emphasise the role of property rights and contract enforcement in 
generating incentives for investment in the market.  This thesis will evaluate the 
mechanism through which different categories of institutions influence sustained, 
long run economic growth in middle- and low-income economies, using fixed and 
random effects estimation models to assess whether the effect of institutions is fixed 
or random amongst the sample of developing economies.   
This thesis is intended to add to the existing literature, by developing a 
framework for understanding how developing economies can make knowledgeable 
decisions about practices and policies to improve their economic performance, 
through improving their institutional infrastructure.  The World Economic Forum has 
measured competitiveness for almost 35 years and has persistently found that 
economies that have ‘strong’ institutions traditionally appear at the top of the Global 
Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum, 2018). For example, Nordic 
countries such as Finland, Denmark and Norway have been ranked as generally 
higher quality institutions and persistently achieve higher levels of economic 
performance (World Economic Forum, 2018). Increasing awareness of the influence 
of institutions on levels of productivity and accumulation of the factors of production 
contribute to the burgeoning literature in this area.  Unfortunately, many of these 
studies have focused on OECD or advanced economies.  There are few empirical 
studies that have considered this relationship in the developing world.  This thesis is 
intended to contribute to filling the gap in the understanding of the relationship 
between institutions, productivity and economic performance in selected developing 
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economies. The developing economies selected for this study are chosen on the 
basis of the availability of data for all variables included in the model.  
This research is particularly relevant to practitioners and policy makers as it 
focuses attention on the influence of institutions on; i) decisions to invest in either 
accumulation of capital or labour; ii) decisions to invest in those skills, knowledge or 
technology that increase levels of productivity; or iii) the ease of access to 
technology or knowledge that can contribute to increased levels of productivity.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters (Figure 1.1: Thesis 
structure). Chapter 2 of this thesis presents a review of the core literature on the 
relevance of economic growth and the determinants of economic growth; proximate 
and deep determinants. It places this thesis within the neoclassical economic 
growth theory.  It identifies the core presumptions and assumptions of the 
neoclassical economic growth theory, distinguishing it from other exogenous 
economic growth theories and endogenous economic growth theories.  Section 2.2 
starts the chapter with a discussion of the concepts of the resource and product 
markets and the interaction of the scarce resources for producing output within an 
economy.  Section 2.3 provides a brief survey of the exogenous and endogenous 
economic growth theories and their basic assumptions and presumptions.  Sections 
2.4 provides an overview of the theoretical perspectives on decomposing economic 
growth. Sections 2.5 introduces the proximate determinants of economic growth and 
the concept of productivity and Section 2.6 introduces the theory of ‘deep’ or 
‘fundamental’ determinants of economic growth; including, geography, integration 
with the global economy, luck and culture and institutions.  
 Chapter 3 explores the theoretical concepts that underpin the definition and 
categorisation of institutions and their relationship with the factors of production, 
productivity and long-run economic performance.  It will begin with an assessment 
of the theoretical approaches to defining and categorising institutions in sections 
3.2, 3.2 and 3.4.  It will then survey the extant theoretical literature that relates to the 
further categorisation of political and economic institutions in section 3.5. The review 
of the theoretical literature presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is meant to 
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provide an overview of the theoretical origins of economic growth theory and the 
theoretical underpinnings of conceptualising institutions as fundamental 
determinants of economic growth. This literature review will form the basis of the 
review of comparative empirical studies of the relationship between economic 
growth, productivity and institutions that will be presented in Chapter 4, which will be 
used to address the gaps in the extant literature to build upon the understanding of 
the relation between institutions, productivity and economic growth in selected 
developing economies.  
Chapter 4 sets out a review of comparative empirical studies that explore the 
relationship between economic growth, productivity and institutions. The conceptual 
framework in this study is predicated upon the neoclassical economic growth theory, 
upon which the research design and philosophical assumptions of this thesis will be 
based.  This conceptual framework presented in section 4.4 provides the foundation 
for the analysis of the results of the empirical investigation undertaken in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 ends by presenting the research questions that will be addressed in this 
thesis to achieve the research aims and objectives.  
Chapter 5 discusses the research philosophy and research design used in 
this thesis.  Chapter 5 highlights the research hypotheses which will be tested to 
answer the research questions identified in Chapter 4.  This chapter will also 
present the research design of this study and explains preliminary data analysis and 
diagnostic tests.  Chapter 5 will also discuss the data and collection issues, ending 
with a description of the sample of economies that will be used to examine the 
relation between institutions, productivity and economic performance in developing 
economies.  
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Figure 1.1: Thesis structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical results of estimations of the models 
identified in Chapter 4.  Chapter 6 will also discuss the results of robustness checks 
undertaken to confirm the appropriateness of the base regression estimations.   
Chapter 7 will discuss the results of these estimations in the context of the 
conceptual framework set out in Chapter 4.  Each discussion in Chapter 7, 
addresses how the empirical results of this thesis contribute to existing knowledge 
and extant relevant literature.  
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis and highlights the potential contributions to 
practice and policy from the empirical results.  It will also address the limitations to 
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areas for further research on the relationship between institutions, productivity and 
economic performance in developing economies.  
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CHAPTER 2 DECOMPOSING ECONOMIC GROWTH 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the theoretical origins of economic growth as a 
preface to the forthcoming chapters. This chapter discusses the theoretical 
perspectives of the concept of economic performance and identifies the 
mechanisms that economic theory suggests economic growth is derived. Measuring 
economic performance provides a ‘barometer’ of whether an economy is expanding, 
contracting or stagnant. Section 2.2 briefly introduces the concept of the market 
structure of the economy within which economic actors exchange goods, services 
and information. Section 2.3 traces the development of the exogenous and 
endogenous theories of economic growth. This is followed by section 2.4 which 
outlines in brief the various theoretical perspectives on the decomposition of 
economic growth.  The theoretical origins of the theories of economic growth are 
outlined in brief to provide the background for the discussion of the relationship 
between economic growth and its determinants; productivity, capital and labour 
might be better understood.  This Chapter will help provide a background of how the 
extant literature has defined the relationship between capital, labour and productivity 
as proximate determinants of economic growth.  
The decomposition of economic growth provides a starting point for the 
exploration of the possible differences in economic growth, contraction or stagnation 
amongst economies of different levels of development. There is a large body of 
literature on the mechanisms through which productivity influences economic 
growth though this literature tends to lack consensus on how to measure 
productivity or its relationship with capital and labour.  This Chapter will explore this 
theoretical discussion from both the exogenous and endogenous economic growth 
perspectives.  
While economic growth theories typically identify technological progress with 
productivity, the two are distinct concepts. More specifically, technological progress 
contributes to productivity change. Productivity is a measure of the real output of 
capital and labour. Productivity change, is therefore a measure over time of the 
growth (or not) of the real output of capital or labour.  This Chapter will survey the 
theoretical origins of the relationship between technological progress and 
productivity.  While technological progress and productivity may on the surface 
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appear theoretically distinct, they are often linked. Their relationship is complex and 
may be difficult to measure.  Notwithstanding the large body of literature on both 
technological progress and productivity, there remains little ‘conventional wisdom’ 
on either the nature or the magnitude of their association.  This chapter will explore 
how both the exogenous and endogenous economic growth theories suggest that 
technological progress and productivity are related.  
This chapter will conclude in Section 2.5 with a review and assessment of 
the extant literature that has explored the relationship between productivity, capital 
and labour and their association with economic growth. This summary will provide 
support for the conceptual framework used in this thesis.   
 
 
2.2 Markets and the factors of production 
This section will briefly provide a distinction between centrally planned markets, 
where government agencies choose what gets produced, to free markets, where the 
choice of what gets produced is compelled by supply and demand and competitive 
markets, where firms compete to provide the goods and services that consumers 
want and need. This section will then assess the role of markets within the 
economy.  
In planned or command economies, governments own the factors that go 
into the production process, the major factors required to produce goods and 
services. Marx (1887) defined these factors of production as land, labour and 
capital. Alternatively, in free or market economies, individuals own the factors of 
production, governments take a more hands off or laissez faire approach to 
production and trade. Free markets are characterised by the deregulation of the 
economy and cutting taxes, particularly corporate taxes to increase production of 
goods and services (Lucas Jr., 1990; Say, Reprint 1971).   
Modern market economies are neither entirely free markets nor planned 
markets, instead, there is usually some extent of government involvement. At one 
extreme is North Korea, with a planned economy where production is entirely 
controlled by the government. On the other extreme are economies like New 
Zealand that have private property, few regulations and few taxes.  In the middle is 
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the rest of the world.  Most modern economies are competitive market economies, 
with characteristics of both free markets and varying degrees of government 
intervention.   
Competitive market economies are based on the premise of allowing; i) 
private firms to produce and sell the output of their production; ii) households to sell 
their scarce resources (limited supply of land, labour and capital, through savings of 
money) to firms; and iii) governments intercede in certain areas of the economy, for 
example, providing public services (health, education, waste management) and the 
regulation of private business (e.g. protecting private property and reducing the risk 
of monopolistic behaviour). Competitive market economies, allow private ownership 
of property and the operation of factor markets, in which the firms, households and 
governments can trade and exchange products and resources.   
Factor markets are where firms, businesses and governments meet to 
engage in mutually beneficial exchange of the scarce resources and output of 
production with each other.  In a market economy, there are two fundamental types 
of markets that must exist for mutually beneficial exchange to occur: i) resource or 
factor markets – where households and firms engage and exchange the scarce 
resources; and ii) product markets – that benefit both firms and households. 
Competitive markets are constructed as a results of a myriad of transactions 
between economic actors. Ostrom (2010) argues that the market is the optimal 
structure for the production and exchange of private goods. Within the market, 
economic decisions are guided by the aggregate interactions of economic actors, 
individuals, businesses and government. Competitive markets facilitate trade 
(Kranton, 1996), including the trade of the factors of production.   Markets either 
emerge spontaneously or are deliberately constructed based on human interaction, 
to enable the exchange of goods and services. Consequently, markets are where 
the factors of production are traded  
The competitive market system includes both the search for other traders 
and access to the resources required for the production process (Kranton, 1996).  In 
competitive markets, economic agents search for trading partners and may not have 
information or have limited information about the other economic agents within the 
market.  In the market there are either ‘buyers’ who demand a factor of production, 
good or service and ‘sellers’ who own and supply these factors, goods or services. 
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The interaction between these economic actors within the market determines prices 
and contribute to the self-organised coordination of productive activity (Lie, 1997).  
Well-functioning competitive markets play a critical role in economic activity, in 
particular the allocation of the factors of production to the most efficient uses 
(Schmidt, 2018). From this perspective, the market is the system for disentangling 
the economic problem of scarce resources. 
   
2.3 Theoretical origins of economic growth  
Economic growth is about the increase in the market-value of the goods and 
services produced by an economy over time.  Different theories of economic growth 
would stress alternative determinants of economic growth. From mercantilism 
stressing the accumulation of gold and running a trade surplus; to the classical 
theory propagated by Adam Smith that placed emphasis on the role of increasing 
economies of scale (specialisation); to the neoclassical theory based on supply-side 
factors such as the productivity of labour and the size of the workforce; then the 
endogenous theory that emphasises the influence of human capital and the rate of 
technological progress to Keynesian demand-side theory that argues that aggregate 
demand plays a role in influencing economic growth. Economic theories are 
constantly being proven, disproven and revised.   
While economics is not an exact science, the various economic theories aim 
to arrive at conclusions about human nature. Economic theories reflect different 
attitudes about human nature, which is likely to change over time. This section will 
examine the evolution of some of these theories to provide an understanding of how 
they explain long-run economic growth.  The theories that will be discussed in this 
Chapter have been divided amongst exogenous and endogenous economic 
ideologies. Endogenous economic growth theories such as the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 model, 
predominantly consider that the main determinants of economic performance are 
formed inside the economy. Conversely, exogenous economic growth theories such 
as the Solow model, consider that economic performance is the result of influences 
from outside the economy, rather than internal factors.  
The originator of modern economics, Scottish philosopher Adam Smith’s 
publication ‘The Wealth of Nations’, was an organised analysis about production, 
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markets and economic theory and was exceptionally influential (Smith, 1776).  He 
popularised the notion that a person pursuing their self-interests could ultimately 
benefit the common good and promoted the idea of free trade. At the time of his 
writing many economies had many expensive taxes that preserved the paramountcy 
of domestic manufacturers at the expense of international trade. A generation later, 
Ricardo (1815) broadened Smith’s idea by advancing what is now referred to as the 
‘theory of comparative advantage’. The notion that two people or economies could 
both gain from trade, even if one of them could produce more of everything. Ricardo 
suggests that when both economies produce goods or services that they are best at 
and then trade those goods and services, everyone benefits (Ricardo, 1815). The 
field of economics has continued to grow since Smith and Ricardo, advancing ideas 
of private property and free markets.  
 
2.3.1  The theoretical origins of endogenous economic growth  
This section will examine the theoretical assumptions of the endogenous economic 
growth theories relating to production of national output. By 1962 economists had 
begun work on new schools of economic thought that treated the steady-state rate 
of economic growth as itself endogenous and determined within the economy.  
Endogenous economic growth models favour the replacement of exogenous 
unexplained technological progress with determinants of growth that are explicit in 
the model. Omitting technological change, the endogenous economic growth theory 
placed emphasis on indefinite investment in human capital that they suggested had 
a spill over effect on the economy by reducing the diminishing return of capital 
accumulation. This section will examine what endogenous theorist suggest are the 
underlying determinant of sustainable economic growth.  
Endogenous economic growth theories, are predicated on endogenous 
technological progress and argue that investments in the accumulation of capital 
and labour stocks does not adequately explain cross-country differences in 
economic growth. Technological progress is defined by endogenous growth 
theorists as technological advancement that incorporates skills and knowledge that 
make workers productive (Lucas Jr., 1988; Kurz & Salvadori, 2001) or the skills and 
knowledge embedded in workers. Technical progress is derived from the stock of 
knowledge in the research sector of the economy (Romer, 1990a). The market price 
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of knowledge is assumed to be zero, the knowledge market is presumed to not 
provide rewards to investors who incur the cost of research and development 
(‘R&D’) necessary to increase the stock of skills and knowledge.  
In its broadest sense, technological change or progress is the rate at which 
innovation and diffusion of knowledge are introduced and adopted within the 
economy. Endogenous growth theorists explain differences in economic growth by 
examining national choices to invest in R&D, emphasising that innovation and 
technological progress increase the rate of economic growth in the long-run (Romer, 
1986). The choice of investing in R&D and education is what makes technological 
progress endogenous, in that the decision arises within the economy system. With 
technology being considered endogenous, it can be more easily reallocated within 
the knowledge market to achieve faster technological progress. Adding more 
resources to R&D contributes to more rapid accumulation of knowledge and skills. 
The level of national production can be influenced not only by its own research 
efforts, but by its capacity to access and import knowledge from abroad (Griliches, 
1987).  
This is in vast contrast to the exogenous economic growth theory that 
suggests that technological progress could also be achieved through new 
processes and the adoption of new capital equipment that is unrelated to the explicit 
growth of innovation or R&D. From the exogenous economic growth theory point of 
view, there is often no clear distinction between a new process and a new product. 
Yet, from either perspective, technological change contributes to increased 
productivity by increasing the real output of either capital or labour. The conceptual 
problem associated with this conceptualisation of technology is its measurement. It 
is difficult to conceive of a single measure that could accurately measure or reflect 
the complex and heterogeneous nature of technological progress.  This is where 
both the endogenous and exogenous economic growth theories differ in the 
identification of a reasonable proxy of measure.  
Romer (1994)  posited that there is a functional association between 
technology and the other factors of production, written simply as: 
  𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (1) 
Where (𝑌𝑌) represents total output, (𝐴𝐴) is a composite measure of both 
physical and human capital (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004) and (𝐴𝐴) represents the 
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stock of ‘non-rivalous’ and ‘non-excludable’ ideas in the research sector of the 
economy and knowledge accessed from abroad (Jones, 1997).  These 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 models 
as they have become to be known, such as equation (1) simplify the analysis of 
economic performance to focus on capital. The 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 model is the simplest 
endogenous model that provides a constant-savings rate of endogenous growth and 
assumes a constant, exogenous, saving rate. It models technological progress with 
a single parameter 𝐴𝐴.  This model assumes that the production function does not 
exhibit diminishing returns to scale. This has sometimes been considered a direct 
extension of the exogenous Solow (1957) production function model.  
Exogenous economic growth models assume that the accumulation of 
capital is exogenous rather than responsive to economic incentives within the 
national economic system. However, to the extent that technology, and thereby 
productivity is embodied in capital inputs alone, can give rise to potential 
identification problems. Specifically, it can become difficult to discern empirically the 
contribution of ‘conventional’ factor or other ‘non-conventional’ factors (for example 
R&D or technological spill overs) separately from the contribution of technological 
progress. That is, it may be difficult to empirically separate the productivity effects of 
increases in scale and scope of the production process from the effects of 
implementing and exploiting new technologies, holding scale and scope constant. 
However for the endogenous 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 model, unlike the neoclassical theory, 
economic growth is not determined by the exogenous savings rate.  Instead 
importance is placed on the production of new technologies and their positive spill 
over effect on capital accumulation.  In a knowledge-based economy there would be 
no diminishing returns to capital, if there is robust investment in technology and 
people. As such, growth in productivity in the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 model are determined by 
differences in investment in R&D and education.  The suggestion that economic 
growth could be generated from within the economic system as a direct result of 
internal processes and decisions to invest in R&D and education makes the 
endogenous economic growth theory endogenous.  
This is in direct contrast with the exogenous economic growth model which 
does not allow for economic actors to decide how much skills, knowledge or 
technological progress they will accumulate based on the rate of return to, for 
example, investment in R&D.  This simplistic  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 endogenous economic growth 
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model presumes that each additional year of education adds the same proportional 
amount to how much output a worker can produce, making worker productivity an 
exponential function of technological progress, more specifically a function of 
education and investment in R&D (Romer, 1990a; Angelopoulos et al., 2017).  
Endogenous economic growth theories contend that continued economic 
growth is dependent on existing technology or investment in education and R&D 
and the speed of the innovation process.  Endogenous growth models maintain that 
the accumulation of knowledge is an endogenous process driven by demand for 
innovation, created within the economic system, to increase how much output each 
worker can produce.  
 
2.3.2 The theoretical origins of exogenous growth  
This section will provide a brief survey of the exogenous theories of economic 
growth from the classical theory, to the Harrod-Domar growth model and the 
neoclassical model.   Principally, exogenous economic growth theories differ from 
the endogenous economic growth theories in that the exogenous models require 
forces outside the economic system, outside of capital, investment and population 
growth to generate and sustain economic growth.  Conversely the endogenous 
economic growth theories suggest that economic growth could continue indefinitely 
on the basis of already available factors such as existing technology or investment 
in education. Classicism attaches great importance to the role of physical capital 
accumulation for economic growth. Roy Harrod (1939) and Evsey Domar (1946) 
independently advanced economic growth models that arrived at the same basic 
underlying assumption, based on the Kenynesian saving-investment model that 
explains economic growth in terms of the level of savings and the increased 
productive capacity through investment in labour-saving capital. More recently, 
neoclassical growth models focus on increasing how much output workers can 
produce, through either increasing the size of the work force or improving the 
efficiency with which they use capital.  
Classicists Adam Smith and David Ricardo contended that economic growth 
is determined by production (Piętak, 2014).  Smith opined that the economy could 
only grow if productive capacity, which he contends depends on the division of 
labour and capital accumulation, was allowed to thrive. The division of labour would 
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arise from the extent of capital accumulatoin and gradual expansion of the product 
market (Smith, 1776). Ricardo (1817) opined that the accumulation of capital would 
depend on the productivity of labour. Harrod and Domar emphasise that investment 
through capital accumulation was the only contributor to economic growth (Van den 
Berg, 2013). Increased producitive capacity increases the demand for labour in the 
resource market, to utilise the labour-saving equipment, generating increased levels 
of ouput. Classical economist argue that economic growth is driven by growth in 
investment in accumulation of the factors of production and improvement of 
productive capacity (Piętak, 2014).   
Laterly, neoclassicism alternatively considered labour the primary factor of 
production. Solow (1957) provided a growth accounting framework that explains 
economic growth in relation to the growth of productivity and efficiency measured as 
the residual term (the Solow residual) within the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The ‘unexplained’ productivity residual in the Cobb-Douglas production function is 
not presumed to be only comprised of technological change. This residual has even 
been criticised as potentially reflecting biases in the measurement of capital and 
labour. In the Cobb-Douglas production function capital is assumed to have 
decreasing marginal product characteristics and each new addition increases output 
by less than the previous addition.  The neoclassical economic growth model relies 
on continued increases in the productive capacity of labour, through either 
increasing the size of the work force or improving the efficiency with which they use 
capital. Fare, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994) suggested that production 
capacity could be decomposed into variations in efficiency (catching up) and 
advances in technology (innovation).  In the neoclassical economic growth model, 
technology is used to put capital and labour to work. 
 Neoclassicism includes technological progress in its model, as does the 
endogenous economic growth theories, but their underlying assumptions of 
technological progress differ. Instead, neoclassicism argues that technology is not 
embedded in skills or labour.  Neoclassicism exogenises technological progress and 
considers that it is brought about by incentives from outside the economic process 
(Solow, 1957); in part from investmet in R&D determined independently of any 
demand for new innovation created within the economic system and in part 
embodied in new capital. Neoclassicism suggests that new processes that require 
the adotion of new capital equipment could also be considered technological 
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progress.  This type of technological progress increases productivity by increasing 
the real output of either capital or labour.  This is in contrast to the endogenous 
economic growth theories that suggest that the choice to invest in R&D is in 
response to demand for new innovation created within the economic system arising 
from the decision to invest in skills knowledge or technological progress.  
Economies at the technology frontiers are better able to convert ideas into 
new goods and services.  Abramovitz (1986) suggests that economies at the 
technology frontier have the capacity to absorb technology embodied in each 
vintage stock of capital, while economies that are further from the technology 
frontier, will be unable to even absorb the technology in new capital stock.  New 
capital can embody the frontier of knowledge, but unless an economy is able to 
efficiently absorb or distribute this embodied knowledge, they will be unable to take 
advantage of the potential to ‘catch-up’ with the technology leaders.  Abramovitz 
(1986) also suggests that the quality of education, the character of industrial, 
commercial and financial organisations also have an impact on an economies’ 
ability to fully exploit the power of existing or new technology.  
Solow (1956) contends that long-run economic growth could only be 
sustained through unending advances in technology in order to mitigate the 
consequences of diminishing returns to labour and capital that could in due course 
result in ceasing economic growth. In the neoclassical economic growth model, 
productivity is defined as ‘total factor productivity’ (‘𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇’) (Kendrick, 1956).  Solow’s 
model makes two assumptions about 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇: i) ideas are a public good; ii) growth in 
ideas is exogenous. Neoclassical growth models juxtapose 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 as an amorphous 
‘black box’ that comprises a number of hard-to-measure components of productivity 
not otherwise accounted for by physical capital and labour, including technological 
progress (Easterly & Levine, 2001), this includes technological progress. As such, 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is not solely technological progress (Hofman, Aravena, & Friedman, 2017).  
Capital and worker hours can be improved by the quality of labour, thereby raising 
output, the unmeasured quality improvements show up as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth in the 
neoclassical economic growth model (Easterly & Levine, 2001).  Similarly 
unmeasured advancements in the quality of capital show up as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth  in the 
neoclassical economic growth model (Easterly & Levine, 2001).   
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The determinants of productivity growth are factors which either enhances 
the quality of outputs or the efficiency with which factors of production are converted 
into outputs (Solow, 1956; Syverson, 2011).   Technological change is only one of 
several potential ‘non-conventional’ factors that can increase the productivity of real 
output. For the neoclassical economic growth theory, productivity change does not 
have to be associated solely with increases in technological change. Cross-country 
variances in the rate of growth of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 are the result of differences in the efficiency 
with which factor of production are combined in the production process (Comin, 
2010).  
Exogenous economic growth models differ from endogenous economic 
growth models in that the exogenous model depends upon elements other than 
capital investment and a growing labour force in the resource market, for an 
economy to continually grow.  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the common measure of productivity in the 
neoclassical growth model. Increased efficiency contributes to increased output 
from production.  
 
2.4 Theoretical perspectives on the decomposition of 
economic growth 
This section briefly sets out three theoretical approaches commonly used to 
measure aggregate economic growth represented as gross domestic product 
(‘GDP’). The most widely used measure of economic activity is gross domestic 
product (‘GDP’). GDP is the estimation of total production of new goods and 
services (or product) of the domestic economy within a given year. Macroeconomic 
performance is about the ‘aggregate and macro outcomes’ of production of goods 
and services within an economy (Acemoglu, 2012). Aggregate measures such as; 
the value added to national income levels by each additional new output, of a good 
or service produced, exclusive of the cost of production; income derived by 
residents or citizens of the country; consumption of goods and services within the 
economy; and savings as a measure of the total income not consumed but saved, 
are all composite values that calculate the result of economic activity from different 
perspectives.  These aggregate components provide a means of measuring an 
economy’s size.  
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GDP reflects the circular flow of money, goods, services and exchanges 
within the economy between households and firms in the product and resource 
markets. GDP provides a measure of recorded transactions within the economy, but 
does not record activities that are not carried out within the economic market.  
Economic growth indicates a positive percentage change in total GDP from one 
year to another (Boeh-Ocansey & Appiah-Adu, 2015). Growth suggests that a 
national economy is experiencing long-run expansion of productive potential.  
Expansion of the economies’ productive capacity reflects changes in levels of output 
of new goods and services; real increases in output are beneficial for the 
percentage change to be considered ‘growth’.  As a measure of output, GDP can 
also be used to measure levels of output per worker and efficiency within the 
economy.   
As an aggregate measure, GDP is based on three distinctive elements: 
gross versus net, domestic versus national, product versus income and current or 
constant.  GDP can be estimated from three theoretical approaches: i) demand 
side; ii) income; or iii) supply side (Higgs, 2013).  The demand side estimates GDP 
in terms of final expenditure on consumption, observing what is happening across 
different types of spending.  The supply side estimates GDP in terms of the value 
added by each new good or service produced, which is the sum of the output from 
production factors.  The income approach measures the income earned by 
households for different factors of production.  
 
2.4.1 Theoretical approaches to measuring GDP  
This section further investigates the three theoretical approaches to measuring 
GDP.  Theoretically all three approaches to measuring GDP should equal the same 
amount, with national output (supply) equalling national expenditure (aggregate 
demand) equalling national income. Each market transaction that enters the 
measurement of GDP implies that there must be both a buyer and a seller.  
Measuring GDP from the supply side provides a measure of the productive capacity 
of the sellers within the market.  Measuring GDP by aggregate demand provides a 
measure of the appetite and capacity for spending and consumption within the 
markets. While the income approach to measuring GDP provides a measure of the 
wages, rents, interest, profits and other income earned from the production of goods 
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and services within the market. The choice of method for measuring GDP will 
depend on the perspective from which economic performance is being viewed, 
whether from the perspective of its productive capacity, demand for good and 
services or income earned from production.  
GDP from the demand side is calculated based on the sum of spending on 
consuming final goods and services by domestic private consumers (𝐶𝐶) 
(consumption by individuals), domestic investors (𝐼𝐼) (investment by businesses), 
domestic government spending (𝐺𝐺) at all levels, and the monetary worth of exported 
goods and services (𝑋𝑋) less the value of imported goods and services (𝑀𝑀) (Higgs, 
2013).  The basic demand side equation, that divides expenditure, is: 
 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝐼 + 𝐺𝐺 + (𝑋𝑋 −𝑀𝑀) (2) 
 Secondly, the income approach to measuring GDP equates total output to 
the income earned by residents or citizens of the country from the resource market 
(Higgs, 2013). The main types of income that are included in the equation are: i) 
employee compensation; ii) interest earned; iii) rental income less landlord 
expenses; iv) royalties earned from the use of intellectual property and natural 
resources, written as: 
 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 = 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (3) 
Where (𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌) is national income, (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇) is indirect business taxes, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴) is capital 
utilisation (consumption) allowance and capital devaluation (depreciation) and (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) is factor payments to the rest of the world after deducting expenses.   
 Equations (2) and (3) illustrate estimation of GDP from the perspective of 
how businesses, households, the government and foreigners interact within the four 
key markets: i) goods and services; ii) resources; iii) loanable funds; and iv) foreign 
exchange markets.  While equation (2) measures GDP in terms of the monetary 
worth of additional goods and services made in the product market. Value added 
can also be viewed as the elements that comprise income in the resource market. 
While the expenditure or demand side approach estimates total output based on the 
total money spent; the income technique to measuring GDP equates total output to 
the income earned (wages, rents, interest and profits) by households selling their 
scarce factors in the resource market. Both the demand and income approaches to 
measuring GDP disguise the structure and relative efficiency of production that 
underlies total expenditure and income (Landefeld, Seskin, & Fraumeni, 2008).  
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Conversely, the supply-side neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function 
provides a means of measuring; i) changes in the amount of labour and capital used 
to produce output; and ii) the relationship between labour and capital in the 
production process (Cobb & Douglas, 1928).  The Cobb-Douglas production 
function takes account of the durability of capital inputs, such as machines, 
buildings, equipment and labour (Dosi & Grazzi, 2009). In the long-run this formula 
examines productive capacity, versus just output capacity. Changes in productive 
capacity of this production function tend to move gradually year to year, as the 
factors that influence it move in long-run cycles.   
 
2.4.2 The determinants of economic growth 
Discerning the drivers of aggregate economic performance is critical in explaining 
how levels of productivity and output increase.  This section will analyse the 
categories of determinants of economic growth and briefly identify the implications 
of these determinants for economic growth. The neoclassical theory of economic 
growth suggests that economic growth is the result of the accumulation of capital 
and labour stocks.  Endogenous economic schools of thought suggest that 
economic growth is the result of technological progress.  Focusing solely on the 
factors of production denies an understanding of what determines the accumulation 
and productivity of these factors.  
In their 1973 book, North and Thomas referred to labour, capital and 
productivity growth as proximate factors of economic growth, more particularly the 
‘evidence of growth’ and not the true causes of growth (North and Thomas, 1973, 
cited in Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2004, p. 1). Although an empirically 
straightforward way to decompose the observable evidence of economic 
performance, accumulation and productivity are indicators of performance and not 
explanations of what motivates accumulation or productivity (Acemoglu et al., 2004).  
The ‘deep’ determinants of economic growth help to explain what compels a 
country’s decision to invest in either technology, labour, capital, skills or knowledge 
and why those decisions have different outcomes for different countries (Keller & 
Shiue, 2013).   
There have been several suggestions made as to the fundamental or deeper 
reasons why different countries and economic agents make the decisions they 
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make regarding productivity.  For example, i) Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et 
al. (2004), Hu et al. (2014) and Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson (2015) emphasise 
the critical role of institutions and government policies; ii) Edwards (1998) and Dollar 
and Kraay (2003) emphasise the role of trade openness; and Rodrik et al. (2004) 
and Deliktas and Balcilar (2005) have emphasised the role of natural resources and 
geography.       
Examination of the performance of the factors of production cannot answer 
the question why simply changing either investment strategies or opening 
economies to trade, reducing taxation rates or increased government spending, 
may not be sufficient to increase a country’s rate of output. For example, calculating 
the contribution of human capital through skills and knowledge accumulation to 
increase productive capacity, does not provide an explanation of why an economy 
would choose or not choose to invest in skills and knowledge accumulation. The 
findings of empirical studies that favour productivity over factor accumulation as 
integral to explaining cross-country variations in economic growth and economic 
growth rates, reinforces the need to better discern the deep determinants of 
economic performance.  
 
2.5 Theoretical perspectives on the proximate determinants 
of economic growth 
The main factors of production identified by the economic growth theories are 
capital (𝐴𝐴) and labour (𝐿𝐿). Labour represents the inputs related to the work force 
and hours worked. Capital refers to all physical capital. In any economy, there is a 
finite availability of these factors of production (capital and labour). The distribution 
of these resources on the resource market, underpin the context of the production 
process and what takes place within the production market. The demand for any 
factor input is assumed to be made by profit-maximising firms, who choose the 
optimal quantity and quality of the factor input, taking account of its price, potential 
substitutes and the value of the output being produced. The production process 
requires economic actors to make choices on the most efficient allocation of 
resources to produce the output that would yield the most benefit. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the 
process by which the allocative and productive efficiency of these factor inputs can 
be increased to maximise their utility. For example, the labour force cannot utilise 
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capital without a formula or blueprint of how to do it. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the knowledge or 
technology of how to maximise the utility of the capital (Dosi & Grazzi, 2009). As 
technology, knowledge and skills improve over time within the resource market, it 
makes the production process more efficient. This section will briefly outline the 
main factor of production and their role in determining the level of production, 
towards achieving economic growth. 
 
2.5.1 Implications of labour accumulation as a proximate determinant of 
economic growth 
In any economy, there is a finite availability of labour. The finite availability of this 
resource can limit the potential for economic growth in any economy (Hansen & 
Prescott, 2002). Endogenous growth theories suggest that the labour market 
features a great deal of heterogeneity (Urne, 2014).  Endogenous growth theories 
acknowledge that workers have different characteristics, ability, skills and 
preferences for different types of jobs.  Accordingly, endogenous growth theories 
suggest that free labour markets are imperfect (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004). In the resource market, there are substantial 
information asymmetries between the firm purchasing labour and the worker, selling 
their labour.  Labour is exchanged in the resource market for wages. A firm can 
have several information advantages including knowledge about the extent and 
quality of work available.  Whilst the worker has very little access to this information 
and may have few opportunities to discover further information until after accepting 
the offered work.   
Alternatively, exogenous theories of economic growth suggest that labour 
and its supply are usually determined outside the economic system (McCrystal, 
2009) and that the labour market is perfectly competitive (Solow, 1956, 1994; Ten 
Raa & Mohnen, 2002). Neoclassicism assumes that labour stocks grow at an 
exogenous rate in accordance with population growth (Solow, 1962a, 1974). As the 
population size grows independent of economic activity in the labour market, the 
size of the potential labour force increases. Exogenous assumptions ignore the 
potential impact of the potential heterogeneity of the labour force or external shocks 
to the quality and quantity of the workforce, such as access to quality health care or 
the mobility of the workforce.  
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2.5.2 Implications of capital accumulation as a proximate determinant of 
economic growth 
Capital is an aggregate comprised of several elements including durable; i) 
equipment; ii) fixed plant; iii) intangibles such as intellectual property. More 
particularly, for some purposes, capital may also include natural resource such as 
mineral deposits and arable land’ (McFadden, 2008). Capital accumulation is the 
result of exchange within the resource market to allocate resources to the 
production of output.  There are two factors that can affect the levels of capital stock 
within an economy: i) investment; and (ii) depreciation.  Investment increases 
capital stock through expenditure on new land, plant or equipment in the resource 
market, or repairing or replacing existing plant or equipment (Kataoka, 2013).  
Alternatively, depreciation reduces capital stock through the cost of wear and tear 
on old capital caused by aging and use (Schündeln, 2013). The rate of capital 
accumulation is equal to investment minus depreciation.  
An investment in capital today, is meant to augment future output (Barrell et 
al., 2010).  Capital accumulation or amassing investments in capital, can increase 
the productive capacity of labour.  Labour per hour can become more efficient as 
the quantity of capital in the form of equipment or buildings increases (Shackleton, 
2013). As workers have access to more equipment to make the production process 
more efficient, they can become more productive per hour, for the same level of 
workers. From the neoclassical growth theory perspective, this means that growth in 
levels of output are equal to the growth in labour productivity. For neoclassicism 
capital accumulation is a means of increasing technological progress and thereby 
increasing the efficiency of the labour force.  
 
2.5.3 Implication of productivity as a proximate determinant of economic  
While capital and labour are directly used in the production of goods and services, 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the measure of the productive efficiency with labour and capital are 
combined to produce output. Neoclassical growth theorists have included 
technological progress in their definition of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (Solow, 1957; Dosi & Grazzi, 2009; 
Bacovic & Lipovina-Bozovic, 2010).  While endogenous growth theories do not 
specifically define skills and knowledge as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, endogenous growth theorists 
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consider endogenous labour augmenting, skills and knowledge as measures of the 
efficiency of labour.   
Human capital in the endogenous growth model represents the skill and 
knowledge embodied in workers (Romer, 1990b).  Human capital is the expandable 
and self-generating stock of skills and knowledge accumulated by workers through 
education, learning by doing and self-improvement. Endogenous growth theories 
suggests that workers can become more efficient as a result of their ability, training 
and skill (Lucas Jr., 1988).  Human capital is the result of investment in education 
and in the endogenous economic growth model, long-run economic growth can be 
achieved through increased levels of human capital, even in the absence of 
exogenous technological progress. As such endogenous productivity of human 
capital can be an ambiguous contributor to economic growth as it does not 
distinguish the complementarity of labour and technology within the economic 
growth model. 
Alternatively, exogenous economic growth models suggest that productivity 
may be derived indirectly from the resource market contained in capital investments 
(Sveikuskas, 1981), or directly through investment in technology, education, training 
or R&D (Criscuolo et al., 2010). The inclusion of technological progress in 
exogenous growth theories, frees the model to consider that the growth rate of 
output relies on exogenous labour-augmenting improvements in technology. This 
model assumes that all economies that use similar technology, should have 
converging rates of productivity growth (Solow, 1994).  Knowledge or technological 
progress is presumed to be independent of either capital or labour and a non-rival 
good that is free for use by all businesses within the economy.  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 occurs 
multiplicatively, augmenting the productivity of labour. The productivity of labour in 
the neoclassical model is dependent of several factors, the amount of capital 
employed and activities such as education, health and the provision of public goods.  
All these activities are aggregated within the education and health sector of the 
resource markets and represented within 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.   
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2.6 Theoretical perspectives on the fundamental and ‘deep’ 
determinants of economic growth 
To understand cross-country disparities in economic performance there is a need to 
understand the determinants of productivity and factor accumulation. This has given 
rise to literature on the deeper determinants of productivity, such as the extent of 
integration with world markets (trade), geographical characteristics, differences in 
culture, luck and the quality of a country’s institutions. This section aims to provide a 
brief overview of this literature, emphasising the basic arguments that lie behind 
these propositions. Deep determinants can be used to examine why, when faced 
with multiple equilibria, countries with otherwise identical characteristics, make 
different choices with far-ranging consequences (Bennett & Nikolaev, 2016).  
Examination of the fundamental determinants of economic performance helps 
identify the uncertainty of outcomes and elements of heterogeneity amongst 
economies that, all other variables being equal, would drive what would appear to 
be incongruous choices.    
 
2.6.1 Theoretical perspectives on luck and culture as fundamental 
determinants of economic growth 
The luck hypothesis is proposed as an explanation for divergent paths of economic 
performance among countries that are ‘on the surface’ similar (Acemoglu et al., 
2004).  It has been suggested that luck explains why countries that seemingly share 
a common culture or religion perform differently (Bennett & Nikolaev, 2016).  The 
cultural hypothesis focuses on the relationship between national beliefs, 
preferences, values and the choices for inter alia preferences to save over 
consume, willingness to accumulate capital or labour stocks or invest in skills or 
knowledge. The cultural hypothesis suggests that culture will directly affect 
differences in preferences that can influence a societies’ choice regarding 
acquisition of wealth and consumption (Diamond, 1997).  Culture can affect 
individuals’ willingness to engage in different activities such as the trade-off between 
work and leisure or to trade off consumption today versus saving for a later date. 
Secondly, it can affect the levels of trust and cooperation within society, which may 
be important foundations for productivity-enhancing activities.  Despite all this, it is 
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difficult to reconcile how luck or culture could fully explain the role of productivity or 
factor accumulation towards increasing levels of output.     
 
2.6.2 Theoretical perspectives on integration with world markets (trade 
openness) as a fundamental determinant of economic growth 
Rodrik et al. (2004) included the consequences of international trade of goods, 
services, capital and possibly labour as a deep determinant of productivity.  Rodrik 
(2003) considered trade as a partly endogenous factor as it is partly determined by 
income levels and partly by geography (distance from markets and institutions) 
(Winters & Masters, 2013).  Some academics argue that economies that are more 
integrated with the world markets tend to grow at a more rapid rate than closed 
economies (Wang, Liu, & Wei, 2004).  The three means through which openness 
can influence economic growth rates identified by Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
are: i) the international transference of ideas; ii) the flow of goods within the 
international product markets; and iii) movement of capital.  
Through the international transference of ideas, trade openness could have 
an impact on the existing stock of knowledge.  International trade improves the 
process of knowledge and technology spill-overs from developed to developing 
countries through activities such as licensing, trade of goods and services or foreign 
direct investment (Wang et al., 2004). As developing countries import final 
manufactured products from developed countries, producers from developing 
countries cumulatively get familiarised with technological advancements that 
contribute to increased labour productivity.  From this perspective, trade openness 
can strengthen the ability of developing economies to access training for its labour 
force, including knowledge of new management practices and organisational 
arrangements.  If trade is hindered, productivity may be lower than in those 
countries that are open to trade.    
However integration can only be achieved through the appropriate 
institutional framework, including trade policy such as lower tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade, that make it possible to become more integrated in the 
international markets.  Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) found no evidence of a 
significant association between trade openness and economic growth rates. There 
are strong arguments in the literature that trade openness provides only a minimal 
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explanation for economic growth, through increased net trade.  It does not provide 
an explanation of why or how economies decide to accumulate the factors of 
production or how economies increase levels of productivity.   
 
2.6.3 Theoretical perspectives on geography as a fundamental determinant 
of economic growth 
Geography refers to the advantages or disadvantages created by a country’s 
physical location, natural resources and climate.  The consequences of geographic 
location or endowments on long-run economic performance can be multifaceted. 
Human health, population growth, food productivity, resource endowment and the 
mobility of factors of production are all geographic characteristics that may affect 
long-run economic performance (Bloch & Tang, 2004). Hall and Jones (1999) found 
a positive relationship between the absolute value of latitude and per capita income. 
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) found evidence that tropical climates have 
negative effects on human health and agricultural productivity, resulting in lower 
levels of per capita income. A countries’ initial geographic factors directly impact its’ 
ability to sustain life and economic activity on the basis of the suitability of land and 
the ecosystem (Dao & Dávila, 2013).   
Geography provides a greater explanation of productivity and factor 
accumulation than luck, culture or integration.  For example, land may be habitable, 
but because of its location, or ecosystem, a country is unable to tap into its natural 
resources, including its labour force, with its current technology. Alternatively, the 
climate or levels of health care could influence the availability and access to 
workers, hindering potential growth of labour stocks.  Geography could also impact 
an economies’ ability to integrate within world markets: landlocked economies may 
find it costlier to export; the climate may inhibit the production of goods suitable for 
export. Geographic factor endowments influence production through constraining 
the accumulation of physical and human capital and make productivity more costly 
or difficult to access.  Consequently, it would make sense that a country or region 
would specialise in a form of production for which it had a comparative advantage, 
as a result of its innate factor endowments (Chor, 2010). However, geographic 
characteristics are insufficient to explain why economies are not taking advantage of 
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their comparative advantages towards increasing levels of output and national 
income.    
 
2.6.4 Theoretical perspectives on institutions as fundamental determinants 
of economic growth 
The institutional hypothesis argues that the geography influences economic 
performance through its ‘long-lasting impact on institutions’ (Easterly & Levine, 
2003, p. 6).  Economic outcomes are complex and inexplicable in a purely 
geographic context.  Factor endowments cannot explain the initial emergence of 
property rights that created and entrenched rights of ownership on physical capital, 
land and technology. In this context institutions are different from organisations as 
the former determines the constraints and environment within which the latter 
emerges, develops and functions (Leftwich & Sen, 2011). This distinction is 
important as organisations (such as firms, banks, and regulatory agencies) are goal-
oriented economic actors that are both prompted and compelled by institutions and 
are executors of institutional norms.  
Institutions arose as a means of regulating the distribution and accumulation 
of factor endowments, motivated by the intention to protect legal rights and 
economic opportunities available within the economy (Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997). 
National institutional infrastructure can also have an impact on levels of integration 
by either facilitating or hindering international trade (Lauridsen, 2012).  Institutions 
can also evolve over time as a result of culture or luck, through decisions made 
within the society (Petrakos, Arvanitidis, & Pavleas, 2007).  Institutions defined as 
‘humanly devised constraints that limit and define’ choices of individuals (North, 
1994) may arise as a solution to collective problems or choices taken by 
businesses. Consequently, institutions can seemingly account for luck and cultural 
preferences, choices to integrate with world markets, and the impact of geographic 
endowments. 
Both formal and informal institutions can be initiated, monitored, enacted and 
enforced by formal organisations acting in a possessory role.  Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) argue that institutions influence economic agents’ incentives to 
invest in the factors of production or adopt better technology that could have 
boosted productivity.  Specifically, North (1990) contends that national institutional 
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frameworks directly impact economic outcomes through the development of a 
structure within which individuals make decisions about whether or not and in what 
form they participate in the resource and product markets.   The more complex the 
resource or product markets becomes, the greater the need for society to develop 
institutions that would regulate them and rights to private property within the 
markets.   
 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter presented some of the theoretical origins of the theories of economic 
growth, the theoretical approaches to decomposing and measuring economic 
growth and the theoretical discourse on the role of the proximate and fundamental 
determinants of economic growth.  The extant theory that explores the source of 
economic growth centres around two basic explanations rooted in: factor 
accumulation and productivity. Both the endogenous and exogenous economic 
growth theories can be used to explain and decompose economic growth and its 
constituent components.   
Some would argue that endogenous economic growth theories focus more 
on efficiency of capital from endogenous technological change.  Others would argue 
that exogenous economic growth theories focus on explaining increased output 
from factor accumulation and exogenous 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. However, the endogenous and 
exogenous theories of economic growth are not logically irreconcilable. They both 
contend that the production process requires economic actors to make choices in 
the resource markets on the allocation of finite factors to make the goods and 
services that would yield the most benefit in the product market.  They also both 
contend that trade and access to capital, labour, skills, knowledge and R&D in the 
resource market are critical to driving productivity and as a result, increasing levels 
of output and economic growth. They diverge in terms of where these drivers are 
determined; endogenous growth theorists argue that the drivers of productivity 
originate within the economy in response to demand for the factors of production to 
produce more output; exogenous growth theorists alternatively argue that the 
drivers of productivity originate outside the economy independent of demand or 
levels of output.   
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The proximate determinants of growth are the primary focus of the 
neoclassical model of economic growth. This provides a conceptually 
straightforward decomposition of the sources of economic growth. The proximate 
determinants of economic growth are of course influenced, by a host of various 
indirect determinants.  Neoclassicism does not completely ignore these deeper 
determinants of output, but measures them indirectly as the aggregate exogenous 
measure of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. Neoclassicism judges the extent to which 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 alters the proximate 
determinants, and then calculates the effect of these changes on output.  This has 
resulted in the development of increasing empirical research into the deep 
determinants of factor accumulation, productivity and economic performance, which 
will be explored in Chapter 4.   
 Beyond the theories of economic growth explored in this Chapter there are 
other more broad-ranging concepts of economic growth, including considering 
sustainable or balanced economic growth or development of wellbeing, which are 
closer to measuring welfare objectives and may be more complicated and harder to 
quantify. However, these concepts are beyond the scope of this thesis.  This study 
focuses on how economic growth may be used as a barometer of the economic 
activity within an economy. This study will contend that the stage of development of 
a country’s economy is critical for comparing economic performance between 
countries. In particular the importance of measuring economic growth provides an 
understanding of how national economies distribute and use their scare resources.   
In managing the economy, governments aim to achieve: i) full employment 
of labour; ii) stability of prices; iii) sustainable economic growth; iv) equilibrium of 
balance of payments; and v) distribution of income.  Economic growth can lead to 
increased employment, contributing to increased national revenue from taxes and 
increased consumption of goods and services. Increased employment, could lead to 
increased government spending to provide public goods and increased 
consumption could encourage increased spending, while reducing savings.  
Economic growth is the measure of an economy’s continual improvement in 
its productive capacity to meet the demand for goods and services, leading to 
increased and improved production of goods and services (Syverson, 2011). 
Measured in the long-run, economic growth is structural in nature, in terms of the 
reallocation of productive resources among different sectors within the economy 
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(Stern, 1991; Gabardo, Pereima, & Einloft, 2017). The nature of the structural 
change is the continual shift of factor inputs to production from lower to higher 
productivity sectors, which contributes to increasing production and efficiency within 
the economy.  Economic growth suggests that there has been allocative and 
productive efficiency of factor inputs in the resource markets towards their most 
efficient uses in the production markets.   
Increased supply of goods and services can be achieved through: i) 
increasing the level of output of human effort (labour); ii) increasing the 
effectiveness of capital stocks such as buildings, machinery and tools and 
intermediate products used in the production of consumer goods and services; iii) 
how efficiently an economy utilises its labour and capital stocks; and v) the strength 
and changes to the national labour force and the pace of investment in 
accumulating capital stock. Depending on whether supply side or demand side 
driven growth is occurring there are different implications for economic actors and 
investors and their decisions to invest in accumulating factors of production, 
expanding production or otherwise. Ultimately, assessing economic growth can help 
economic actors and investors understand what is happening in both the resource 
and product markets. 
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CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUALISING INSTITUTIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 investigated the theoretical origins of economic growth and how these 
theories suggest that economic growth could be measured and decomposed. 
Chapter 2 also introduced the concept of the fundamental determinants of economic 
growth. This Chapter 3 will review the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of 
institutions as a fundamental determinant of economic growth and their relationship 
with the proximate determinants of economic growth. This Chapter will begin with a 
brief assessment of the theoretical approaches to defining institutions in Sections 
3.2 and 3.3.  This Chapter will then discuss the theoretical approaches to 
categorising institutions in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. The exposition of these theoretical 
underpinnings will provide the background for the further discussion of the 
relationship between economic growth, productivity and institutions in Chapter 4. 
The theoretical approaches surveyed in this Chapter suggest that as a 
fundamental determinant of economic growth, institutions may have a role in 
shaping incentives and constraints for the accumulation of labour and capital within 
the resource and product markets and the choice to invest in technological 
progress. This Chapter will briefly identify some of the theoretical mechanisms 
suggested for these relationships.  This Chapter will conclude with an assessment 
of how institutions are theoretically perceived and highlight the mechanisms through 
which the theory suggests institutions act as fundamental determinants of economic 
growth.  This summary will provide support for the discussion in Chapter 4 which will 
establish the conceptual framework that will be used for this study.    
 
3.2 Theoretical approaches to defining institutions  
Institutions are multifaceted and defined by social scientists in many ways from 
several different contexts, from political, evolutionary to historical.  The common 
theme in defining institutions has been the importance of institutions for decision-
making and ensuring stability and certainty, rendering collective action feasible. To 
understand how institutions, accomplish these roles within the economy, it is 
necessary to identify a clear definition that will help with their identification, 
categorisation and analysis. This section will briefly outline some of theoretical 
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definitions of institutions, including the distinction between the rational choice and 
historical definition of institutions and the new institutional economics and 
neoclassical definitions of institutions.  
 
3.2.1 Rational choice and historical approaches of defining institutions 
Institutions are the infrastructure of social relationships; institutions are a collective 
from the perspective of historically accumulated systems of rights, duties and 
obligations at work in the present. Institutions set the framework of prevalent social 
rules that bring order to social interaction. This section will briefly assess the 
theoretical constructs of the rational and historical definitions of institutions. As 
societies develop structures that determine the distribution of resources and rules 
for social order, they slowly develop into the institutions that contain the tacit and 
explicit knowledge of the rules by which the society will operate. Institutions 
condition the control, expansion and liberation of individual action of social and 
economic actors within any society, economy or community. 
From the historical perspective, institutions are the norms of behaviour that 
were enforced through ‘social sanction’ (Nelson & Sampat, 2001).  Historical 
institutionalist defined institutions from the context of their persistence and posit that 
formal institutions that create, enforce and apply laws matter most (Amenta & 
Ramsey, 2010).  Rational choice institutionalism borrowed from rational choice 
economics and focus on how individuals use institutions to maximise their interests 
(Weingast, 2002), defining institutions in the context of their role in constraining 
individual behaviour.  Institutions are viewed by rational theorists, in terms of the 
outcome of self-enforcing behaviour that confirms associated beliefs and 
regenerates associated norms (Greif, 2006). From the rational choice perspective, 
institutions make it possible for economic agents to make decisions during 
informational failure occurring when one party to an economic transaction enjoys 
greater fundamental knowledge than the other party to the transaction (‘information 
asymmetry’).  
 Together the historical and rational perspectives provide units of analysis to 
explain the relevance of the origin of the institutional environment. The past, 
encapsulates institutional elements, the current institutional framework reflects the 
impact of these past institutional elements. The current national institutional 
40 
 
framework becomes embodied in individual preferences and establishes beliefs 
about what would be expected, normative and socially accepted behaviour in the 
economy, society or community.  
 
3.2.2 New institutional economics and neoclassical approaches of 
institutions 
Considered a heterodox school of economic thought, as its theoretical 
underpinnings are beyond the mainstream or orthodox schools of economic 
thought, new institutional theorists (‘NIE’) such as Coase (1937), Alchian and 
Demsetz (1973), Williamson (2000), Greif (2006) and Aoki (2011) adopt a rational 
choice approach and define institutions in terms of their embedded behavioural 
attributes. NIE emphasises the emergence of institutions to provide structure to 
exchange interactions. Conversely, neoclassical theorists do not explicitly consider 
institutions, when examining the process of exchange interactions within the 
economy. Neoclassical theorists such as Smith (1776), Swan (1956), Solow (1957), 
North (1991) and Dequech (2013) acknowledged the capacity of institutions to 
increase the allocative efficiency of the factors of production, but take for granted 
their existence within the economic system.  
 The neoclassical approach to defining institutions is based on the 
assumption that rational economic actors make decisions to maximise their 
opportunities and future benefits and argue that economic outcomes are the result 
of individual choice (North, 2016).  Conversely, NIE theorists defined institutions 
primarily based on collective behavioural regularities, including instincts and habits. 
For NIE, individual choice is motivated by the collective acceptance of the expected 
behaviour and habits of individuals within the society.  Conversely, neoclassicism 
focuses on individual choice driven by the desire to maximise outcomes and 
benefits, rather than considering the expected norms of behaviour. Hayek  
succinctly encapsulated the neoclassical approach to institutions when he stated 
that institutions arise ‘spontaneously as by-products of individual choices, rather 
than deliberately through collective action’ (cited in Huggins, 2013, p. 5).   
The neoclassical approach to defining institutions considers the potential for 
informational asymmetry and asserts that economic actors understand the contexts 
in which they operate and make choices based not just in rationality, but on the 
41 
 
assessment of appropriateness, their objectives and the opportunities and sanctions 
they face. The NIE approach to defining institutions tends to concentrate on the 
emergence and evolution of institutions. Like the neoclassical approach, the NIE 
perspective also placing emphasis on self-interested rational agents. The lines of 
demarcation between the neoclassical and NIE approach to defining institutions are 
hazy at best. The difference in their approaches are how they consider institutions 
function within the economic system.  While neoclassicism takes institutions for 
granted, as part of the ‘black box’ of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, NIE argue that institutions can be 
specifically identified within the economic system. More particularly, NIE contend 
that institutions are one of the fundamental determinants of economic performance 
that influences the performance and productivity of the factors of production.   
 
3.3 Theoretical definitions of institutions 
The definition of institutions has been through several theoretical iterations.  From 
being defined as a shared set of rules, to settled habits of thought and more recently 
as human devised constraints that limit and define individual choice and social rules 
that structure social interaction. In estimating the role of institutions in the process of 
decision making within the markets and ensuring stability and certainty, it has been 
suggested that institutions render collective action feasible.  Inherent in their role in 
the decision-making process, institutions become the infrastructure of social 
relationships.  Within the resource and product markets there will be instances of 
informational asymmetry.  This section will survey how the extant theory considers 
that institutions contribute to the basic and stable systems that govern the incentives 
of economic agents and coordinate their activities within the markets, mitigating 
against potential market failures or inefficiency arising from information 
asymmetries. 
 
3.3.1 What are institutions? 
Institutions become the constituent components of social and political life within the 
economy. The preferences, capabilities and basic self-identities of economic agents 
are habituated to the institutional structures within the economy.  An economy’s 
institutional environment sets the framework of prevalent social rules that not only 
structure social relationships (North, 1989) but exchange within the resource and 
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product markets (Leite, Silva, & Afonso, 2014).  Although institutions are varied in 
form and content they can be defined and classified based on their effect on 
transactions and exchanges within the markets. Their primary effect is to provide 
predictability of behaviour of economic actors (individuals, firms and governments), 
thereby encouraging economic agents to contract amongst each other (Nelson & 
Sampat, 2001).  Institutions condition the control, expansion and liberation of 
individual action of economic actors. Within the product and resource markets, 
institutions set the ‘rules of the game’ by codifying, constraining, prescribing and 
sanctioning habits, customs, instincts and systems of operation within the economy 
(North, 1990, p. 3).  
Institutions as ‘rules of the game’ set the framework within which economic 
actors interact within the markets and despite informational asymmetries, build upon 
their ‘mutually shared and legitimate expectations’. These include concepts such as 
language, money, legal systems, systems of weights and measures, traffic 
conventions, corporate governance and firms. The existence of institutions 
influences the behaviour of economic actors within the economy; they can influence 
greater participation, by creating an environment that provides incentives to invest 
and protection of private property (Leite et al., 2014).  Exchange within the markets 
are facilitated by institutions that mitigate against potential hazards of trade 
(including weak property rights protection), establish governance structures that 
reduce costs, encourage capital formation and capital mobility, permits risks to be 
priced and shared and otherwise facilitates coordination of resources within the 
economy (Leite et al., 2014).  As a form of governance within the markets, 
institutions determine the efficiency inter alia with which economic relationships 
such as contracts, employment, supply or credit are implemented.   
 
3.3.2 Defining institutions as formal rules or informal norms 
This section will assess the literature that defines institutions as either ‘formal’ rules 
or ‘informal’ norms of behaviour.  Institutions are endogenous and not generated by 
themselves or capable of existing without external support, they are incapable of 
accomplishing much on their own. Institutions gain their structure, form and force 
from within the economic system. Institutions are legitimised and adhered to, based 
on their outcomes and their ability to be enforced.  The process of legitimising 
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institutions requires individual and collective agency by economic actors and 
governments voluntarily permitting their actions and decisions to be constrained by 
the form and force of the institutions. This section will briefly examine the literature 
that suggests that the contrast between institutions as formal rules and informal 
norms is critical to the role of institutions within the economic system.     
  Institutions are specified in formal terms such as constitutions, statute, 
common laws and contracts (Carey, 2000).  Ostrom (1986) asserted that rules are 
not only formal precepts, but are known, used and legitimised because of explicit 
collective efforts to achieve order and predictability. Formal rules encompass 
instances of regulatory precepts, such as whether it is illegal to sleep in public.  
Breaches can be easily and explicitly identified and the community to which they 
apply can be easily defined (Williamson, 2000). Institutions as formal rules, arise to 
fill gaps in the market; they provide structure to exchange in an environment of 
asymmetrical information (North, 2016).  
Conversely, informal norms of behaviour, customary practices, conventions 
and traditions, (Hall, 1992) are ‘deep’, ‘slow-moving’ institutions based in culture and 
ideologies, subject to shifts in collective values and beliefs.  Rather than being 
explicit and easily identified, informal norms form part of the tacit knowledge of a 
community, society or economic system (Dequech, 2013). It is more challenging to 
identify and quantify informal norms of behaviour, as they do not show up in formal 
terms.  They become observable through the regularity of behaviour (Tauheed, 
2013). 
While formal rules may provide a series of distinct and potentially 
overlapping, yet predicable and stable patterns for interaction, informal norms 
provide efficacy to the formal rules.  Together they form the institutional 
arrangements that are determined by interests and ideologies within a society. As 
governance structures, institutions determine the efficiency with which economic 
relationships inter alia such as contracts of employment, for supply or for credit are 
implemented.   
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3.4 Theoretical approaches to categorising institutions  
This section will then investigate the extant literature on the categorisation of 
institutions.  The investigation of the role of institutions in economic performance 
has often used broad and inadequate definitions of institutions.  In less formal 
terms, institutions have been considered the rules of the game within a society 
directed at shaping the incentives for exchange transactions.  Though in most cases 
it is accepted, this broad definition focuses primarily on the obstacles that are 
confronted when examining institutions, namely the failure to clearly specify which 
institutions are being addressed in relation of the range of possible categories of 
institutions.  Some research has questioned the flawed approach of not recognising 
the endogeneity of institutions and that it is necessary to unbundle institutions into 
easy to understand categories.  
 Some studies simply capture an economies’ institutional environment as a 
composite of institutions. This oversimplification clusters varying categories of 
institutions into one compound measure, making it difficult to draw material 
inferences from the empirical results. Given this ambiguity, it is worth exploring the 
various broad categorisations used in empirical studies. Roland (2004) identified 
two approaches to classifying institutions: the functional approach and the 
macrosystemic approach. This section will briefly outline these two approaches. 
Table (3.1) summarises the categorisations of institutions from either the 
macrosystemic or functional approach. 
 
3.4.1 The Macrosystemic approach to categorising institutions 
This approach categorises institutions along of range of general rules (for example, 
political, legal, social institutions), to specific rules (for example, electoral rules, rules 
affecting legislative bargaining).  This perspective focuses on a comparative 
analysis of the outcome or effect of institutions. This approach tends to focus 
primarily on the political rules that constrain government action or self-enforce 
government choice (Persson & Tabellini, 2003).  It uses game theory to determine 
the relevance of different political rules, including the choice of polity.   
An examination of the extant literature reveals various categorisations of 
institutions.  This section will now explore the implication of adopting the 
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macrosystemic approach to categorising institutions. ‘Good’, ‘bad’ and ‘weak’ are 
used by scholars in reference to their description of the efficiency of institutions 
within the economic system (Acemoglu, 2006; Aisen & Veiga, 2013; Tebaldi & 
Elmslie, 2013; Adams-Kane & Lim, 2016; Afonso & Jalles, 2016). Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) devised the terms ‘inclusive’ and ‘extractive’ to describe whether 
institutional frameworks encourage economic activity, technological development 
and knowledge creation and the diffusion of political power.  
 
3.4.1.1 Institutions categorised as ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘weak’ 
Adopting a macrosystemic approach, it can be logically concluded that ‘good’ 
institutions are efficient institutions that cause better decision making and fill the gap 
of information asymmetry. When institutions are ‘good’, moral values and beliefs 
enhance cooperation among individuals within the society. Efficient institutions 
define the constraints within which individuals can carry out their activities; they 
enable transactions at a lower cost (Bhaumik & Dimova, 2014).  ‘Good’ institutions 
are characterised by their ability to inter alia: i) ensure protection of private property 
rights and enforcement of contracts; and ii) filling the gaps of information asymmetry 
through providing opportunities to invest and retain control of the return on those 
investments, control of inflation and open exchange of currency (Diamond, 2012).  
Using the same macrosystemic logic, it can be argued that institutions are 
categorised as either ‘bad’, ‘weak’ or ‘inefficient’ where rules are absent, suboptimal 
or poorly enforced. ‘Weak’ connotes failure (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).  There 
have been empirical studies that suggest that ‘weak’, ‘poor’ or ‘bad’ institutions are 
the result of colonial and legal origins (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Glaeser, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004), ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (Easterly & 
Levine, 1997), resource endowments (Sachs & Warner, 2001; Collier, 2010) and 
religious homogeneity (Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 2003).  Alternatively, 
where rules do exist, they may also be counterproductive or impose excessive 
controls, also resulting in bad or weak institutions (Diamond, 2012).  
Neither term is the absolute opposite of the other. Furthermore, ‘good’, 
‘efficient’, ‘inefficient’, ‘weak’, ‘bad’ or ‘poor’ can only apply to ex post analysis of 
outcomes. The dichotomy between good, efficient, bad, weak, inefficient is by no 
means rigid and inherently depends on a subjective assessment of the resulting 
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outcomes of economic actions. This raises questions of what specific form 
institutions should take, to be good, bad, efficient, inefficient or weak and whether 
these would differ across economies based on their level of development, initial 
conditions or levels of investment in factor accumulation. Table (3.1) identifies 
empirical studies that categorise institutions as ‘good’; ‘efficient’; ‘inefficient’; ‘weak’; 
‘bad’ or ‘poor’. 
 
3.4.1.2 Institutions categorised as either ‘inclusive’ or ‘extractive’  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) building upon the work of Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997) also adopted a macrosystemic approach and identified a new categorisation 
to explain the difference between institutions that favoured inequality and those that 
favour the accumulation of wealth. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012) agree that ‘extractive’ institutional systems serve individual 
interests, rather than the economy as a whole, and inhibit economic opportunities.  
Extractive and inclusive institutions can only persist within a framework of certain 
types of political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu, Ticchi, & 
Vindigni, 2011). Extractive political institutions consolidate political power in the 
hands of a few, without constraints, checks and balances and give rise to extractive 
economic institutions.  Likewise, inclusive political institutions allow expansive 
participation; impose restrictions, and constraints on politicians, producing inclusive 
economic institutions.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) opine that extractive institutions are the 
result of European colonialization.  The colonization strategy determined the 
character of the rules established in individual colonies (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2008). These implanted rules ignored the pre-existing informal norms and 
ideologies of these societies. Geography dictated the settlement strategy that would 
eventually give rise to the institutional frameworks imposed by the coloniser. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) maintain that these artificially imposed rules 
resulted in institutional frameworks that gave rise to structural inequality that 
supported accumulation of wealth, as opposed to accumulation of factors of 
production and inhibited efficiency within the economic system.  
However, the distinction between extractive and inclusive remains arbitrary. 
Neither term is the opposite of the other. The opposite of inclusive is exclusive, 
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while the opposite of extractive is insertion. These classifications are axiomatic, 
derived from observing actual outcomes that define them based on whether the 
economies were failing or not - ‘extractive’ institutions fail and ‘inclusive’ institutions 
do not.  There is no sense of what should be ‘inclusive’ relative to ‘extractive’ from 
one society to another, other than exploring their historical context.  However, 
factual examples do not support this distinction. There are examples of economies 
like China, Chile (1973 to 1990) and Taiwan with ‘non-inclusive’ political institutions 
that are exhibiting strong economic growth. Table (3.1) identifies empirical studies 
that categorise institutions as either extractive or inclusive. 
 
3.4.2 The functional approach to categorising institutions 
Roland (2004) suggests that the functional approach categorises institutions by their 
ability to meet the needs of efficient contracting and investing.  In other words, 
specific institutions correspond to a particular need to regulate interactions within 
the economy (for example, writing contracts; enforce contracts; secure investment; 
supply of public goods and infrastructure by the government and so on).  This 
approach provides a very straightforward framework to think about how institutions 
perform a range of functions within the economic system.  The functional approach 
to categorising institutions inevitably subsumes the macrosystemic approach as it 
categorises political institutions on the premise of their function within the economy, 
rather than their effect on outcomes. The functional approach to categorising 
institutions prioritises function over effect and argues that an institutions’ function, 
will determine its effect.  
The two macrosystemic categorisations explored in Sections 3.4.1.1 and 
3.4.1.2, acknowledge that the economic system has both political institutions that 
constrain the executive and allocate power and economic institutions that allocates 
resources, set the parameters for exchange and transactions within the economic 
system. The literature also agrees that there is an interrelationship between political 
institutions and economic institutions. Institutions have been categorised as either 
‘political’ or ‘economic’ in reference to the specific societal function that they perform 
within the system (North, 1992; Weingast, 1995; North, 2003; Wiggans & Davis, 
2006; Leite et al., 2014). Economic institutions stimulate economic growth only 
when political institutions create effective restraint on the behaviour of power-
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holders, to prevent their monopolisation of the market through rent seeking. This 
section will examine the extant literature that adopt a functional approach to 
categorising institutions as either political or economic based on their role within the 
economy. 
 
3.4.2.1 Institutions categorised as either political and economic 
Economic institutions organise economic activity (Leite et al., 2014).  They construct 
incentives for actors to take part in the economy and in particular prompts 
investments in physical and human capital and technology, and the management of 
production (Acemoglu et al., 2004). Economic institutions achieve this through 
setting rules and expectations of behaviour amongst economic actors. By setting 
these rules of behaviour, they can reduce uncertainty and risk in economic 
exchanges Rodrik (2000). Different economic institutions will tend to lead to different 
distribution of resources, which can give rise to conflict amongst groups and 
individuals regarding the choice of economic institutions.   
Politics and political institutions determine what economic institutions a 
country will have. The choice of institutions is the direct result of the collective action 
of individuals within the society that hold the political power (Davis, 2010). The 
administration of political power amongst different groups or social classes is a 
primary driver of the choice and structure of economic institutions. The state should 
be strong and stable enough to be able to provide public goods and establish 
governance enhancing economic institutions, such as legal protection of private 
property (Besley & Persson, 2010). The central feature of a secure political system 
is that it is ‘credibly committed’ to safeguard markets, through self-enforced limited 
political preference (Weingast, 1995).   
The distribution of political institutions can constrain the executive and 
influence the allocation of resources, while reflecting the underlying collective 
informal norms and ideologies of power relationships within the society and 
economy. Economic institutions are not self-emerging, but arise endogenously 
through the operation of political institutions. The literature agrees that both 
economic institutions and political institutions that can effectively constrain the 
executive and allocate resources, while protecting private property rights and 
enforce contracts matter for economic growth.  
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Table 3.1: Approached to categorisation of institutions in empirical studies 
Categorisation of 
Institutions Key Arguments Studies 
Good institutions 
Efficient institutions 
These types of institutions are 
those structures and systems that 
are most likely to increase 
economic growth.  
Ethnic homogeneity should result 
in good institutions and pro-growth 
policies. 
Good institutions aid efficiency and 
reduce uncertainty in exchange 
transactions. 
 
Aisen & Veiga (2013),  
Tebaldi & Elmslie (2013), 
Adams-Kane & Lim (2016), 
Afonso & Jalles (2016)  
 
 
 
 
Weak institutions 
Inferior institutions 
Inefficient institutions 
Institutions may be weak where 
rules are not present, negligible or 
poorly enforced.  
Economies with inferior institutions 
will invest less in knowledge and 
technology and be less innovative.  
Institutions that do not maximise 
economic growth potential are 
weak, inferior or inefficient.  
 
Aaron (2000),  
Farole, Rodríguez-Pose, and 
Storper (2010),  
Diamond (2012) 
Extractive and inclusive 
institutions 
Extractive institutions have 
persisted from colonisation. 
Extractive institutions do not 
provide protection of private 
property or allow for restraint and 
balances against government 
expropriation of private property.  
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001),   
Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012),  
d'Agostino and Scarlato (2012)  
Abad and van Zanden (2016), 
Schein (2016),  
Rocha Menocal (2017) 
Political institutions Political institutions restrain public 
officials and are critical to positive 
economic growth.   
Economic institutions have a 
greater impact on economic growth 
where political institutions are 
strong.  
 
Knack and Keefer (1995),  
Hall and Jones (1999),  
Rodrik (1999);  
Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
Glaeser et al. (2004),  
Angeles (2010),     
d'Agostino and Scarlato (2012)     
Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013) 
 
Economic institutions Economic institutions are derived 
from political institutions.  
Economic institutions protect 
property rights and enforcing 
contracts. Economic institutions 
determine economic actors’ 
incentives to invest in factor 
accumulation and trade within the 
economic system.  
 
Rodrik et al. (2004),  
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005),  
Law and Habibullah (2006)  
Haggard and Tiede (2011), 
Farhadi, Islam, and Moslehi 
(2015) 
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3.5 The role of political and economic institutions within 
the economic system   
That institutions are critical for economic performance has been conclusively 
proven.  Despite this consensus, the earlier sections highlight the mixed empirical 
results about the category of institutions and the nature of institutions that are 
important for economic performance.  It could be argued that the oversimplified 
categorisation of institutions as either political or economic may fail to support a 
meaningful interpretation of earlier empirical studies.  It is acknowledge that there 
are many features of the function of institutions that are yet to be appropriately 
categorised.  However, in the absence of conclusive theoretical approaches the 
categorisation as political or economic provides a credible foundation for a clearer 
classification of the myriad function of institutions within the economic system to 
either create or deepen markets. This is pertinent for the investigation of the role of 
institutions within the economy.  The following section of this Chapter will examine 
literature that further classifies different political and economic institutions based on 
their function in either creating or deepening the resource and product markets in 
support of factor accumulation and productivity. 
 
3.5.1 Market-creating political and economic institutions 
Market-creating institutions create complete and contingent resource and product 
markets. Market creating institutions encapsulate the extent to which existing 
institutions for conflict resolution bolster the emergence or growth of markets where 
economic actors feel confident that they can engage in mutually beneficial economic 
activities. Market-creating institutions will tend to reduce transactions costs, 
encouraging higher volume of transactions, factor accumulation and investment in 
skills, knowledge and R&D in the resource market.  Likewise, social conflict 
institutions create a level playing field and enhance internal security (Rodrik, 2000).  
 In the absence of market-creating institutions, markets for exchange of 
goods and services would not exist or would perform poorly (Voigt & Gutmann, 
2013).  Market-creating institutions allow economic actors to interact, transact and 
make goods and services in the knowledge that their economic profit will be within 
their control (Das & Quirk, 2016).  The market-creating effect encourages trust and 
cooperation amongst economic actors, businesses and the state and support the 
51 
 
emergence or growth of markets. They include those political and economic 
institutions that protect the individual and their property and enforce contracts.  
 
3.5.2 Market-deepening political and economic institutions 
Market-deepening institutions create efficiency within the resource and product 
markets. They include those regulatory political and economic institutions that 
mitigate against market failures, agency problems and establish arrangements for 
corporate governance and accountability of policy makers. These include 
institutions of macroeconomic stabilisation, which reduce uncertainty in the capital 
and labour markets and encourage sustainable extensive economic growth, through 
increased accumulation of capital and labour. Lauridsen (2012) contends that 
political and economic institutions that enhance the efficiency of public policy and 
mitigate against the risk of anti-competitive behaviour, free-riding and rent-seeking 
by corporate actors can deepen labour and capital markets, for example, economic 
institutions that regulate taxation, trade and investment.   
 Market-deepening institutions emphasise that economic actors are 
imperfectly coordinated by the market alone and that economising on transaction 
costs is the key to successful economic performance. Making markets more efficient 
involves economic institutions that reduce the costs of transactions, support the 
mechanisms for securing property rights and political institutions that enforce 
bureaucratic procedures and increase the credibility of government decision-
making.  Market efficiency mitigates informational asymmetry (Wang, Zhou, & Chen, 
2011).  Market efficiency contributes to providing incentives for increased 
investments and volume of contracting (Ugur, 2010). Political and economic 
institutions that have a market deepening function reduce the incidence of 
macroeconomic volatility and the likelihood of economies suffering from resource 
misallocation and distortions.  By curbing, legal, political and bureaucratic rents, 
market-deepening institutions reduce the cost of enforcing property rights and 
increase the benefits to be derived from market creating institutions (Siddiqui & 
Ahmed, 2013). 
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3.5.3 Rodrik’s categorisation of market-deepening and market-creating 
institutions 
Rodrik (2000) examined the functioning of economic and political institutions in 
aligning the incentives of economic actors. He developed a taxonomy of institutions 
that identified four key functions of institutions within the economy; i) market-
creating; ii) market-regulating; iii) market-stabilising; and iv) market-legitimising.  
Rodrik’s taxonomy specifies a useful structure for examining the different 
mechanisms through which different categories of political and economic institutions 
can affect long-run economic performance. Rodrik (2000) envisaged that both 
political and economic institutions that perform these key functions within the 
economy protect against market coordination failure. 
 Each of these categories of institutions is related to a need within the 
market. For example, any type of market exchange will presuppose the existence of 
property rights and some form of contract enforcement. Using Rodrik’s taxonomy, 
political and economic institutions can be more specifically categorised in terms of 
their function as either creating or deepening the market. Market-creating and 
market-legitimising institutions refer to those political and economic institutions that 
are instrumental for economic exchange, regulating interaction, transactions and 
exchanges amongst economic actors and the state (Rodrik, 2005). While market-
regulating and market-stabilising political and economic institutions contribute to the 
deepening of markets (Ugur, 2010).   
 Though not strictly market creating, market-legitimising institutions support 
the creation of markets through regulating social conflict and creating a level playing 
field within the economy. Market-legitimising institutions reduce potential market 
coordination failure by redistributing and managing social conflict, providing social 
protection and insurance in the event of shock (Rodrik, 2005).  Conflicts increase 
the risk and costs of transactions and diverts resources from accumulation, 
diminishing productivity.  Institutions that regulate conflict management can mitigate 
against opportunistic behaviour aimed at amassing a disproportionate share of 
resources (Siddiqui & Ahmed, 2013). Institutions that provide social insurance and 
social protection, like unemployment benefits, government pensions, public health 
care, reduce social divisions and distributional gaps that arise along lines of wealth, 
ethnic identity and geography within the market.  
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 Market-regulating institutions mitigate against fraudulent and anti-
competitive behaviour by economic actors. Market-regulating political and economic 
institutions are those rules and norms that are enforced in response to situations of 
market failure and are aimed at sustaining economic growth over the long-run 
(Rodrik, 2005).  Regulatory institutions coordinate conduct in goods, services, 
labour, asset and financial markets. For example, employment regulations regarding 
working hours and hiring and firing practices regulate the labour markets, increasing 
the efficiency of the labour markets, deepening their operation and mitigating 
against market failure and agency problems. Market-regulating institutions 
contribute to providing economic actors with incentives to investment and increase 
the volume of contracting and reduce the incidence of externalities and market 
failures. These institutions reduce the cost of enforcing market-creating institutions 
and increase the benefits to be derived from market-creating institutions by ensuring 
that they are more evenly distributed within the economy (Siddiqui & Ahmed, 2013). 
 Economies are not self-stabilising (Rodrik, 2000). Market-stabilising 
institutions are those institutions that enable markets to develop resilience against 
shocks, reduce inflationary pressure, minimise macroeconomic volatility and avert 
financial crisis (Rodrik, 2005).  Market-stabilising political and economic institutions 
stabilise the functions of the market, they include monetary policies designed to 
regulate the size and extent of growth of the money supply, which affects the 
stability of interest rates. Market-stabilising institutions reduce uncertainty and 
encourage investment and long-run productivity by protecting the market against 
external shocks (Bhattacharyya, 2009). This category of political and economic 
institutions provides a system within the market that enables investors to divest 
themselves of risks. 
 
3.6 Summary 
The way institutions are categorised is important for interpreting their effects. 
Categorisations as ‘good’ or ‘weak’, ‘extractive’ or ‘inclusive’, ‘efficient’ or ‘inefficient’ 
may be artificial and axiomatic, providing no real indication of the quality of 
institutions, but providing a description of the effect of their outcomes. These 
axiomatic and parsimonious categorisations of institutions have resulted in the call 
for the use of much more robust techniques for identifying and quantifying 
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institutions in the investigation of the role of institutions on economic performance. 
The only distinction that has withstood empirical and theoretical scrutiny is between 
political and economic institutions. The categorisation of institutions as either 
political or economic has provided the most useful unit of analysis to explain the 
relationship amongst informal norms and formal rules, accumulation of capital and 
labour, productivity and economic growth.   
While some studies categorise institutions based on their outcome or effect 
of institutions, others categorise institutions by the function they perform within the 
economy. This latter approach, provides a more straightforward framework within 
which to examine the influence of institutions within the economy, which prioritises 
function over effect.  The functional categorisation of institutions as either political or 
economic acknowledges the complexity of the role of institutions as either creating 
or deepening the resource and produce markets. Yet the simplistic categorisation of 
institutions as merely political and economic has proven insufficient to elucidate the 
relationship between institutions and the economic system. This has led to the 
further functional categorisation of political or economic institutions as either market-
creating or market-deepening.  This functional categorisation has been taken a step 
further by Rodrik (2000) who developed a taxonomy of institutions based on four 
key functions; market-creating, market-regulating, market-stabilising and market-
legitimising.  While this taxonomy provides a useful method with which to examine 
the different mechanisms through which different categories of political and 
economic institutions can affect long-run economic growth, there has been no 
consensus on the relationship between these categories of institutions and the 
proximate determinants or productivity. 
Market-regulating and market-stabilising institutions reduce uncertainty in 
the market and encourage sustainable economic growth, thereby having a market-
deepening effect in the economic system.  Markets that are more efficient reduce 
the impact of externalities and market failures and reduce macroeconomic 
unpredicabiilty. Market-deepening institutions support the function of market-
creating and market-legitimising institutions, such as, supporting the enforcement of 
property rights. 
  
55 
 
Market-creating and market-legitimising institutions not only create the 
markets within the economic system, but also provide social insurance and support 
systems for risk sharing.  By legitimising the market, they ensure social cohesion 
and stability, reducing social conflict that can potentially divert resources from 
productive activities. These institutions could contribute to the reduction of 
transaction costs, security of private property and enforcement of bureaucratic 
procedures that increase market participation and investment in factor 
accumulation, skills, knowledge and R&D.  
The combined effect of market-creating and market-deepening institutions is 
to encourage and support economic actors and economic decision-making to 
engage in mutually beneficial activities through interaction and conclusion of 
contracts. They enable economic actors to achieve higher overall returns on a given 
capacity of contracting by decreasing transaction costs.  The combined effect of 
these institutions underpins the incentive for investing in factor accumulation and 
productivity.  
The theoretical case for the significance of institutions for economic growth, 
is that they matter as determinants of the costs and benefits of undertaking growth-
enhancing activities, such as the accumulating physical and human capital or 
participating in international trade.  If that is indeed the case, then these factors 
should be only intermediary channels through which institutions are associated with 
economic growth and they should not be controlled for in estimations aimed at 
examining the overall effect of institutions on economic growth.  In other words, 
physical and human capital and trade openness are the outcomes of the institutional 
infrastructure and their inclusion would include some of the growth effects that 
should ultimately be ascribed to institutions. 
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CHAPTER 4 COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY AND INSTITUTIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The conceptual framework for this thesis is based upon the relationship amongst 
the proximate determinants, productivity and institutions as fundamental 
determinants of economic growth. The theory surveyed in Chapter 2 has highlighted 
the origins of endogenous and exogenous economic growth theoretical perspectives 
of the role of the proximate determinants of economic growth. Both theories suggest 
that economic growth is driven in part by the impact of technological advancements 
on the efficient allocation and use of the factors of production.  They both agree that 
skills, knowledge and R&D contribute to the relative efficiency and productivity of 
labour and capital. This functional relationship occurs within the resource markets. 
The exogenous neoclassicism theory further posits that investment in capital in the 
resource market contributes to the relative productivity of labour. One of the 
constituent assumptions of the neoclassical economic growth theory, propounded 
by Solow (1994) is that economies that use similar technology, should have 
converging rates of productivity.  This assumption is predicated on the further 
assumption that knowledge and technology are independent of capital and labour 
and are non-rival goods that are free for use by all businesses within an economy.  
 Chapter 2 has highlighted that there is a lack of consensus on how to 
quantify productivity.  While the endogenous growth theories endogenise 
productivity, measured as the level of technological progress, exogenous growth 
theorists consider that productivity occurs outside the economic system and can be 
quantified by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 measured as anything that contributes to economic performance 
that is not otherwise accounted for as capital or labour. It is within the context of this 
lack of consensus that the extant literature has failed to provide a consistent 
measure of productivity. This lack of consensus and consistency on the 
quantification of productivity has led to different assumptions on the corresponding 
importance of productivity for economic growth of economies with different levels of 
national income.   
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Section 4.2 surveys the extant empirical literature that adopts an exogenous 
approach to decomposing economic growth. For sustained long-run economic 
growth, there must be a measure of productivity that supports the efficient allocation 
and deployment of the proximate determinants of economic growth within the 
resource and product markets. This survey will explore the continued empirical 
disagreement on how productivity should be measured and disagreement on the 
relative importance of accumulation of capital and labour versus productivity.    
This research will suggest that the neoclassical model of economic growth 
provides a consistent theoretical grounding for the focus on the proximate 
determinants of economic growth.  Solow’s inclusion of the residual 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in the 
simple Cobb-Douglas production function, expands the basic neoclassical model of 
economic growth to take account of those deeper determinants that can influence 
the productivity of capital and labour.  This has given rise to burgeoning literature 
that has attempted to quantify those deeper determinants of the productivity of 
capital and labour.   
The theory explored in Chapter 3 tend to agree that there may be an 
association between political and economic institutions and economic growth. More 
recent literature suggests that institutions win out as a more fundamental deep 
determinant of economic growth. The extant literature has identified that institutions 
can override the impact of geography, luck or culture and trade openness.  In fact, 
some of the empirical literature would suggest that geography and trade openness 
have a relation to levels of economic growth, in the presence of appropriate 
institutional infrastructure (Easterly & Levine, 2001; Lauridsen, 2012). This 
suggestion puts the focus on the critical role that institutions can play in influencing 
decisions within the resource market and resultant levels of productivity.  As 
resource markets develop, either spontaneously or are deliberately constructed, 
they require institutional frameworks that protect against the diversion of free trade 
of goods and services within the resource market, by either predation, high costs of 
exchange or information asymmetries.   
Chapter 3 examined some of the issues in the theoretical definition of 
institutions.  Chapter 3 highlighted that the underlying assumption is that institutions 
are those endogenous building blocks of social and political exchange within the 
economy. Institutions as either formal rules or informal norms provide the set of 
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rules that constrain, prescribe or sanction trade within the resource and product 
market. In this context, institutions provide the basis for the efficiency of economic 
relationships such as contracts, employment relationships, supply of goods or 
services or the provision of credit. Yet with the consensus on the role of institutions 
within the economy, there remains a lack of agreement on how they should be 
categorised.  
The remainder of this Chapter 4 is presented as follows.  Section 4.2 
considers the extant literature that have examined productivity, accumulation of 
capital and labour as proximate determinants of economic growth. Section 4.3 
presents a survey of the empirical literature that explores the association amongst 
institutions, productivity, accumulation of capital and labour. Section 4.4 
summarises the literature surveyed in this Chapter and establishes the conceptual 
framework within which the empirical work of this study will be conducted.  
 
 
4.2 Comparative empirical studies of the proximate 
determinants for economic growth 
This section surveys the extant empirical literature that investigates the association 
between productivity and the factors of production and their association with 
differences in national income of economies of varying degrees of economic 
development. This section considers how the extant literature has examined the 
proximate determinants of economic growth from two perspectives: i) accumulation 
of the factors of production; and ii) increased levels of productivity.   Table (4.1) 
provides a summary of empirical studies from 2012, which are discussed in this 
section.  
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Table 4.1: Comparative empirical studies decomposing long-run economic growth 
Theoretical 
approach Study Key arguments 
Productivity  Lee, J.W. and Hong, K. (2012) 
Eberhardt, M. and Teal F. (2013) 
Manuelli, R.E. and Seshardri, A. 
(2014) 
Bergeaud, A., Cette, G. and Lecat, 
R. (2017) 
Yalcinkaya, O., Huseyni, I. and 
Celik, A.K (2017) 
 
 
• 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 accounts for at least 
three-quarters of the 
variation in the growth of 
labour productivity. 
• Environmental variables 
have an important role in 
cross-country differences 
in technical efficiency.  
• Policies can influence 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
– relevant ones are those 
that support innovation and 
foster greater productivity 
benefits from technology 
shocks. 
• Output per worker is highly 
responsive to changes in 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  
 
Factor accumulation Rao, B.B. & Hassan, G.M. (2012) 
Turner, C., Tamura, R. and 
Mulholland, S.E. (2013) 
Hofman, A., Aravena, C. and 
Friedman, J. (2017) 
Aguiar, D., Costa, L. and Silva, E. 
(2017) 
Eichengreen, B., Park, D. and 
Shin, K (2018) 
 
 
 
• Economic growth is 
primarily due to factor 
accumulation. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 only 
makes a small, but positive 
contribution to the growth 
rate.  
• Capital plays a key role in 
GDP growth. 
• The productivity of labour 
grows through capital 
accumulation.  
 
 Ideally the association between economic growth and the proximate 
determinants and their productivity is assessed using quantitative methods.  
Dependant on whether the researcher adopts an endogenous or exogenous 
approach to decomposing economic growth in order to assess this relationship, 
there could be disparity in the proxies used for either capital, labour or productivity. 
Since all three; capital, labour and productivity, operate interdependently and 
simultaneously, it can be difficult to isolate the distinct association of any one with 
economic growth. Section 4.2.1 will survey the empirical studies that assess the 
relationship between productivity and economic growth from both the endogenous 
and exogenous economic growth theory perspectives.     
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4.2.1 Comparative empirical studies on the relationship between 
productivity and economic growth 
It would be incorrect to associate productivity with only technological progress 
(Hofman et al., 2017).  Instead it is a measure of the change in the production 
function at a given level of capital and labour.  It quantifies the rate of change of the 
production function over and above what can be explained by capital and labour.  
The production process requires economic actors to make choices on the allocation 
of the finite factors of production to produce the goods and services that would yield 
the most benefit.  Increased efficiency contributes to increased output from 
production (Auerbach & Gorondnichenko, 2012).  In particular, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the 
amorphous ‘black-box’ that comprises a number of hard-to-measure components of 
productivity that are not otherwise accounted for by capital and labour, including 
technological progress (Easterly & Levine, 2001).  
The early study by Hall and Jones (1999) assumed that labour was 
homogenous and that along a balanced growth path, the capital-output ratio is 
proportionate to the rate of investment in their examination of the determinants of 
cross-country variations in the Solow residual. Hall and Jones (1999) also argued 
that an economies’ capital-labour ratio will rise because of the increase in 
productivity.  They conducted a levels growth accounting exercise for 127 
economies of varying degrees of economic development.  They examined the 
influence of productivity on output per worker and found that in the long-run, high 
levels of output per worker are the result of higher investment rates in both physical 
and human capital, to increase levels of productivity.  Their results would suggest 
that there is a positive covariance association among capital, labour and 
productivity.  Contrary to the simple Cobb-Douglas production function, Hall and 
Jones (1999) did not assume that workers with different educational achievements 
or skill levels were perfect substitutes. Instead, their model specifically isolates the 
level of workforce skill and education in their measure of endogenous human 
capital.   
In the simple Cobb-Douglas production function, differences in educational 
achievements or skill levels may show up in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and not the measure of the labour 
force.  Whereas including human capital in the production function introduces a 
labour-augmenting Harrod-neutral where the relative factor shares are constant at 
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any capital-output ratio.  This endongeous approach may cast doubt on the 
empirical robustness of the relationship between productivity and in particular, the 
real output of labour, making it near impossible to isolate the productivity of labour 
as opposed to the productivity of capital. This would contribute to Hall and Jones 
(1999) findings that economies have higher levels of output arising from higher 
levels of technology, when they exhibit higher rates of investment in physical capital 
and education with low rates of population growth.  
In their investigation of the degree to which assumptions about aggregation 
and homogeneity matter for inferences as to the nature of cross-country technology 
differences, Eberhardt and Teal (2013) used sectoral value-add, labour stocks, 
physical capital stock and arable and permanent crop land capital stock 
(constructed using the investment series with perpetual inventory method).  
Following Abramovitz (1956) they maintained that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is more than technology.  
They argued that it is a ‘measure of our ignorance’ driven by latent activities that are 
either difficult to measure or observe. They maintained that aggregate specifications 
are likely to result in misleading inferences of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. Their study found evidence that 
cross-country and sectoral differences in technological differences are important 
when explaining differences in output and productivity (Eberhardt & Teal, 2013).   
Eberhardt and Teal (2013) results highlight the care that must be taken 
when designating a model for the production function taking account of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  As it is 
a ‘hard-to-measure’ component of a modern production function, care must be 
taken that account is carefully taken of the other parameters included in the model 
and the potential for measurement errors that may appear in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  This could also 
have implications for whether 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 should be interpreted as Hicks-neutral or Harrod-
neutral.  The appropriate interpretation may depend on many factors, including 
whether the model treats labour and capital as substitutes or takes into account 
different levels of quality of labour stock or treats labour as homogenous within the 
economy. The implication is that how econometric analysis treats the factors of 
production as homogenous substitutes or heterogeneous alternatives may have a 
significant effect on the interpretation of the relationship between capital, labour and 
productivity. 
 Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) adopted an endogenous AK model approach 
and argued that changes in endogenous Harrod-neutral 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 causes endogenous 
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changes in all factors of production, including the stock of capital.  In their re-
evaluation of the role of human capital in determining the wealth of nations, they 
included GDP, years of schooling, public expenditure on education relative to GDP, 
life expectancy, total fertility rate adjusted for infant mortality, all averaged over the 
five year period from 2003 to 2007 (Manuelli & Seshadri, 2014).  Their estimations 
not only take account of educational achievements of the workforce, but varying skill 
levels; these assumptions would impact how firms within the economy respond to 
the capacity of the workforce and influence incentives to invest in technology driven 
production or unskilled-labour intensive production.   
 Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) assumptions about the heterogeneity of the 
workforce suggests that effective human capital per worker varies substantially 
cross-country, yet their calculation of cross-country differences in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 are 
significantly smaller than previously estimated in earlier empirical studies.  Their 
results suggests that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is not only endogenous, but also results in endogenous 
changes in stocks of human and physical capital and only accounts for up to 35 
percent of cross-country differences in output per worker (Manuelli & Seshadri, 
2014).  However, their model omits physical capital and only considers human 
capital.  This could suggest that their model underestimates the measure of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
and the potential influence of existing capital or investment in new capital on the 
productivity of the labour force.  They also suggest that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is only accounted for by 
changes in the labour force, arising from years of schooling, development of skills, 
medical care and nutrition. Their estimation assumes that the productivity of capital 
is included in the estimation of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. 
More recently, Yalcinkaya, Huseyni, and Celik (2017) using the growth rate 
of gross fixed capital formation, rather than growth rate of capital stock, found that 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 was a greater contributor to economic growth than fixed capital formation or 
employed labour for their sample of G-20 economies. Their econometric regression 
model included real GDP growth rate, employed labour growth rate and constructed 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth rate using the Tornqvist index.  In their examination of the impact of 
capital, labour and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 on real GDP per capita in G-20 countries over the period 
1992 to 2014, they concluded that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 had a greater impact on economic growth in 
developed economies than emerging countries (Yalcinkaya et al., 2017).  Their 
findings support the earlier work of Caselli and Coleman (2006) who posit that 
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developed economies have a larger stock of skilled labour, which they are able to 
use more efficiently, and which incentivises these developed economies to adopt 
more appropriate technology-driven production methods, thereby increasing levels 
of output and national income.  This would suggest that the opposite may persist in 
less developed economies, where they may be more unskilled labour abundant and 
relying on less efficient technology.  Yalcinkaya et al. (2017) suggested that their 
results suggest that exogenous 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is only a critical determinant of economic 
growth for economies where it has an impact on increasing the level of 
development. They suggest that to increase levels of GDP, the focus should be on 
improving the efficiency of labour through qualitative and quantitative investment in 
education, raising R&D expenditure and promoting corporate structures.   
 
4.2.2 Comparative empirical studies on the relationship between the factors 
of production and economic growth 
Economic growth can also come from adding more capital and labour inputs. Solow 
(1962a) argues that increased rates of capital investment can only temporarily 
increase economic growth rates, through an increase in the capital-labour ratio. 
However, the marginal product of additional units of capital may tend to suffer from 
diminishing returns, and the economy responds in the long-run by an increased 
dependence on the growth and efficiency of the workforce (Solow, 1962a).  The 
neoclassical growth theory posits that long-run economic growth requires increased 
supplies of labour and higher levels of productivity of labour and capital.  This 
section will survey those empirical studies that conversely argue that only 
investments in capital and labour are necessary for long-run economic growth, not 
the pace of productivity. 
Turner, Tamura, and Mulholland (2013) found evidence most of output 
growth is accounted for by the accumulation of capital and labour, rather than 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
for states in the United States during 1840 to 2000. Their cross-state examination of 
levels of factor accumulation and efficiency of factor inputs for output growth, used 
per worker estimates of human capital, physical capital, land and each state’s 
income and capital stocks.  Turner et al. (2013) were basing their arguments on 
neoclassical perspectives, while adopting an endogenous AK model approach. 
They conducted an AK growth accounting approach using levels and not growth 
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rates to calculate 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, like Solow, but arrived at different conclusions regarding the 
relative importance of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 as a driver of output growth. Their model used a 
composite measure of capital (physical and human capital) to explain cross-state 
differences in output levels.  Turner et al. (2013) maintained that their results 
suggest that factor accumulation is a greater contributor to economic growth rates 
than the mobility of capital and labour, common institutions, language, currency and 
trade policy. Empirical results from both Turner et al. (2013) and Yalcinkaya et al. 
(2017) may be misleading as their composite measure of capital, ignores the level 
of labour-augmenting 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 that elevates the efficiency of labour, derived from the 
investment in education, skills and knowledge. 
  More recently Aguiar et al. (2017) found evidence to suggest that 
differences in factor accumulation amongst OECD and emerging countries are more 
critical than differences in changes to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 for explaining cross-country variations in 
economic performance. Their model decomposed the determinants of economic 
growth to estimate why some countries are richer than others (Aguiar et al., 2017).  
Their model included GDP per worker, human capital per worker formulated using 
data on the average years of schooling for the working-age population and rates or 
return associated with different years of education, capital stock per worker 
calculated by dividing capital stock at current PPPs by inter alia the number of 
workers, patents and regulations. Though it is difficult to reconcile why they have 
not considered the investment in skills and knowledge required to increase the 
productivity of labour stock. This disparate model may provide inconsistent results, 
both from the large number of variables and the estimation of human capital as 
opposed to labour stocks, without taking account of the productivity of human 
capital as opposed to the productivity of labour stock. Accounting for human capital 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 may involve measurement errors as both measures may consider the 
heterogeneity of the labour force and the impact of investment in education, 
investment in training and skills acquisition. 
Similarly, Hofman et al. (2017) found evidence that capital plays a critical 
role in GDP growth for their sample of Latin American and Caribbean economies.  
They found that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇’s contribution to output growth was negative and pro-cyclical, 
exhibiting positive characteristics only in countries with high GDP growth. They 
suggest that there is a positive covariance association between capital and 
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productivity and argue that increases in capital generates higher 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (Hofman et 
al., 2017).  They also argued that it is a mistake to associate 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 with only 
technological progress. They adopted a purely neoclassical approach and consider 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 as a measure of the changes in production over and above what can be 
explained by capital and labour (Hofman et al., 2017). These changes in production 
levels can be the result of: technical innovations, organisational or institutional 
changes, demand fluctuations, changes in allocation of capital and labour, scale 
effects and changes in the intensity of labour as well as measurement errors 
(Hofman et al., 2017).  
The results of Hofman et al. (2017) suggest that economic performance is 
driven by firms expanding their maximum production possibilities through increased 
investment in factor accumulation.  However, they do find some evidence that 
during a ‘boom-period’ from 2003 to 2008 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 may have been positive and 
statistically significantly associated with economic growth in their sample of 23 
countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. During this ‘boom-period’ 
they found evidence that the high economic growth rates were associated with 
positive 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 levels, suggesting that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 may exhibit procyclical behaviour in 
response to the slowly responsive capital (Hofman et al., 2017).  They go further to 
suggest that in periods of low economic growth increased levels of ‘idle’ capacity will 
tend to show up in decreased levels of productivity in their sample. They also argue 
that the low economic performance of the economies in their sample, could be 
associated with slower accumulation and the misallocation of productive resources 
across firms or industries (Hofman et al., 2017).  
 
4.3 Comparative empirical studies of relationship between 
institutions and economic growth 
This section surveys the empirical literature that explores the relationship between 
institutions and the factors of production, productivity and economic performance. It 
will seek to identify the mechanisms through which the empirical literature suggests 
institutions are related to economic growth. There have been several empirical 
studies that explored the relationship between the quality of institutions and 
economic performance.  These empirical studies have principally defined institutions 
as formal rules that constrain economic agents and governments in exchange 
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transactions within the economy.  This section will firstly survey the literature that 
examines the direct association between economic growth and institutions.  
Secondly, it will survey empirical literature that investigates whether institutions are 
directly related to economic growth.  Thirdly, it will survey the empirical literature 
that investigates whether institutions are indirectly related to economic growth.  
 
4.3.1 How do institutions relate to economic growth? 
This section will survey the empirical literature that investigates the direct 
association between institutions and economic growth. Several empirical studies 
from 1999 to present were surveyed to assess their findings on the role of 
institutions on long-term economic growth (Table 4.2). Glaeser et al. (2004) 
examining whether political institutions induce economic growth in a mix of both 
high-, middle- and low-income economies (as defined by the World Bank) for the 
period 1960 to 2000, used public data from Polity IV, World Bank Governance 
Indicators (‘WGI’), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, and Shleifer (2004).  
To conduct this examination, Glaeser et al. (2004) used Ordinary Least Squares 
(‘OLS’).  They found no evidence of an association between institutions and 
economic growth. They argue that human capital may be a more essential cause of 
economic growth, particularly for poor economies. They suggest that human capital 
has a first order effect that shapes both institutional and productive capacity of 
economies. Though their conclusion, belies the influence of institutions in the 
decision to invest in skills and knowledge required to accumulate human capital.   
 Lim and Decker (2007) investigated whether economies with democratic 
political institutions grew faster than those economies with non-democratic political 
institutions.  Similar to Glaeser et al. (2004), Lim and Decker (2007) conducted their 
investigation using public data from the Polity IV, they also used public data from 
Herfindahl Index of government from the World Bank and Military spending 
information from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (‘WDI’) for 128 
economies, over an eighteen-year period from 1984 to 2002. Their investigation 
used military spending as a proxy for the level of democracy, presuming that 
democracies likely have lower levels of military expenditure as a proportion of 
government expenditure. Lim and Decker (2007) did not observe any evidence that 
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political institutions that primarily establish democracy are critical to achieving 
economic growth amongst the sample of 128 economies. 
 Lee and Kim (2009) examined the growth effect of institutions on 14 
economies of different levels of income for the period 1965 to 2002.  They used 
public data from Polity IV and ICRG. They found evidence that institutions and 
productivity matter differently for economies at different levels of income. More 
particularly, both political institutions that constrain the executive and productivity 
derived from a better-educated work force, are more decisive for low-income 
economies.  While economic institutions are more critical for economic growth in 
high-income economies. Their study also suggests that political institutions that 
perform primarily market-regulating, market-stabilisation and market-legitimisation 
functions within the economy, such as those political institutions that regulate 
participation in politics, the impartiality and competitiveness of executive recruitment 
and constrain the executive. 
Eicher and Leukert (2009) examined the influence of institutions on 
economic performance of 46 economies (OECD and non-OECD economies) over 
the period 1900 to 1989.  To conduct this examination Eicher and Leukert (2009) 
also used public data on the constraints on the chief executive from Polity IV, as 
well as public data on chief executive recruitment regulation from the World Bank 
and indicators of political institutions from ICRG.  They did not find a positive or 
significant association between political institutions and economic performance 
across the sample.  While they did not find any evidence that political institutions 
directly affected national output, they did find some evidence that there is a common 
impact of political institutions among low-income economies.  Eicher and Leukert 
(2009) concluded that institutions are ‘three times more important in developing 
countries than in OECD countries’ (p. 208), suggesting that the quality and 
persistence of political market-regulating institutions has a greater impact on 
economic performance of low-income economies than on high-income economies.  
These political market-regulating institutions include institutions that regulate the 
distribution of de jure political power and assign power to alter economic market-
creating institutions.   
Haggard and Tiede (2011) examined the functional relationship between the 
rule of law and economic growth in 74 developing and transition non-OECD 
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economies over the nineteen-year period 1985 to 2004.  Haggard and Tiede (2011) 
used several indicators to proxy institutions: (i) the index of political stability and 
absence of violence from PRS; (ii) contract viability and average protection against 
risk of expropriation from the World Bank and the number of procedures required to 
enforce a contract and WGO rule of law indicators; (iii) Henisz measure of political 
constraints; (iv) Cignarelli and Richards measure of judicial independence; (v) 
Transparency International corruption perception index; (vi) the Economist 
Intelligence Unit measure of corruption among political officials; and (vii) the World 
Economic Forum’s rule of law measure.  They argue that the rule of law is a 
multifaceted concept that encompasses a variety of distinct elements from the 
security of a person and property rights, to control of government and control 
against corruption (Haggard & Tiede, 2011).  They found evidence that effective 
provision of law and order has a stronger effect on the volatility of economic growth 
in developing economies.  They did not observe a ‘tight’ correlation among other 
elements of the rule of law among developing economies.  Haggard and Tiede 
(2011) assert that this suggests that previous inferences about the effect of property 
rights protection on economic growth in developing economies may not be 
warranted.  On this premise they argue that the elements of the rule of law ‘hang 
together in very different ways in advanced industrial and developing countries’ 
(Haggard & Tiede, 2011, p. 677). 
de Crombrugghe and Farla (2012) testing for the relationship between cross-
country variations in institutional characteristics, income levels and rates of growth, 
examined 122 countries. Their panel included twenty-four developed countries, 
thirty sub-Saharan African economies, sixteen middle East and North African 
economies, eighteen Latin American and Caribbean economies, seventeen central 
Asian and European economies and eighteen developing economies in Asia over a 
fourteen-year period (1993 to 2007). They used institutional data from the 
Institutional Profiles Database (‘IPD’), 2009, which data was based on a survey 
conducted by the French Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment and 
the French Development Agency (de Crombrugghe & Farla, 2012). The IPD 
includes data on 123 economies on 367 rudimentary variables that are intended to 
explain the role of institutions in economic development and goes beyond 
measuring governance (French Development Agency & French Ministry for the 
Economy, 2012). This data is subjective, based on surveys and its results rely upon 
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the emerging views of the questionnaire respondents. It does not include external 
data sources. It reviews nine institutional functions: political institutions; safety, law 
and order; public governance; markets’ operating freedom; coordination; security of 
transactions and contracts; regulations and corporate governance; openness to the 
outside world; and social cohesion (French Development Agency & French Ministry 
for the Economy, 2012). They observed a statistically significant association 
between institutions and income levels, but no evidence of an institutional influence 
on economic growth rates.  
de Crombrugghe and Farla (2012) sought to construct a multi-dimensional 
perspective of cross-country differences in institutional characteristics. Using 333 
elementary variables and 40,426 data points, they found evidence of a strong 
association between institutions and income levels, but no evidence of an 
association between institutions and rates of economic growth and only mixed 
evidence of an association between institutions and the unpredictability of economic 
growth (de Crombrugghe & Farla, 2012). They argue that institutions are 
multifaceted, which makes comparison difficult. Furthermore, that specific 
institutional attributes matter at varying stages of economic development. It is an 
‘institutionally heterogeneous world’ that is comprised of complex relationships 
between institutional indicators, income levels, growth rates and the unpredictability 
of economic growth (de Crombrugghe & Farla, 2012, p. 3). 
Law, Lim, and Ismail (2013) sought to answer the question whether, 
institutions induce economic development or whether they develop and evolve 
simply as a consequence of economic growth by investigating sixty countries 
divided between higher, upper middle, lower middle and low income over an 
eighteen-year period (1990 to 2008) using data from ICRG and the WGIs. 
Concluding that there was a bi-directional causal association between institutions 
and economic development that was highly heterogeneous (Law et al., 2013). In 
particular, Law et al. (2013) observed that institutional quality was significantly 
influential in encouraging economic growth in middle income economies, but 
minimally responsive in promoting economic growth in high income countries. 
Further, that there is a causal association between economic performance and 
improvement of institutional quality in lower middle income and low-income 
economies (Law et al., 2013). It is more probable that economic growth in lower 
middle income and low-income economies could affect improvement in institutional 
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quality.  Like de Crombrugghe and Farla (2012), Law et al. (2013) found that there 
was an association between institutions and income levels and that specific 
institutional characteristics matter at varying stages of economic development.  
 More recently Nawaz (2015) examined the impact of political institutions that 
ensure government stability, control corruption and the rule of law on economic 
growth in 56 economies of varying income levels (high- and low-income 
economies), over a period of 29 years (1981 to 2010).  To conduct their 
examination, Nawaz (2015) used public data on government stability, investment 
profile, control over corruption, law and order, democratic accountability and 
bureaucracy quality from the International Country Risk Guide (‘ICRG’) to capture 
the quality of political institutions that confer political stability, administrative quality 
and democratic accountability.  This investigation was conducted using a static 
panel fixed effects and a dynamic panel system GMM.  The results suggest that 
there is a positive association between the political market-regulating institutions 
and long-run economic growth in high-income economies. Stable governments 
contribute to policy stability, which not only encourages increased participation in 
the economy, but makes the economy more attractive for foreign investment 
(Nawaz, 2015). More particularly, these results would suggest that political market-
regulating institutions that ensure a stable government in high-income economies 
have a positive influence on long-run economic growth 
 Flachaire, García-Peñalosa, and Konte (2014) contend that there are 
particular aspects of political institutions that are particularly critical for achieving 
economic institutions that encourage economic growth.  Where political systems are 
stable, the resulting economic institutions generate strong incentives for 
participation within the economic system, inducing economic growth. Flachaire et al. 
(2014) opine that the type of regime (democratic or autocratic) is irrelevant to the 
question of the role of political institutions in influencing economic growth. What 
matters most is the effectiveness of the regulatory policies implemented by a stable 
regime (Narayan, Narayan, & Smyth, 2011).  Their results would support the 
suggestion that market-regulating political institutions are critical for supporting 
market-creation and activity within the resource market.   
 Fabro and Aixalá (2013) examined the impact of political institutions on 
economic performance in 156 economies of varying income levels (high-, middle- 
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and low-income) over the period 1996 to 2011.  To conduct this examination, Fabro 
and Aixalá (2013) used public data on six aggregate governance indicators from 
WGI to proxy political institutions and national output figures from WDI.  They found 
evidence that the effect of the different aspects of political institutions is different 
based on the economies’ level of income. Their results imply that the 
responsiveness of economic performance to different aspects of political institutions 
depends on the level of the economies’ income, which is based on the level of 
output; (i) better institutional quality fostered economic growth in upper middle-
income economies; (ii) economic growth tended to result in increased institutional 
quality in low-income economies. Fabro and Aixalá (2013) suggest that the quality 
of political institutions matter at different stages of economic growth.  Their study 
provides evidence that political market-creating institutions such as the rule of law 
and protection of property rights and market-regulating political institutions for 
corruption control are critical for influencing economic performance.   
Seven of the studies surveyed found no evidence of an association between 
political institutions in achieving long-run economic growth. Six of the studies that 
found no association between political institutions and economic performance, used 
public data on levels of democracy from Polity IV (Glaeser et al., 2004; Lim & 
Decker, 2007; Bolt & Bezemer, 2009; Eicher & Leukert, 2009; Angeles, 2010; 
Commander & Nikoloski, 2011). This would tend to suggest that political market-
regulating institutions that establish democratic regimes are not critical or sufficient 
on their own for economic performance. This finds support in Barro (1998) whose 
earlier work observed that democracy had a small association with economic 
growth.  This does not negate the association between political market-regulating 
institutions and economic performance, but begins to identify the ‘type’ of political 
market-regulating institutions that may not have an influence on economic 
performance.  
Eleven of the studies surveyed found positive and significant evidence that 
political institutions are critical in determining long-run economic performance 
(studies have typically examined the relationship over a period of eighteen to forty-
five years, using publicly available time series data).  More particularly, their findings 
agree that political institutions that are regulatory, control for corruption, ensure 
effective bureaucracy, maintain the rule of law and desirable law and order matter 
for the rate and level of economic performance in low-income economies.  These 
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studies used public data from ICRG and WGI.  This suggests that there is a role for 
political market-creating and certain types of political market-regulating institution in 
achieving economic performance.  However, these studies did not identify the 
mechanism through which institutions affect economic performance. The following 
two sections of this Chapter, shall examine how institutions may indirectly influence 
economic performance through the mechanisms of the factors of production and 
productivity. 
 
Table 4.2: Empirical studies investigating the direct association between institutions 
and economic performance.  
The nature of the 
relationship Key arguments Studies 
There is a direct association 
between political institutions 
and economic institutions 
and economic performance 
Institutions are statistically 
significant drivers of 
economic performance.  
The influence of institutions 
on economic performance 
varies according to the level 
of national income.  
Better institutional quality 
encourages economic 
growth in high- and middle-
income economies; though 
economic growth tends to 
result in an improvement 
institutional quality in low-
income economies.  
 
Chong and Calderon 
(2000),  
Law and Habibullah (2006), 
Law and Bany-Ariffin 
(2008),  
Klomp and de Haan (2009), 
Law et al. (2013),  
Fabro and Aixalá (2013), 
Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013), 
Rachdi and Saidi (2015), 
Madsen, Raschky, and 
Skali (2015),  
Nawaz (2015),  
Yıldırım and Gökalp (2016), 
Góes (2016) 
Neither political nor 
economic institutions 
directly influence economic 
performance 
Political institutions may not 
affect output directly.  
Lim and Decker (2007),  
Bolt and Bezemer (2009); 
Eicher and Leukert (2009), 
Angeles (2010),  
Commander and Nikoloski 
(2011),  
de Crombrugghe and Farla 
(2012),  
 
 
4.3.2 The relationship between institutions and the factors of production 
Some empirical studies that find no direct association between institutions and 
economic performance, suggest that institutions affect economic performance 
indirectly through their influence on the factors of production.  These studies 
contend that differences in the accumulation of capital and labour stocks, amongst 
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economies, are driven by differences in institutional quality (Tavares & Wacziarg, 
2001; Glaeser et al., 2004; Hall, Sobel, & Crowley, 2010).  This section will survey 
literature that suggest that institutions influence economic performance indirectly 
through institutions’ direct impact on factor accumulation.  These studies have 
tended to focus on economic market-creating institutions, particularly those that 
secure private property and enforce contract rights.  This section will attempt to 
identify the mechanism through which these studies suggest that private property 
protection and contract enforcement influence the accumulation of the capital and 
labour.  
 Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) found positive, though weak evidence that 
democratic political institutions affect economic growth by improving the conditions 
for accumulation of human capital, but at the expense of accumulation of physical 
capital. They suggest that a democratic process is more suitable for economic 
prosperity as it nurtures civil liberties, secure property, and contract rights. 
Democratic political institutions that protect private property from expropriation and 
theft are more probable to be growth enhancing as they protect returns on private 
investments, create certainty during informational asymmetry and encourage the 
accumulation to securing private property, rather than the diversion of resources to 
unproductive activities, such as paying for personal security.   
 Garrett and Rhine (2011) investigated the effect of economic institutions on 
United States (‘U.S.’) state employment growth for three separate periods (1980 – 
1990, 1990 – 2000 and 2000 – 2005).  To conduct their analysis, they used public 
data from Fraser Institute’s, Economic Freedom of North America 2008, which 
provides a measure of institutions that set restrictions on free-market activity. Their 
results imply that a one-unit increase in economic freedom index contributed to an 
increase in employment growth (3.8 percent from 1980 to 1990, 4.5 percent from 
1990 to 2000 and 1.4 percent from 2000 to 2005).  Meaning that protection of 
private property and private markets operating with minimal government intervention 
are fundamental determinants of higher rates of employment growth.  These 
economic institutions indirectly influence economic performance, through their direct 
impact on the accumulation of labour stock.  
 These findings were echoed in the study by Heller and Stephenson (2014) 
who also examined the role of economic institutions in the accumulation of labour in 
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50 U.S. States, over the period 1981 to 2009.  Heller and Stephenson (2014) also 
used public data from Fraser Institute’s, Economic Freedom of North America index.  
They found evidence that greater economic freedom, exhibited by stronger 
institutions that protect private property and regulate free-market activity, with 
minimal government intervention, are strongly related to lower unemployment rates 
and higher labour force participation rates and employment-population ratios.  
 Alternatively, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that economic institutions 
that protect property rights and safeguard the certainty of contracting, have a direct 
influence on the accumulation of physical capital through investment. Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) examined the long-run association between economic institutions 
and investment and financial development in 42 common law economies & 47 civil 
law economies.  They used public data available from the World Bank, Polity IV and 
Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) data on legal 
formalism.  They suggest that protection of property rights ensures that there are 
restraints on the state, politicians and elites providing private citizens with the 
security essential for investment. While enforcement of contracts enables economic 
actors to enter into private arrangements for exchange transactions. 
 Similarly, Hall et al. (2010) examined the association between institutional 
quality and the accumulation and productivity of capital, for 96 countries for the 
period 1980 to 2000. They used public data from ICRG.  They concluded that 
physical capital is responsive to economic institutions that secure property rights, 
ensure unbiased contract enforcement and allow market prices and profits and 
losses to govern economic activity (Hall et al., 2010).  These results support the 
proposition that economies with free market institutions that protect property rights 
and put into effect policies that provide for free exchange on the product and 
resource markets will tend to experience higher levels of capital accumulation, 
through the reduction of uncertainty and risk.   
 Hall et al. (2010) argue that the productivity of capital investment and human 
capital investment are responsive to institutional quality.  They suggest further that 
physical capital investment is more so than human capital investments. Their results 
showed that countries with certain categories of institutions are characterised by 
social, political and legal rules that provide secure property rights, unbiased contract 
enforcement and rely on market prices and profits and losses to govern economic 
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activity (Hall et al., 2010).  They further argue that economies with ‘good’ institutions 
exhibit higher returns to investment in rent-seeking enterprise that plundered the 
wealth of others, through pressing for political action and exploitation of lawsuit 
actions.   
  These two alternative explanations for the effect of institutions on 
accumulation of labour and capital stocks do not logically contradict each other, and 
may both play a role (Table 4.3).  The literature solidly establishes that the 
economic framework that provides for protection of property rights, enforcement of 
contracts and voluntary exchange at market-determined prices, are necessary for 
investment in capital and labour stocks.  Economic actors will be cautious not to risk 
their investments where property rights are not well enforced or poorly protected 
and there is the risk that others may appropriate the returns on their investment. 
Moreover, economic institutions set the infrastructure for the exploitation of the 
capital market, which is important for investment in physical capital. Yet these 
studies do not explore the how institutions are related to the productivity of the 
factors of production.  The following section shall examine the literature that 
assesses the association between economic institutions and the productivity of 
capital and labour, measured by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. 
 
Table 4.3: Empirical studies investigating the association between institutions and 
the accumulation of capital stocks and labour stocks 
The nature of the 
relationship Key arguments Studies 
There is an association 
between institutions and the 
accumulation of capital 
stocks. 
Economic institutions that 
protect private property and 
enforce contractual 
arrangements are the 
foundation of the capital 
market that is important for 
reducing uncertainty and 
risks of investing in 
accumulating capital.  
 
Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005),  
Gwartney, Holcombe, and 
Lawson (2006),  
Alfaro et al. (2008),   
Hall et al. (2010),  
Kovač and Spruk (2016) 
 
There is an association 
between institutions and the 
accumulation of labour 
stocks.  
 
Economic institutions that 
promote a free-market with 
minimal government 
intervention is strongly 
related to lower 
unemployment rates and 
higher labour force 
participation. 
Tavares and Wacziarg 
(2001),  
Garrett and Rhine (2011), 
Heller and Stephenson 
(2014),  
Sonora (2014) 
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4.3.3 The relationship between institutions and productivity 
Empirical studies on the nature of the association between institutions and 
economic performance must come to terms with the inescapable and yet often 
ambiguous nature of productivity.  They must disentangle how institutions affect the 
technical and allocative efficiency within the economic system. This section will 
assess the literature that examines how institutions increase productivity through 
the promotion of knowledge creation and macroeconomic stabilising, supporting the 
productivity of capital stock and labour stocks.  
 Glaeser et al. (2004) investigated whether political institutions or human 
capital induce economic growth in low-income countries over the period 1960 to 
2000.  They conducted this study using public data from Policy IV, ICRG and WGI.  
They found evidence that human capital is a more elementary source of growth than 
institutions.  However, their conclusion does not keep in view the role of institutions 
in influencing the decision to invest in accumulating skills, knowledge and R&D that 
convert labour stocks to human capital. Similarly, Bolt and Bezemer (2009) 
examined whether human capital or institutions affect long-run economic 
performance in 24 sub-Saharan African economies. They used public data from 
Polity IV.  They also found confirmation that human capital explained long-run 
economic performance, better than the quality of institutions.   
 Law and Bany-Ariffin (2008) examined the causality among institutions and 
economic performance in 72 diverse economies with varying levels of income (high-
middle- and low-income economies) over a 21-year period (1980 to 2001).  To 
conduct their study Law and Bany-Ariffin (2008) used public data from ICRG. Law 
and Bany-Ariffin (2008) carried out this examination using a generalised method of 
moments (‘GMM’) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and pooled 
mean group (‘PMG’) estimator proposed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999).  Law 
and Bany-Ariffin (2008) found evidence that institutions are quicker to react to 
economic growth in middle- and low-income economies. Further, that the state of 
labour-augmenting technology depended not only on exogenous technological 
developments, but also on the peculiar characteristics of the institutional 
infrastructure. They suggest that institutions that reduce the level of bureaucracy 
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and set restrictions on rent-seeking activities influence the productivity of labour in 
middle- and low-income economies.  
 Dias and Tebaldi (2012) investigated whether political institutions gave rise 
to high levels of productivity and thereby long-run economic performance in sixty-
one economies (East Asia Pacific, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, 
South Asia, Sub-Saharan economies, transnational and advanced economies 
omitted) over a forty-year period (1965 to 2005).  They examined this relationship 
using public data from Polity IV (a measure of democracy and autocracy and the 
ratio of people with post-secondary education to people with no schooling as a 
proxy for the influence of institutions on the accumulation of human capital).  They 
found evidence that those structural institutions that influence the decision to 
accumulate human capital have a direct association with productivity and thereby 
dictate an economy’s rate of economic growth.  
 d'Agostino and Scarlato (2012) examined whether institutions contributed to 
the innovative process, favouring economic growth in 15 European economies over 
the period 1996 to 2010.  To conduct their examination d'Agostino and Scarlato 
(2012) used public data from WGI.  They found evidence that there was a positive 
association between institutions and innovation.  They argue that the quality of 
political institutions could contribute to compelling incentives for knowledge diffusion 
and the acceptance of technological innovation, thereby directly inducing 
productivity. This would suggest that growth-enhancing institutions can directly 
increase productivity through the promotion of knowledge creation.   
 Hall and Jones (1999) famously stated that ‘productive activities are 
vulnerable to predation’ (p. 95).  Institutions have two main functions: i) set stable 
structures for human interaction (North, 1991); and (ii) fill gaps in the market (North, 
2016).  Hall and Jones (1999) found that productivity was higher in economies with 
long-standing governance structures that favoured productive activities.  They 
assert that higher levels of productivity are driven by government anti-diversion 
arrangements, years open to trade; the character of the economy (statist or mixed 
statist/capitalist-statist or mixed/capitalist or mixed capitalist), the portion of the 
population that speak English, the portion of the population that speak another 
language and their climate (Hall & Jones, 1999).  More importantly, they found 
evidence that suggests that economies with high levels of output had adopted 
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‘favourable’ social infrastructure characterised by rules and institutions that support 
activities, skills acquisition, invention and technology transfer and protect the output 
from predation and diversion (Hall & Jones, 1999).  This would suggest that 
economies that achieve high levels of productivity and output may have a ‘best-fit’ 
structure of institutions. 
 Of the literature surveyed, there is consensus that political and economic 
institutions can directly increase productivity through the promotion of knowledge 
creation, impacting the way in which levels of physical capital stock and labour stock 
evolve through technological advancement, thereby indirectly affecting rates of 
economic growth (Table 4.4). Political and economic institutions that promote the 
ease of doing business, the character of tertiary education and the level of patent 
protection are more likely to benefit skills, knowledge creation and diffusion and 
innovation, thereby indirectly contributing to increased levels of productivity.  
 Economies with institutional frameworks that promote: ease of doing 
business; the character of tertiary education systems; and the level of patent 
protection are argued to be more likely to gain from R&D efforts and international 
R&D spill overs (Tebaldi & Elmslie, 2013). Institutions that create efficiency through 
macroeconomic stabilising policies, such as stable monetary policies and fiscal 
policies are arguably growth-enhancing; whereas institutions that manage 
distribution of resources and social issues, may only indirectly affect productivity 
through their direct influence on accumulation and distribution of resources (Rodrik, 
2005).  Different institutions may result in different technologies and affect an 
economies ability to maximise productivity.  
 The character of the institutional framework can either provide incentives for 
productive activities that have high private and social returns or give rise to rent-
seeking and non-productive enterprises that provide little benefit (Krammer, 2015). 
Nelson and Sampat (2001) asserted that institutions that secure private property, 
provide clarity and enforce contracts make certain kinds of transactions or 
exchanges more attractive or easy, supporting productive activities. Furthermore, 
that these types of ‘social technologies’ could significantly influence the way in 
which levels of physical and human capital per worker become more efficient 
through technological advancement. This would suggest that economic growth 
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through increased productivity is the result of the interaction between the 
institutional framework and the co-evolution of capital and labour. 
 
Table 4.4: Empirical studies investigating the association between institutions and 
productivity 
The nature of the 
relationship Key arguments Studies 
There is no association 
between institutions and 
productivity  
Human capital is a more 
fundamental source of 
economic growth than 
institutions 
 
Glaeser et al. (2004);    
Bolt and Bezemer (2009) 
 
There is an association 
between institutions and 
productivity 
Variations in national levels of 
capital accumulation and 
productivity are driven by 
differences in institutional 
infrastructure. 
Political institutions can affect 
the rate of productivity growth. 
Political institutions can 
indirectly increase productivity 
through the promotion of skills 
and knowledge creation and 
diffusion and adoption.  
Those political institutions that 
favour increased investment in 
education, are important for 
productivity in low-income 
economies; political institutions 
that encourage investment in 
technology and R&D are 
important for productivity in 
high- and upper middle-income 
economies.  
Hall and Jones (1999);  
Lee and Kim (2009);  
Hall et al. (2010);   
d'Agostino and Scarlato 
(2012); 
Aisen and Veiga (2013) 
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4.4 Summary 
The extant empirical literature that explores the sources of economic growth centre 
around two basic explanations rooted in: factor accumulation and productivity. Both 
endogenous and exogenous economic growth theories can be used to explain and 
decompose growth of productivity and growth of output. The total output of an 
economy is the result of access and distribution of the proximate determinants 
(capital and labour stocks) and the productivity with which these determinants are 
allocated and deployed. This functional association can be expressed in the form of 
production functions where technical efficiency of productivity is distributed across 
economic activities. The studies examined in this Chapter 4, highlight the 
differences in approaches by the endogenous and exogenous growth theories in 
accounting for the determinants of productivity and output.   
The studies highlighted in this chapter, demonstrate that there is a lack of 
empirical consensus on both the determinants of economic growth and explanations 
for cross-country variations in levels of output.  Some of the empirical studies take 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 to include levels of human capital, entrepreneurial climate, level of 
competitiveness, technological development and innovation capabilities and 
corporate efficiency. Others strictly consider 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 as technological progress derived 
from investment in R&D and education. All studies have found evidence of a 
significant and positive association between 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and economic growth, though 
some conclude that capital accumulation has a stronger association with output 
levels than 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. These studies highlight that the inconsistency in the inclusion and 
omission of variables which can contribute to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and output can derive 
incongruous results.  These inconsistencies in measuring 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 occur regardless of 
whether the studies measure 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 as exogenous or endogenous.  At the same time 
that some empirical studies have included R&D in the neoclassical production 
functions, others have explored the microeconomics of technological progress from 
an endogenous perspective.  This key findings of these divergent approaches 
should be highlighted here.  One is that there remains substantial uncertainty on the 
effect of creating new technologies versus the impact of existing technologies. The 
other is the considerable variance among the empirical variance among the rate 
with which economies create and adopt technologies, particularly in advanced 
economies.  This is partly the consequence of whether productivity is considered as 
purely technological progress that is proprietary or a public good in the empirical 
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study. More generally, the assumptions built into the simple neoclassical model 
could be criticised on the grounds that it considers that technological knowledge is a 
public good and that economic growth is an equilibrium process.  This could be 
considered inconsistent with the mechanisms that contribute to the creation of new 
technology in capitalist economies.  However, the endogenous conceptualisation of 
technological progress as proprietary negates the potential for the effect of 
technological spill over.  More particularly the simplistic endogenous 
conceptualisation of productivity as only technological progress, denies the role of 
‘non-conventional’ factors on increasing levels of productivity.  
Resource reallocation could reflect and involve discrepancies between factor 
returns in the production functions. The neoclassical model is committed to 
relatively sustained full employment and macroeconomic stability.  While the 
empirical studies remain divided on the explanation of the relationship between 
productivity and capital and labour, there seems no doubt that inadequate 
institutions are at least in part responsible for macroeconomic instability and slow 
productivity. Some empirical studies have concentrated on R&D spending as a 
determinant of  productivity (Griliches, 1987).  Others have focused on geography 
(Rodrik et al., 2004; Deliktas & Balcilar, 2005), trade openness (Edwards, 1998; 
Dollar & Kraay, 2003) and institutions and government policies (Hall & Jones, 1999; 
Acemoglu et al., 2004; Bayraktar & Moreno-Dodson, 2015).  While some of the 
extant literature agrees that luck, culture, integration and geography are important 
for enhancing productivity and factor accumulation, their roles are often complex. 
Luck, culture, integration and geography can only provide minimal explanations for 
the dynamics of decisions to accumulate factors of production and investments that 
would make production more efficient.  
Some studies surveyed highlight that institutions may matter more for 
economic performance of developing, middle- and low-income economies.  More 
particularly, they present evidence that institutions are indirectly associated with 
economic growth, through the mechanism of their direct association with 
accumulation and productivity of capital and labour stocks in middle- and low-
income economies.  Though these arguments are not inconsistent, they have not 
definitively identified the category of either political or economic institutions that are 
relevant for the operation of these relationships. For example, Garrett and Rhine 
(2011) and Heller and Stephenson (2014) suggest that freer private markets with 
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minimal government intervention contribute to the accumulation of labour, but have 
not specifically identified, which category of either political or economic institutions 
support this.  
Thus far the empirical results suggest that the association between 
institutions and productivity and factor accumulation is more robust than that of 
either trade or geography. Institutions are formed endogenously inside the 
economic system arising because of interaction within the economy and the need to 
constrain, prescribe, regulate and protect exchange within the resource and product 
markets. This raises the question of what is the relationship between endogenous 
institutions and exogenous productivity of labour and capital in the production of 
output towards achieving economic growth.  
There has been no agreement on whether these categories of institutions 
are associated economic growth through; i) their direct association with levels of 
output; ii) their indirect association with decisions to accumulate factors of 
production; or ii) their indirect association with process of increasing levels of 
productivity. Section 4.3 highlights the lack of consensus.  It provides a brief 
synopsis of the empirical studies that have investigated the cross-national 
differences in economic performance.  Some studies maintain that purely political or 
economic market-creating or market-regulating institutions are directly associated 
with economic growth.  Conversely others maintain that purely political or economic 
market-deepening institutions have a more relevant relationship with economic 
growth.  Market-creating and market-deepening institutions are related to economic 
performance in different contexts.  
There remains no consensus on which of these categories of institutions is 
most important for inducing economic growth.  There is even less agreement on the 
mechanisms through which these institutions are related to economic growth, 
versus stagnation or decline. Hence this thesis will address this gap in the literature 
and attempt to understand the dynamics of the mechanisms through which 
institutions are associated with economic growth either directly or indirectly through 
their interaction with the continuous process of the accumulation of the factors of 
production or increasing levels of productivity.   
The empirical studies highlighted in this section, highlight that earlier 
empirical work on the influence of the factors of production and productivity on 
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economic performance has predominantly been examined in the context of 
developed or high-income economies.  In particular, there is room for further 
exploration of how developing economies access and distribute the factors of 
production, technology and knowledge.  Some of the studies surveyed in this 
Chapter have demonstrated that high-income economies may be more capital- and 
technology-intensive, with resources allocated to industries that can benefit from a 
skilled labour force and incentivises economic agents to invest in the creation of 
new ideas.  This contributes to their capacity to absorb new technology and 
maintain ‘leadership’ at the technology frontier.  There are fewer studies that have 
specifically assessed the association of low-cost abundant unskilled labour with 
levels of productivity and incentives to invest in new technology.  The relationship 
between these factors and the productivity of the labour force and levels of output 
are yet to be fully investigated in the context of developing economies. 
Yet further, there have been few empirical studies that have sought to 
investigate the determinants of the instability of economic performance 
characterised by developing economies over the past few decades.  Few studies 
consider how capital scarce, but skilled labour abundant developing economies can 
better combine their factors of production to create new ideas towards increasing 
levels of output and economic growth.  Similarly, few studies have examined 
whether the neoclassical economic growth assumption that economic growth is 
primarily driven by the accumulation of capital is relevant for capital scarce 
developing economies.  
There is some agreement amongst the extant literature that diverse 
institutional characteristics may relate differently with economic growth at varying 
stages of economic development.  There is even some agreement that institutional 
infrastructure may be more significantly associated with promoting economic growth 
in developing economies and only minimally associated with economic growth in 
high-income economies.  While Law and Bany-Ariffin (2008), Eicher and Leukert 
(2009), Haggard and Tiede (2011), de Crombrugghe and Farla (2012) and Law et 
al. (2013) have attempted to isolate the association between institutions and 
economic growth in middle- and low-income economies, there are very few other 
studies that focus their investigation on developing economies.  It is presumed that 
high-income economies will have more responsive institutions that appropriately 
provide support for the efficient and effective functioning of their product and 
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resource markets, providing resilience against external shocks and volatility. Yet 
neither of these studies could come to a conclusive agreement on the category of 
institutions that is most supportive of economic growth, nor the mechanism through 
which institutions supports economic growth in developing economies.  
This thesis will seek to address these gaps in the extant empirical 
knowledge. It is within these contexts highlighted in sections 1.1 and 1.1 that this 
thesis will seek to build upon the existing empirical understanding of the relationship 
between productivity, institutions and economic growth in developing economies. To 
that end the following chapters of this thesis will explain how this research will 
answer the following research questions to address these empirical gaps: 
RQ1: To investigate the relationship between differences in levels of national 
output of a sample of 17 selected developing economies and 
differences in levels of productivity.  
RQ2: To investigate the relationship between different levels of national 
output in a sample of 17 selected developing economies and different 
categories of institutions. 
Chapter 5 will firstly present and discuss the theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings of the design of this research.  It will then discuss the data and 
empirical approaches that will be used to analyse the data.   
 This thesis will contribute to the existing literature by estimating the effects of 
institutions on economic performance in developing economies using panel 
regressions with fixed and random effects, using the proximate determinants of 
economic growth as the dependent variables and eliminating control variables that 
are likely to be themselves the outcome of institutions.  In addition to these panel 
regressions, this thesis will also examine the association between productivity and 
economic growth also using panel regressions. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
ASSUMPTIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the design of the thesis in conformity with a preferred 
philosophical paradigm. It identifies the position, values and role of the researcher 
as an independent researcher. The first section considers the paradigm of the 
formalistic-deductive framework of neoclassical economics, providing an 
understanding of the existing ontology, epistemology and the methodology of 
research used by mainstream economists.  This section presents the philosophical 
paradigm that forms the basis of the thesis to identify the underlying assumptions of 
authentic truth used in this research and substantiate the choice of methodology 
used.  
The second section supports the set of research questions and hypotheses 
derived from the aims and objectives identified in Chapter 1.  This section will add to 
the perception of the research hypotheses in this thesis.  The third section will justify 
the model and data used in this study.  This research uses secondary data retrieved 
from publicly available sources.  This study does not involve working with people. 
There were no ethical issues or concerns that were required to be specified.  
Accordingly, there is no specific section on ethical considerations in this thesis.    
 
5.2 Philosophical underpinnings 
Previous studies that have investigated the association between institutions and 
long-run economic growth have employed several different methodologies ranging 
from simple least squares regression to generalised method of moments. All these 
methods consist of an optimisation procedure drawn upon from differential calculus 
which focuses on variable selection.  These models assume that all other things 
remain constant, or constitutes a mere residual which has a negligible influence on 
the econometric model. In order to relate theoretical claims of neoclassical 
presuppositions to the empirical evidence these studies have made certain 
assumptions about the institutions that constitute the framework of economic 
transactions (Mäki, 2001).  Mäki (2001) argues that these assumptions are 
sometimes inflexible and unrealistic.   
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Though these studies may conflict in their respective logic they are all based 
in the long tradition of econometrics, understood as the measurement of quantities 
relevant to economic analysis, which dates back to the work of Schumpeter (1954).  
However, the approach adopted by the early econometricians who initiated classical 
economics, is very different from the methods of contemporary econometricians. 
For classical econometricians, the study of economic activity stems from the study 
of production and measuring surplus.  To achieve their research aims, they used 
arithmetical methods to measure quantities of land and labour time employed in the 
production process which could be objectively observed (Ornelas Martins, 2016). 
Later, neoclassical economics adopted differential calculus methods that 
gave rise to a new autonomous field of econometrics, focusing on how changes in 
one variable affects another variable, while isolating the studied variables from 
everything else. This soon became termed ‘mainstream’ economics which Kanth 
(1997) suggests is deliberately ‘rigged’ to bring about results that support the ‘status 
quo’ conception that ‘laissez-faire produces optimal outcomes, but for the disruptive 
operation of the odd externality (a belated correction) here and there’ (p. 191-2).  
Lawson (2006) suggests that one constituent of the ‘rigging’ is the neoclassical 
stipulation that human beings are rational (optimising) atomistic entities. Secondly 
that the ‘rigging’ is achieved through the construction of theoretical models that are 
specified in such a way that they will ensure results that provide optimal outcomes 
(Lawson, 2006).  
However, this simplistic generalisation may be overly conspiratorial and 
presumptive. In fact, neoclassicism uses a formalistic-deductive framework. It has 
evolved to a more complex multi-dimensional system of evolving ideas (Colander, 
Holt, & Rosser, 2004); though it is still embedded in mathematical deductive 
modelling. Consideration of these generalisations raises questions of the realism of 
economic assumptions and the sensitivity of economic models to empirical data and 
whether economics obeys the methodological standards of an empirical science. 
Econometric models experimentally isolate one cause from other causes, which 
could disturb the effect that it produces. Econometric models have been criticised as 
lacking realism, based on imaginary worlds rather than the real world itself.  
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5.2.1 Ontological underpinnings 
Ontology is the study of, or a theory concerning, the basic essence and framework 
of a reality (Crotty, 1998).  All researchers adopt an ontological stance and the use 
of any approach to empirical analysis carries with it certain ontological 
presumptions. As a form of deductivism, neoclassicism explains economic activity in 
terms of closed systems, positing functional relationships presupposed on ‘closures 
of causal sequence’ (Lawson, 2006, p. 493).  This often requires econometricians to 
depend on formulations phrased in terms of (i) isolated (ii) ‘atoms’ (Keynes, 1936), 
to confirm that under certain given conditions (x) will always result in the same 
outcome (y) (Lawson, 2006).  This would suggest that neoclassicism is couched in 
ontological presuppositions that restrict the social domain to isolated atoms that are 
the singular elucidating variable for social analysis.  Hodgson (2011) would suggest 
that neoclassicism is committed to a ‘model-based prediction’ (p.164). 
 Hodgson (2011) argues that economists have ‘remained in an artificial world 
of much simpler models, partly to maintain the rhetoric of prediction’ (p. 164).  This 
is supported by the increased reliance on mathematical formalism in mainstream 
economics, directed at yielding useful predictions. Friedman (1953) in his influential 
work on the ontology of economics, argues that positive economics in principle 
deals with ‘what is’ rather than ‘what ought to be’ (p. 146).  This he suggests is the 
task of providing ‘system of generali[z]ations that can be used to make correct 
predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstance’ (Friedman, 
1953, p. 6).  This would place positive economics within the realm of an ‘objective’ 
science. Neoclassicism finds credence in these presuppositions to sustain its 
assumption that actors occupy themselves in rational optimisation within given 
restraints based on rational expectations.  These assumptions allow neoclassical 
models of markets as tending towards determinate and predictable equilibrium 
outcomes (Bronk, 2011).  
 Hodgson (2011) would suggest that the failure of predictive models is their 
overestimation of the importance and possibility of prediction. Sutton (2000) has 
argued that instead econometric models should be used as ‘diagnostic’ tools to 
tease out systematic tendencies, identify emerging patterns and replicate the 
possible impact of crossing certain thresholds. Instead the goal of neoclassical 
econometric modelling should be to develop a theory of the unpredictability of the 
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world and how meaning-making unfolds despite the uncertainty of specific 
outcomes.  
The existence of institutional frameworks is conditioned on human agency, 
through decision making. The sum of the human agency in the political and 
economic system are continually transforming, in some aspect.  In this context 
institutional frameworks are intrinsically dynamic and their existence is the result of 
a process of complete change; they exist in a constant process of becoming.  
Fundamentally institutional frameworks are built upon the prevalence of internal 
social relations.  This creates a structure comprised of several ontological levels that 
are underpinned by social structures and processes and their powers and 
tendencies (Bronk, 2011).  Bronk (2011) suggests that these ontological levels 
include the physical restraints, institutional frameworks, individual understanding 
and action, social meaning and macro-level development. This thesis adopts a 
positivist-deductivist approach to aggregate these social structures in a single 
conceptual framework. The structured social realm emerges from human 
interaction, which poses epistemological challenges of how to aggregate all these 
factors in one theoretical or modelling framework, without stripping them of their real 
individual significance.   
 
5.2.2 Epistemological underpinnings 
Hoover (2001) has argued that it is an undeniable truth that the eventual reason for 
the study of macroeconomics is to contribute to knowledge on which to base policy 
about influencing outcomes, about control or attempted control.  He further argues 
that the study of particular relationships within macroeconomics allows control of 
one thing to influence another, thereby identifying causality (Hoover, 2001).  
Granger (1980) first derived an explicit definition of ‘cause’ (p. 330). More recently 
Hoover (2013) has elaborated on macroeconomic causality. The research objective 
of mainstream econometrics is formed on the positivist realm of differential calculus 
methods in which a given variable (or set of variables) x influences a given variable 
(or set of variables) y, everything else remaining constant. This is arguably not 
causality as it is usually understood. 
These models focus on the direct effects of x on y expressed in terms of 
regression coefficients associated with each variable x, leaving other aspects as 
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part of a residual term.  Econometric models are positivist attempts to find laws of 
the form ‘if x then y’, searching for connections between isolated parts, while 
ignoring other interactions that x and y may have with other entities (z).  Positivism 
relies on the ontological assumption that reality exists independently from the social 
actors and the epistemological expectations that knowledge is meaningful only if it is 
based on consideration of this external reality (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 
2012).  
 Byrne (2013) argues that it is impossible to establish ‘causality’ in a world 
that is complex and emergent.  This raises practical issues. Can statistical 
techniques cope with large numbers of variables, in terms of assigning causal 
power to individual predictors in models? Byrne (2013) suggests that one way to 
resolve this issue is to lessen the number of attributes used in the model.  Two 
possible approaches he suggests, are use of factor analysis and the use of cluster 
analysis.  Regardless of the approach adopted, it is important that care is taken with 
the specification of the sub-set of variables used, which must be justified on the 
ground of theory.  This thesis will use factor analysis to generate institution factors.  
The emphasis on the process of econometric modelling is significant of the 
‘temporal order in complex causation’  (Byrne, 2013, p. 225).  Tilly (1984) famously 
argues that ‘when things happen within a sequence it affects how they happen’ 
(p.14).  Every sophisticated social intervention is considered a ‘case’ and systematic 
observations across cases allows generalisations ‘within limits’, that still permits the 
transmission of knowledge beyond the unique ‘ideographically’ characterised 
instance (Byrne, 2011). The econometric model used in this study is premised on 
the contention that no single model can sum up all significant and relevant 
variables. As noted by Levine and Renelt (1992) there are many variables that have 
equal theoretical status that can be included in econometric models, but the 
interpretation of their results depends on the ‘conditioning set of information’ (p. 
942). Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) observed as many as 145 potential 
growth-improving variables used in empirical studies on the long-run economic 
outcomes.  The researcher must exercise judgement regarding the possible models 
and variables to use in their analysis on the basis of theory.  In this thesis variables 
were chosen on the premise of the supply side neoclassical theory of economic 
growth.  
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For this thesis, institutions and their quality are multidimensional and 
motivational for productive behaviour may be the result of many institutional 
characteristics.  Simultaneously the economic environment is continuously changing 
because of either; i) institutional adjustments in the short-run or the result of reverse 
causality; and ii) in the long-run the result of higher growth rates.  The impact of 
institutional quality on growth may depend on a trend; if institutional quality improves 
along a positive trend, higher quality institutions may be understood as a sign of 
improvements of institutions and economic growth. Alternatively, the opposite along 
a negative trend may give rise to uncertainty and indicate that the quality of 
institutions are declining and so are incentives for productive behaviour and as a 
result, economic performance.  As such the empirical tests used in this thesis to test 
growth effects of institutional quality will allow for the multiplicity in the findings, 
more specifically it should: 
- Acknowledge the multifaceted nature of the character of specific 
institutions; 
- Allow for the impact of changes in economic performance to vary based 
on the trend in the character of institutional quality, accumulation of 
factors of production or productivity;  
- Allow effects to vary amongst countries. 
 
5.3 Empirical Models and Data 
5.3.1 Growth accounting exercise to calculate total factor productivity (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)  
RQ1:   To investigate the relationship between differences in levels of 
national output of a sample of 17 selected developing economies and 
differences in levels of productivity. 
From this research the following research null hypotheses will be tested: 
Null hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between differences in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 
differences in levels of national output in selected developing economies. 
This null hypothesis assumes that efficiency in productivity measured as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 does 
not contribute a larger share to national output levels than physical capital stock and 
labour stock in developing economies. The rejection of this hypothesis will provide 
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further evidence that cross-country differences in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 has a ‘large effect’ on levels 
of output in the sample selected developing economies.  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is an substantial contributing factor to a large number of studies on 
economic growth in developed and advanced economies.  Manuelli and Seshadri 
(2014) noted that only approximately 35 percent of difference in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 accounts for 
differences in output per worker.  This is in stark contrast to Solow (1957) who’s 
empirical results suggested that the growth rate of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 had a prevailing role in 
driving the growth rate of output per capita and Kuznets (1971) who later found that 
growth in productivity accounted for more than half of the growth of output per 
capita. Many of these earlier studies on the role of productivity, defined as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, 
adopted times series growth accounting approaches in either absolute form or 
relative form.   
Absolute form approaches give 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 comparisons in terms of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth 
rates and not 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 levels (Hall & Jones, 1999).  Relative form approaches overcome 
the limitations of absolute form time series approaches.  Relative form approaches 
produce 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 levels and growth rates for all years of the sample period.  Jorgenson 
and those that have adopted the time series approach, distinguish growth in both 
quality and quantity of inputs, by disaggregating data on varying types of capital and 
labour and remittances to both.  This type of data is difficult to acquire for wider 
samples of countries, and for developing countries. As such it is likely that such a 
sophisticated version of times series approach will remain limited to only developed 
countries.  
 Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) have famously criticised earlier 
empirical work that examined the impact of aid on ‘good policy environment’ for 
choosing variables ‘without clear guidance from theory, which often means there are 
more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample’ (p. 2).  This 
criticism could also be levelled against earlier studies examining the comparative 
contribution of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 to long-run economic growth, which neglect the Solow model 
and use ad hoc conditions loosely substantiated on the basis of a variety of 
endogenous growth models.  Some specifications used to estimate the growth 
effects of one or other growth-enhancing variable may be spurious.  
The standard Cobb-Douglas production function has three properties of 
technological progress; a) Hicks-neutral technical progress can be used to provide 
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an explanation of the main connotations of the Solow (1956) model (Rao & Hassan, 
2012) that assumes the ratio of marginal product of capital to the marginal product 
of labour is constant for any given capital to labour ratio 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼); b) 
Harrod-neutral technological progress that is labour-augmenting (relative factor 
shares are constant at any capital-output ratio) (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)1−𝛼𝛼); and c) Solow-
neutral if technological progress is capital-augmenting (relative factor shares are 
constant at any labour-output ratio) (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼) (Solow, 1956).  
In the Cobb-Douglas equation output (𝑌𝑌) changes over time (𝑡𝑡) in response 
to changes in physical capital (𝐴𝐴), labour (𝐿𝐿), (𝛼𝛼 is the elasticity of capital) and total 
factor productivity (𝐴𝐴), assumed to grow exogenously from the effect of new 
technology and more efficient management practices. The Cobb-Douglas 
production function permits the decomposition of output into contribution of capital, 
labour and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  Harrod-neutral labour-augmenting technological progress takes 
place when 𝐴𝐴 increases over time, with labour becoming more productive when the 
corresponding level of technology is higher. When technical progress advances at a 
constant rate and does not rely on any other variable, it is considered exogenous.  
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼 (4) 
When technological progress is growing at a constant rate, output may be 
considered as technology-adjusted per worker.  
 
5.3.1.1 Dealing with heterogeneity of cross-country fixed effects 
Countries are heterogeneous and their production functions differ. Brock and 
Durlauf (2001) remarked that ‘assumption of parameter homogeneity seems 
particularly inappropriate when one is studying complex heterogeneous objects 
such as countries’ (p. 8 & 9).  Many empirical studies utilise aggregate production 
functions that can only offer an ‘appropriate construct’ in cross-country analysis, if 
the economies under investigation are not largely different in sectoral structure 
(Eberhardt & Teal, 2013, p. 4). A single production function presumes a singular 
prevailing level of production technology across all economies with the same factor 
prices. Advanced developed economies would develop productivity-enhancing 
technologies that are appropriate for their own capital-labour ratios, which poorer 
economies may find difficult to replicate within their own capital-labour ratios 
(Eberhardt & Teal, 2013).  
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Accepting as a stylized fact that technology capabilities differ across 
economies, aggregated production technology will not yield useful results. Country 
relevant ‘distortions’ such as resource wealth, population growth rate and savings 
rate justify the calculation of country specific technology parameters in cross-
country studies. Country-level analysis mitigates against assumptions of 
homogeneity that persist in aggregate constructs.  The growth accounting 
framework used in this thesis will be based on the Solow (1956) growth model, with 
the assumption that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is unknown and exogenous. Rather than an aggregate 
production function for the full sample, economy specific production functions have 
been estimated with country specific indicators for 𝛼𝛼.   
The production function assumes a common growth rate of technological 
progress across all firms in an economy, facing the same factor price.  It assumes 
sectoral homogeneity (Eberhardt & Teal, 2013).  Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin 
(2001) argue that the Solow model is substantially enhanced by not assuming 
parameter-heterogeneity, but instead allowing for country-specific production 
functions. Eberhardt and Teal (2011) suggest that the model was never intended to 
predict homogenous specifications for all economies, but to investigate economy 
specific parameters.  Empirical studies now consider heterogeneous panel models 
where parameters can differ over units. Eberhardt and Teal (2011) concur that 
heterogeneity is central to understanding the growth process.  
Panel estimators assume that if there are similarities in the process bring 
about the data in different units, the efficiency of the parameter estimation can be 
increased by bringing together data from different units. Panel data enables the 
estimation of models to answer questions that cannot be otherwise answered solely 
with: i) time-series data; such as the effect of unobserved common factors or ii) 
cross-section data; such as the patterns of adaptations for change. Panels inject 
flexibility in how parameter heterogeneity can be defined, e.g. over time or over 
units (Eberhardt & Teal, 2011).  In a linear model with data (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇, 𝑖𝑖 =1, … ,𝑁𝑁 where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a 𝑘𝑘 × 1 vector of exogenous variables.  When 𝑇𝑇 is small, the 
data has to be interpreted as a set of cross-sections and when 𝑁𝑁 is small, as a set 
of time series. When both 𝑁𝑁 and  𝑇𝑇 are large there is an alternative option. The data 
can be treated as a set of 𝑇𝑇 cross-section regressions, allowing the parameters to 
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diverge freely over time and independence is assumed both over time and over 
units.  
 
5.3.1.2 Empirical model and data for calculating productivity 
To calculate levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in selected developing economies for the period 1990 to 
2014, this thesis uses official public data from the World Bank Development 
Indicators (‘WDI’) and Penn World Tables.  A detailed description of the country 
sample is set out at Table 5.1). To generate 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 this thesis adopts the Cobb-
Douglas production function. These economies have been included in this research 
based on the both the availability of data, economic relevance and shared historical 
origin. The dataset includes a mix of economies with varying population growth 
rates, economic growth rates and capital-labour ratios.  A detailed description of the 
dataset used to calculate the productivity factor are provided in Table 5.2). 
To estimate the extent to which neoclassical assumptions that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 matters 
for labour productivity growth in the selected developing economies, this thesis will 
estimate country specific Cobb-Douglas production functions with a Solow residual 
(Solow, 1956). The production function estimation will use the theoretical framework 
drawn from Hall and Jones (1999).   Hall and Jones (1999) use a simple Cobb-
Douglas production function with the Solow residual in equation (4), to decompose 
GDP (constant) into factors of production and productivity. However, unlike Hall and 
Jones (1999) this thesis will not include human capital-augmented labour.  The 
inclusion of human capital-augmented labour could potentially result in 
measurement errors as differences in educational attainment and labour force skill 
levels may be accounted for in both 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and human capital-augmented labour.  
Instead, this thesis will use a ‘simple’ Cobb-Douglas production function that only 
decomposes output amongst physical capital, labour and Hicks-neutral productivity. 
The base Cobb-Douglas production function also assumes that labour is 
homogenous within a country and that each unit of labour has been trained with the 
same number of years of education.  Assumptions about how one additional year of 
education will influence national output will be taken account for in the measure of 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. 
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Table 5.1: Sample economies: middle- and low-income 
Country Income level 
Bangladesh Lower Middle 
Botswana Upper Middle 
Egypt Lower Middle 
Ghana Lower Middle 
India Lower Middle 
Jamaica Upper Middle 
Kenya Lower Middle 
Malawi Low  
Malaysia Upper Middle 
Mauritius Upper Middle 
Nigeria Lower Middle 
Pakistan Lower Middle 
Sierra Leone Low  
Sri Lanka Lower Middle 
Tanzania Low  
Zambia Lower Middle 
Zimbabwe Low  
 
Notes: For the current 2018 fiscal year, high income economies are those with a GNI per 
capital of $12,236 or more; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita 
between $3,956 and $12,235; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per 
capita between $1,006 and $3,955; and low-income economies are those with a GNI per 
capita of $1,005 or less in 2016. During the period under examination, some economies 
would have moved up and down the scale from low-income to upper-middle income and vice 
versa. GNI per capita is calculated using the World Bank Atlas method.  
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of data used to calculate productivity 
Variable Description Mean Min Max N 
Y Gross Domestic Product (GDP constant 2010 US$). The sum 
of gross value added by all national producers and any product 
taxes minus any subsidies not otherwise included in the value of 
the products.  Calculated without deducting for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Dollar figures are converted from domestic currencies 
using 2010 official exchange rates.  Source: (World Bank, 2017) 
 
127,731,971,864.31 1,297,819,715.62 2,629,542,211,700.51 510 
GFK Gross fixed capital formation (constant 2010 US$) 1989 - 
2015.  The outlays on increasing fixed assets and net changes in 
inventories.  Fixed assets include land improvements; plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of 
transportation infrastructure (such as roads and railways) and 
public good infrastructure (such as schools, offices, hospitals); 
construction of residential homes and commercial buildings; 
inventory of stock; and ‘work in progress.’ Source: (World Bank, 
2017) 
 
38,928,378,498.07 37,371,137.60 847,063,341,806.71 405 
Missing 
Capital 
Capital stock at constant national prices (in mil. 2011US$) 
1990 - 2015. Capital stock for economies for which GFK was not 
available (Ghana, Jamaica, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe).  
Source: (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015) 
 
12,283,235,429.69 4,314,299,218.75 31,234,712,500.00 130 
L Total labour.  Comprises people ages 15 and older who meet the 
International Labour Organization definition of the economically 
active population; all people who supply labour to produce goods 
and services during a specified period.  It includes both the 
employed and the unemployed.  Source: (World Bank, 2017) 
 
39,734,812 450,355 520,194,130 476 
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5.3.1.3 Calculating capital stock  
Typically, capital stock data (𝐴𝐴) will not be readily available, particularly for 
developing economies.  Data on gross fixed capital formation (constant 2010 US$) 
from the WDI is used to construct a good ‘proxy’ for capital stock.  To create the 
capital stock series the perpetual inventory method has been used: 
 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 (5) 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 is the time t level of capital stock at the beginning of the previous period 
(1989); 𝐼𝐼t-1  is gross investment in the 1989, and consumption of fixed capital is 
represented by 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡. Equation (5) assumes geometric depreciation at a constant rate 
𝛿𝛿. 
   The perpetual inventory method assumes that increases in capital formation 
represent increases in the stock of an economy’s investment in inventory 
(Berlemann & Wesselhoft, 2014).  Further, that once an investment enters the stock 
of an economy’s inventory, it remains there forever and perpetually provides 
services to the inventory owner (Berlemann & Wesselhoft, 2014).  Though its value 
may decrease over time at the rate of depreciation, its value will never fall to zero. 
Depending on the availability of data, some of the time series for many of the 
economies in the sample date back to as early as 1960, providing a rich database 
for comparative empirical analysis, adopting the disequilibrium approach first 
adopted by Griliches (1980) and refined by de la Fuente and Doménech (2006), 
based on the neoclassical growth model.  
 de la Fuente and Doménech (2006) argue that the economy is not 
commonly in its long-run equilibrium, which makes it reasonable to assume that 
they are most of the time on their adjustment path towards equilibrium. Economies 
differ in asset composition and depreciation across assets, de la Fuente and 
Doménech (2006) argue that during this adjustment process, investment and capital 
accumulation will follow a systematic pattern. They propose the use of a Hodrick-
Prescott-Filter to smooth the time-series of investment data, using the average of 
the first ten observations as a proxy for the growth rate of investment. Though using 
a filter like the HP-Filter, will tend to provide inefficient results at the start and 
endpoints of a sample, as the first observations are typically dropped, leading to a 
loss of information.  Instead Berlemann and Wesselhoft (2014) suggest what they 
call a ‘unified approach’ to estimate capital stock. 
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 The unified approach combines three approaches to calculating initial capital 
stock.  It begins at the disequilibrium approach, but does not use a filter to estimate 
initial investment value, calculates the growth rate of investments using an 
estimated parameter and uses a time-varying depreciation rate.  Initial capital 
investment value 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is derived using an OLS regression approach to estimate time 
series log investment 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) for any country 𝑖𝑖 on time 𝑡𝑡: 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (6) 
The fitted value for period 𝑡𝑡1, is calculated using the estimated parameters 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, using the exponential function: 
 ln�𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡1�� = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑡𝑡1 (7) 
The resulting time series of investment ranging from 𝑡𝑡1 to 𝑇𝑇 is used to calculate the 
initial capital stock in period 𝑡𝑡0. The estimated parameter of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is used to measure 
the trend investment growth. Depreciation rates were used from PWT, which 
depending on data availability go as far back as 1960 for many of the economies in 
the sample.   
 
5.3.1.4 Calculating 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
Productivity cannot be measured directly, except through growth accounting (Solow, 
1956, 1957).  Growth accounting indirectly measures productivity as the residual or 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 after decomposing the growth rate of output by its inputs (labour and physical 
capital) (Solow, 1956, 1957). In order to decompose the proximate causes of 
economic output and calculate levels of productivity this thesis adopted a Solow 
(1957) production function model to find productivity as the residual.  Applying it to 
panel data, symmetry between time and space are exploited and Solow’s time index 
is replaced by country index 𝑖𝑖 and time 𝑡𝑡. This will yield results that can identify the 
importance of factor inputs and productivity in explaining cross-country differences 
in levels of national output.  This method provides similar results to those derived 
from the Cobb-Douglas production function and constant elasticities to substitution 
(CES) methods.  
Solow concluded that: 
 𝑦𝑦� = 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘� + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)ℎ� + ?̂?𝐴 (8) 
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where 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑌𝑌/𝐿𝐿, 𝑘𝑘 = 𝐴𝐴/𝐿𝐿, and the hat (ˆ) indicates the log derivative with respect to 
the country index 𝑖𝑖.  This equation proposes that the proportional increase in output 
per worker, 𝑦𝑦� is equal to a weighted average of the proportional increase in physical 
capital per worker and 𝑘𝑘�, where the weight is capital’s share (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) plus the 
proportional increase in productivity (?̂?𝐴).  The measurement of capital’s share of 
income is typically based on the assumption that firms face competitive factor 
markets.  
 Solow’s approach also requires an assumption that the derivation of 
technology, labour, capital and the factor share are differentiable functions of the 
country index. Traditionally, to use this approach across economies, the economies 
must be ordered in a way that similar economies are next to each other. This 
analysis will be seeking to identify country specific productivity levels, using country-
specific measures of capital and labour’s share of income derived from PWT. There 
will be no need to order the economies in this sample. Following Hall and Jones 
(1996) finite differences are used in place of derivatives to solve equation (8): 
 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖)∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 (9) 
Equation (9) calculates productivity as the residual, ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴, the difference in 
productivity. The resulting (log) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 yields not only relative productivity levels, but 
identifies overall factor input contributions to output. This information is used to 
provide a cross-country analysis of real GDP.  
 
5.3.2 Calculating the aggregate institutional index 
RQ2: To investigate the relationship between different levels of national 
output in a sample of 17 selected developing economies and different 
categories of institutions. 
Institutions are multifaceted and encompass a range of attributes, making it difficult 
to undertake cross-country comparisons. de Crombrugghe and Farla (2012) 
suggest that it is an ‘institutionally heterogeneous world’ comprised of complex 
relationships between institutional indicators, income levels, growth rates and 
growth volatility (p. 3).  Different institutional attributes matter at different stages of 
economic development. The institutional infrastructure required to promote 
productivity can differ significantly from one country to another.    
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 To avoid issues of collinearity arising from strong correlations amongst 
institutional indicators, this study will use factor analysis (‘FA’) followed by varimax 
rotation to isolate the underlying correlation structure (Siddiqui & Ahmed, 2013). 
Institutions develop endogenously and this increases the potential for 
contemporaneous correlation amongst any proxies used to examine institutional 
quality (Fabro & Aixalá, 2013).  Endogeneity issues can lead to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates that make it impossible to arrive at a dependable 
inference of the relationship between different institutional dimensions and 
economic growth (Angeles, 2010). FA reduces the institutional indicators to fewer 
components that better explain the variance of correlation amongst all institutional 
indicators (Siddiqui & Ahmed, 2013).     
More recently, Narayan, Narayan, and Thuraisamy (2014); Narayan, 
Sharma, and Thuraisamy (2015) and Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013) used principal 
component analysis to extract new institutional indicators from a larger sub-set of 
correlated institutional indices. Narayan et al. (2014); Narayan et al. (2015) used 
institutional indices from the ICRG to study the effect of institutional quality on stock 
market returns. Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013) also used institutional indicators from 
ICRG, but combined them with indicators from the Business Environment 
Intelligence (‘BERI’) and the World Bank World Governance Indicators (‘WGI’) to 
examine how institutional quality influences economic growth in the theoretical 
framework proposed by North (1990).  
 
5.3.2.1 Data used to estimate institutional factor 
To calculate the aggregate institutional index for selected developing economies, 
this thesis uses public data for the fifteen year period (1990 to 2014) from the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index (‘EFW’) computed by Gwartney, 
Lawson, and Hall (2016)  (Table 5.3) and Appendix (A)). The EFW ranks the degree 
to which policies and institutions are supportive of economic freedom (Gwartney, 
Lawson, & Hall, 2017).  The component ratings within each area are averaged to 
deduce ratings for each of the five areas.  These five area ratings are then averaged 
to determine the summary rating for each country. Three of the five ratings will be 
used as indicators for this thesis: (i) legal system and property rights; (ii) sound 
money; (iii) freedom to trade internationally; and (iv) regulation of credit, labour and 
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business. Data for the omitted years between 1990 and 1999 were linearly 
interpolated.   
   
5.3.2.2 Calculating four institutional factor indicators 
To examine the influence of the different categories of institutions (market-creating, 
market-regulating, market-legitimising and market-stabilising) on the factors of 
production and productivity, this thesis has used FA to identify four institutional 
factor indicators.  The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) was used to determine the 
number of factors that would be extracted for inclusion in the estimation of the 
model, with a lower risk of high collinearity.  The Kaiser criterion specifies that a 
factor is not extracted unless it significantly explains the variance of at least one 
variable (eigenvalue >1).  Factors are latent constructs created using aggregated 
measured variables and so should consist of more than a single measure variable. 
It seems logical that meaningful factors should have eigenvalues greater than 1.  
For a higher explanatory power, extracted factors should together explain at least 
50 percent of the total cumulative variance (Kaiser, 1960).  At this stage, the FA 
model is not hypothesised, therefore, there is no stipulation that the factors should 
be uncorrelated given the fact that institutions are endogenous and interdependent, 
factors are likely to have some correlation.  
The FA was followed by a varimax rotation.  Not only were the resulting 
dimensions of the variables reduced, they were also orthogonal to each other, which 
diminishes the correlation of the individual variables in the final sample. The 
unrotated results would be basically impossible to construe because all the 
measured variables are highly correlated with the latent constructs (Yaremko, 
Harari, Harrison, & Lynn, 2013).  A more interpretation-friendly explanation strikes a 
balance between having enough measured variables correlated with a factor that 
some measured variables disclose the hidden nature of the factor.  However, not so 
many correlated variables that the factors cannot be differentiated from each other 
or are so compounded that their nature cannot be easily understood (Yaremko et 
al., 2013).  Factors are always orthogonal consequent to extraction and remain 
uncorrelated if orthogonal rotation is used.  The most common orthogonal rotation 
method is the varimax rotation method developed by Kaiser (1958). It is considered 
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a default method of rotation and tends to concentrate on maximising the differences 
between the squared pattern/structure coefficients on a factor.  
Although the criteria for factor loadings cut-offs continues to be asserted in 
the literature (Feinstein, Fallon, Petkova, & Liebowitz, 2003; Jacka et al., 2010), 
Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010) (cited in Bartels, Napolitano, and Tissi 
(2014)) suggest that component loadings can be smaller with larger samples and 
larger number of variables to be analysed. However, the larger the number of 
components extracted, larger should be the loadings for statistical significance.  
Shapiro, Lasarev, and McCauley (2002) suggest a cut-off range of ≥0.4 to ≥0.6.  
Conversely, Comrey and Lee (2013) suggest that loadings of ≥0.30 are salient, and 
cut-offs between 0.30 and 0.60 are usual.  In this thesis a cut-off of 0.40 coefficient 
loadings was used allowing each factor to explain at least 16% (that is, 0.402 x 100) 
of the variance in the respective variable. The retained components were 
categorised based on Rodrik (2005) categories of market-creating (MC), market-
regulating (MR), market-legitimising (ML) and market-stabilising (MS) institutions.  
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Table 5.3: Institutional quality indicators taken from the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World Index 
Area of Economic Freedom Institutional Indicator 
Legal System & Property 
Rights 
Judicial independence 
Impartial courts 
Protection of property rights 
Military interference in rule of law and politics 
Legal enforcement of contracts 
Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real 
property 
Reliability of police 
Sound Money Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts 
Freedom to trade 
internationally 
Regulatory trade barriers 
Black market exchange rates 
Foreign ownership/investment restrictions 
Capital controls 
Freedom of foreigners to visit 
Credit market regulations Credit market regulations 
Labour market regulations 
Hiring regulations and minimum wage 
Hiring and firing regulations 
Centralized collective bargaining 
Hours Regulations 
Mandated cost of worker dismissal 
Conscription 
Business Regulations 
Administrative requirements 
Starting a business 
Extra payments/bribes/favouritism 
Licensing restrictions 
 
 
5.3.3 Investigating the relationship between institutions and the factors of 
production and productivity 
From RQ2 the following research null hypotheses will be tested using the calculated 
aggregate institutional index: 
Null hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between national institutional 
infrastructure and differences in levels of investment in physical capital stock in 
selected developing economies; 
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Null hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between national institutional 
infrastructure and differences in levels of investment in labour stock in selected 
developing economies; 
Null hypothesis 4: There is no relationship between national institutional 
infrastructure and differences in levels of productivity in selected developing 
economies. 
These null hypotheses assume that the accumulation of capital stock and labour 
stock and productivity are not influenced by the institutional infrastructure and that 
the coefficient of the aggregate institutional index and the four institutional factors 
will be zero. Rejection of these null hypotheses will provide evidence of the 
functional relationship between institutions and decisions to invest in and 
accumulate physical capital and labour and productivity.  Rejection of these 
hypotheses will provide support for the argument that institutions can enhance or 
hinder activities that support productive investment in the sample of selected 
developing economies. 
Existing economic theory suggests that institutions are endogenously 
devised (Fabro & Aixalá, 2013).  For this reason, previous studies have controlled 
for the fixed effects of the macroeconomic variables in their model on institutions 
and vice versa.  Endogeneity issues can lead to biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates that make it impossible to arrive at a dependable inference of the 
relationship between institutions and economic performance (Angeles, 2010).  This 
thesis uses FA to reduce the correlation amongst the institution factors.  Diagnostic 
Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity were conducted to assess the 
relationship amongst institutions and GDP per capita, capital stock, labour stock and 
the calculated 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  The results of these tests suggest that the aggregate 
institutional index and the four institutional factors should not be treated as 
endogenous, but as an exogenous variable (Table 5.4).  
Table 5.4: Tests of endogeneity 
H0 : variables are exogenous  
Durbin (score) chi2(1) 1.40 (p=0.24) 
Wu-Hausman F(1,402) 1.39 (p=0.24) 
  
Test of overidentification restriction:  
Hansen’s J chi2(2) 8.93 (p=0.01) 
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The following models will be used to assess the influence of institutions on 
long-run economic performance of the selected developing economies:  
 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝐺𝐺 + 𝜀𝜀 (10) 
 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝐺𝐺 + 𝜀𝜀 (11) 
 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 𝐺𝐺 + 𝜀𝜀  (12) 
In all estimations, the 𝑋𝑋 vector consists of control variables, consisting of the 
logarithm of initial GDP per capita to account for conditional convergence, lagged 
capital and labour stocks, to take account of previous investments in capital and 
labour, lagged GDP per capita and lagged 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇; 𝐺𝐺 are time-fixed effects and 𝜀𝜀 is the 
error term. Neoclassical economic growth theory predicts that the 𝑋𝑋 vector in 
Equations (10), (11) and  (12) should be exogenous variables that would not be 
highly correlated with the error terms. Based on the results of the tests for 
endogeneity, the institutional index and four institution factors will be treated as 
exogenous. This would suggest that estimations through ordinary least square 
regression estimation should not lead to biased coefficients.  
To separate the potential effect of slightly biased results of the actual effect 
of institutions in a simple estimation of levels at the beginning of the period, the 𝑋𝑋 
vector control variables were included. These controls capture the effect of past 
capital investment, past increases in labour stock and past economic performance 
on the left side of the model. The control variables in the models are factors that are 
broadly used in empirical growth literature. It is known that previous investments in 
capital, labour and prior economic performance have some influence on current and 
future decisions to invest in capital, labour and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  The control variables on the 
right side of the model account for the confounding bias that may arise from omitted 
variable bias or measurement errors (Kennedy, 2003).  As such the 𝑋𝑋 factor should 
capture the most essential non-institutional determinants of capital, labour and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, 
while ensuring that the specification remains sufficiently parsimonious to include a 
diverse set of economies, in line with Berggren, Bergh, and Bjørnskov (2012).  
There is still a potential for spurious results due to omitted variable bias, for which 2 
Stage Least-Squares (‘2SLS’) estimation are used to test the robustness of the 
simple models at equations (10), (11) and  (12). 
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These are two-way effect models that include both time- and country-fixed 
effects to allow the estimation of these models to identify the growth effect of 
institutions from changes within the economies, not from differences in levels across 
the cross section of economies (Rodrik, 2008b).  Both national and specific changes 
would have occurred in different periods, influenced by the relationship between the 
variables (Pelinescu, 2015). The coefficient of interest throughout this thesis is 𝛽𝛽, 
whether its coefficient is zero (𝛽𝛽 = 0), and there is no effect of institutions on capital 
stock, labour stock and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  This thesis will use a reduce-form econometric model 
to determine whether differences in institutions across economies explain cross-
country differences in investment in physical capital, labour and productivity.   
The effect of institutions across the sample could be interpreted as either 
fixed or random (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998).  Using FE or RE assists the assessment 
of the ‘within’ variation of the effect of institutions on the dependent variables in 
equations (10), (11) and (12).  Thus, the inclusion of the 𝑋𝑋 factor to control for the 
effects across economies and time that cannot be directly measured or observed. 
Controlling for these unobserved and unmeasured differences removes the cross-
sectional variation related to unobserved heterogeneity, such as unobserved 
economy specific effects (Kennedy, 2003).  The remaining variation or ‘within’ 
variation can then be used to identify the relationship between 𝛽𝛽 and physical 
capital and labour stocks and productivity.  Fixed effect of institutions might be 
interpreted as initial levels of individual economies’ production capacities with no 
capital investment, labour investment or productivity; each economy is allowed to 
have its own initial production capacity (Kennedy, 2003).   
A fixed effect of institutions may be evidence that their effect is constant 
across the sample economies. Alternatively, a random effect may be evidence of 
consistency or stability of production.  In a fixed effect model, the null hypothesis is 
that all dummy parameters (𝐺𝐺) except for the dropped one are all zero (𝐻𝐻0:𝜇𝜇1 =
⋯ =  𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1 = 0). The alternative hypothesis is that at least one dummy parameter is 
not zero. This hypothesis was tested by an F test, which is based on the loss of 
goodness-of-fit and examines the intensity with which the goodness-of-fit measures 
changed.  The F test was highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level (p=0.0013). 
This null hypothesis that the coefficients for all years are jointly equal to zero is not 
rejected at the 0.01 level and therefore fixed-effects are needed in this case.  In 
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examining whether there are country-specific fixed effects using the F test, all 
country dummy parameters were omitted for collinearity.  This suggest that the 
correlation between the independent parameter and the country dummy parameter 
is such that they express a linear relationship in the model (Wooldridge, 2010). They 
cannot independently predict the value of the dependent variable.  In other words, 
some of the variance in the dependent variables can be explained by both the 
independent parameters and country-specific parameters, which in turn reduces the 
statistical significance of the independent parameters of interest.  Including country 
dummies may result in spurious p-values and reduce the significance level of the 
coefficient of institutions.  
If levels of capital stock, labour stock or 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 fluctuate significantly, up or 
down, it is evidence that economic performance is not stable (or its variance 
component is larger than those of other economies) even when its productivity slope 
may remain the same across the sample economies (Wooldridge, 2010). To 
determine the appropriateness of either fixed or random effect estimation, the 
Hausman specification test will be used to compare a random effect model to its 
fixed counterpart. If the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated 
with the other regressors is not rejected, a random effect model is favoured over a 
fixed effect model.  More particularly in the estimation of equations (10), (11) and  
(12) if the null hypothesis is rejected (at least one time-specific intercept is not zero), 
it can be concluded that there is a significant fixed effect or significant increase in 
the goodness-of-fit in the fixed effect model 
Both 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 contain zero values and will not be converted as 
logarithm (logarithm of zero is not defined) and to avoid all zero-𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 
observations being dropped. Logarithms eliminate values of ‘zero’ and negative 
values. In this dataset, there are instances where variables are zero (no data) or 
negative. Such values will be eliminated from the estimation. The natural logarithm 
is being used for the other variables to increase the accuracy of the models’ 
estimations. This is useful in reducing heteroscedasticity, particularly as the models 
are testing for the relationship between variables.  
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5.3.4 Robustness checks using 2 stage least squares, including 
instrumental variables 
The validity of the fixed effect and random effect estimations of equations (10), (11) 
and (12) depend on the assumption that institutions are exogenous and that there 
may be fixed or random time- or economy-specific effects. Although these 
presumptions are reasonable, they can be substantiated by directly controlling for 
potential correlation between institutions and physical capital, labour or productivity 
and checking whether the addition of an instrumental variable affects the base 
estimates. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue for the importance of settler mortality as a 
determinant of current institutions.  Acemoglu et al. (2001) assumed that the effect 
of historical instruments on the persistence of institutional quality is linear.  The 
historical instrument is measured by the log of potential settler mortality capped at 
250 per 1000 based on the uncapped settler mortality variable computed by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001). Including these historical instruments means that the 
resulting regression coefficients must be interpreted in terms of the time lag 
between the instrument and the contemporary measure. These historical 
instruments do not have a direct effect on contemporary levels of physical capital, 
labour or productivity and are therefore valid instruments (Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
The advantage of this approach is that settler mortality more than 100 years ago 
should have no effect on contemporary economic performance, except through their 
effect on institutions.  
 
5.4 Summary 
This thesis will adopt a positivist-deductivitst approach to investigate the relationship 
between institutions and productivity and their effect on national output in 
developing economies. To conduct this investigation this thesis will:   
RQ1: investigate the relationship between differences in levels of national 
output of a sample of 17 selected developing economies and 
differences in levels of productivity. . 
RQ2: investigate the relationship between different levels of national output 
in a sample of 17 selected developing economies and different 
categories of institutions. 
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To conduct these investigations, this thesis will use models framed in the 
neoclassical economic growth theory.  Research question 1 will be investigated 
using Cobb-Douglas production function to calculate levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 for 17 selected 
developing economies, using publicly available, official data from the World Bank 
Development Indicators and Penn World Tables.  Before investigating research 
question 2, this thesis will calculate an aggregate institutional index using factor 
analysis, for the selected 17 developing economies.  This factor analysis exercise 
will be conducted using public data from the Economic Freedom of the World Index 
accessed from the Freedom House.  The factor analysis will also be used to 
generate four institutional factors.  
To test for the influence of institution on the factors of production in the 17 
selected developing economies, this thesis will use the aggregate institutional index 
and the four institutional factors and test them against capital stock calculated using 
data from WDI and PWT and against labour stock data collected from WDI.  These 
tests will be conducted using either fixed effect or random effect estimation models. 
The influence of institutions on productivity in the 17 selected developing economies 
will be tested using the aggregate institutional index and the four institutional factors 
against the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 calculated in the growth accounting exercise.  These tests will be 
conducted using either fixed effect or random effect estimation models.  Hausman 
specification tests will be conducted to determine the appropriateness of either a 
fixed or random effect estimation. 
110 
 
CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the descriptive statistics for data used to investigate the 
relationship between institutions and productivity and their effect on national output 
in the 17 selected developing economies. This Chapter also presents empirical 
results of the estimation of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, factor analysis to calculate an aggregate 
institutional index and institutional factors and the various regression estimations 
used to investigate the relationship among institutions, the factors of production and 
productivity for the 17 selected developing economies.   
 
6.2 Summary of results of growth accounting exercise to 
calculate 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 in selected developing economies 
This section outlines the results of the calculation of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 for 17 selected developing 
economies, using public data from the World Bank Development Indicators.  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
was calculated using Cobb-Douglas Production function with a Solow residual. The 
descriptive statistics reported in Table 6.1 shows that there is a strongly balanced 
panel of 442 observations for each of GDP, capital stock and labour stock for the 17 
selected developing economies. Table 6.2 displays the contribution (in logs) of each 
capital, labour and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 to national output for the selected 17 economies.  
 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used to calculate TFP  
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Real GDP 442 0.04 0.05 -0.21 0.34 
Capital Stock (𝐴𝐴) 442 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.80 
Labour Stock (𝐿𝐿) 442 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.06 
 
Notes: Data for GDP constant at 2010 US$ from World Bank (2017). Data for labour stock from World 
Bank (2017).  Capital stock author’s calculation using data on gross fixed capital formation (constant 
2010 US$) from (World Bank, 2017) and capital depreciation rates from Feenstra et al. (2015).  
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Table 6.2 shows that there is an extremely weak correlation amongst GDP, 
capital and labour, though there is a strong correlation between GDP and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
(column 1).  Diagnostic tests of variance inflation factor (VIF) also indicate that there 
is moderate multicollinearity amongst the variables used to decompose national 
output (mean VIF 1.00). The correlation of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth, aggregate capital and labour 
stock growth is zero.  This would suggest that it is possible to uniquely estimate the 
fraction of output growth that is due to aggregate capital or labour stock growth and 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth absent any other assumptions about the correlation of output growth 
due to aggregate factor input growth and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth. This will lend support to the 
argument that much of the significance of the variance of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth across these 
selected developing economies is associated with negative 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth.  Amongst 
these 17 selected developing economies the average 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 expected growth is 0 
percent per year.  This means that if one of the 17 economies are chosen at random 
with equal probability, the expected growth rate of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is 0 percent per year.  This is 
hardly suggestive of technological change.   
 
Table 6.2: Results of Pearson correlation analysis of the relationship between GDP 
(log), capital stock (log), labour stock (log) and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (log)  
(In logs) GDP Capital Stock 
Labour 
Stock 
Capital Stock 0.09 (0.06) 1 
 
Labour Stock 0.01 (0.88) 
-0.12** 
(0.01) 1 
TFP 0.87** (0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.78) 
-0.01 
(0.80) 
 
Notes: 442 observations for each variable. The correlation of all data in logs. **Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level. p value in brackets. 
 
Table 6.2 shows that there is a statistically significant negative (at the one 
percent level) relationship between capital stock and labour stock (r(440) = -0.12, 
p=0.01) . The null hypothesis is not rejected at the 0.01 level.  Not surprisingly, 
there is evidence that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is highly statistically positively significant at the one 
percent level (r(440) = 0.87, p=0.01).  Holding all other variables constant, a unit 
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increase in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is expected to be associated with approximately an 80 percent 
increase in national output amongst these 17 selected developing economies.   
 
Table 6.3: Results of least square regression of GDP, capital stock, labour stock 
and TFP for the period 1990 to 2015 
(In logs) GDP 
Capital Stock 0.05* 
(2.25) 
Labour stock 0.15 
(0.96) 
TFP 1.00*** 
(37.60) 
Constant 0.040*** 
(18.11) 
Obs 442 
R 0.87 
R2 0.76 
 
Notes: Least square regression to examine whether there is a relationship between 
GDP and the proximate determinants of economic growth (capital stock, labour 
stock and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. All data used in the least square regression was in logs. Dependent 
variable GDP, independent variables are capital stock, labour stock and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. t 
statistics in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
113 
 
Figure 6.1: Scatter plot of predicted line of the association between GDP and 
productivity for the period 1990 to 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 displays the least squares regression results of the estimation of 
the relationship amongst GDP, capital stock, labour stock and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. The data set 
used to calculate 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 yields interesting results for the productivity of capital stock 
and labour stock in the 17 selected developing economies for the period 1990 to 
2015. Not unexpectedly, there is evidence of a strong positive statistical relationship 
between GDP and  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (in logs) (Figure 6.1: Scatter with predicted line of 
relationship between GDP and productivity). However, unexpectedly, these selected 
developing economies exhibit high levels of extensive growth, particularly 
characterised by consistently increasing levels of capital stocks (Table 6.4: Average 
percentage change (log) of sources of growth of 17 selected developing economies 
1990 to 2015). Appendix (B) graphically portrays the decomposition of the sources 
of economic growth in the 17 selected developing economies.  
 
The first column of Table 6.4 shows each economies’ output growth. 
Unsurprisingly none of the economies have achieved more than one percentage 
change in economic growth over the 25-year period. Apart from Zimbabwe, Jamaica 
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and Malawi, the remaining 15 economies experienced nearly identical rates of 
economic growth over the full period. The remaining columns of Table 6.4 
decompose percentage changes (in logs) in economic growth into contributions 
from capital stock, labour stock and productivity. The increase in economic growth 
in the 17 selected developing economies is primarily determined by changes in 
capital stock (column 2). 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 levels are expectedly low for all 17 selected 
developing economies. Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt exhibited comparatively higher 
percentage changes in GDP constant from 1989 to 1990 and higher percentage 
changes in productivity from 1989 to 1990 (Figure 6.2: Productivity and real GDP in 
1990).   
 
In 1990 each unit change of TFP is associated with a 100-percent increase 
in real GDP in the selected developing economies (Figure 6.2: Productivity and real 
GDP in 1990).  By 2000 a unit change in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 on average associated with a positive 
increase of 76 percent in real GDP in the selected developing economies (Figure 
6.3: Productivity and real GDP in 2000). By 2015, a unit change in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 on average 
is associated with a 95 percent percentage increase in real GDP in the selected 
developing economies (Figure 6.4: Productivity and real GDP in 2015).  
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Table 6.4: Average percentage change (log) of sources of growth of 17 selected 
developing economies 1990 to 2015  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Results of Cobb-Douglas production function with 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 as Solow residual equation: 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼. Data for GDP constant at 2010 US$ from World Bank (2017). Capital 
stock author’s calculation using perpetual inventory method with data on gross fixed capital 
formation (constant 2010 US$) from World Bank (2017) and capital depreciation rates from 
Feenstra et al. (2015). Data for labour stock from World Bank (2017).  TFP author’s 
calculations using data on GDP, capital stock and labour stock from World Bank (2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP 
Constant 
Contribution to National Output 
Country 
Capital 
Stock 
Labour 
Stock 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
BGD 0.05 0.04 0.01 0 
BWA 0.05 0.04 0.01 0 
EGY 0.04 0.02 0.01 0 
GHA 0.06 0.02 0.01 0 
IND 0.07 0.03 0.01 0 
JAM 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
KEN 0.04 0.03 0.01 0 
LKA 0.05 0.02 0 0 
MUS 0.05 0.02 0.01 0 
MWI 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
MYS 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 
NGA 0.06 0.03 0.01 0 
PAK 0.04 0.01 0.02 0 
SLE 0.03 0.10 0.01 0 
TZA 0.05 0.02 0.01 0 
ZMB 0.05 0 0.02 0 
ZWE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
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Figure 6.2: Productivity and real GDP in 1990 for the sample of 17 selected 
developing economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data for Output per Worker from World Bank (2017). TFP author’s calculations from 
data retrieved from World Bank (2017) 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Productivity and real GDP in 2000 for the sample of 17 selected 
developing economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data for GDP per capitafrom World Bank (2017). TFP author’s calculations from data 
retrieved from World Bank (2017) 
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Figure 6.4: Productivity and real GDP in 2015 for the sample of 17 selected 
developing economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data for GDP per capita from World Bank (2017). TFP author’s calculations from 
data retrieved from World Bank (2017) 
 
 
 
6.3 Summary of the results of calculating the aggregate 
institutional index and four institutional factors 
This section sets out the results of the calculation of the aggregate institutional 
index for 17 selected developing economies for the period 1991 to 2015, using 
public data from EFW.  The institutional index was calculated using factor analysis. 
Table 6.5 presents descriptive statistics of EFW data after missing data has been 
imputed.  It indicates that after imputing missing data there is a strongly balanced 
panel of 425 observations for each of the 24 institutional indicators for the period 
1991 to 2015. 
Table 6.6 presents the average value of the market-legitimising, market-
creating, market-stabilising, market-regulating institutional factors and the aggregate 
institutional index, by economy for the period 1991 to 2015. Appendix B provides a 
graphical portrayal of the trend of these institutional factors over the period for the 
17 selected developing economies. Figure 6.5 displays the relationship between the 
institutional index and the measured percentage change of GDP per capita (in logs) 
in 1991 for the 17 selected developing economies. The economies with the highest 
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measured percentage change of GDP per capita in 1991 were Malaysia, Malawi 
and Botswana are also among the economies with the highest levels of institutional 
indicators. Unexpectedly, it also indicates that three economies with the lowest 
percentage change in GDP per capita in 1991 (Zambia and Nigeria) have the same 
level of institutional indicators as Malaysia and Malawi.  
Figure 6.6 displays the association between the institutional index and the 
measured percentage change of GDP per capita in 2015 for the 17 selected 
developing economies. In 2015, the 17 selected economies all exhibit similar 
percentage changes of GDP per capita.  India has the highest measured 
percentage change in GDP per capita and is among the economies with the highest 
level of institutional indicators. Surprisingly, Ghana and Zimbabwe display the 
highest level of institutional indicators in 2015. Bangladesh maintains the same level 
of institutional indicators from 1991. In 2015, Sierra Leone displayed the least 
measured percentage change in GDP per capita, a reduction from 1991.  In 2015, 
Sierra Leone also displayed a reduced level of institutional indicator from 1991.  
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics of 24 EFW institutional indicators for the 17 selected 
developing economies. 
Notes: Data for 24 institutional indicators from Gwartney et al. (2017) after imputing missing 
data. 
 
 
Four factors were retained; they explained almost 72 percent of the total 
variance of the dataset.  After rotation, the first factor explained on average 22 
Variable Name Indicator Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Judicial independence efw1 425 -0.32 0.81 -2.64 2.56 
Impartial courts efw2 425 -0.36 0.85 -2.48 2.75 
Protection of property rights efw3 425 -0.28 0.96 -4.70 2.31 
Military interference in rule of law 
and politics efw4 425 -0.28 0.94 -3.88 3.01 
Legal enforcement of contracts efw5 425 -0.29 0.89 -3.75 1.80 
Regulatory restrictions on the sale 
of real property efw6 425 -0.28 1.03 -3.46 1.52 
Reliability of police efw7 425 -0.24 0.80 -4.25 3.30 
Freedom to own foreign currency 
bank accounts efw8 425 -0.06 0.90 -1.60 1.80 
Regulatory trade barriers efw9 425 -0.30 0.85 -2.85 3.43 
Black market exchange rates efw10 425 -0.09 1.11 -10.59 1.07 
Foreign ownership/investment 
restrictions efw11 425 -0.20 1.12 -4.64 2.53 
Capital controls efw12 425 -0.10 0.90 -2.48 1.96 
Freedom of foreigners to visit efw13 425 -0.14 1.07 -2.76 3.02 
Credit market regulations efw14 425 -0.24 0.99 -3.70 2.04 
Hiring regulations and minimum 
wage efw15 425 -0.19 1.10 -2.93 2.38 
Hiring and firing regulations efw16 425 0.00 0.85 -3.13 2.86 
Centralized collective bargaining efw17 425 -0.14 1.11 -3.79 3.32 
Hours Regulations efw18 425 -0.08 1.10 -3.67 2.54 
Mandated cost of worker dismissal efw19 425 -0.47 0.90 -1.93 3.75 
Conscription efw20 425 0.05 0.78 -2.67 0.46 
Administrative requirements efw21 425 -0.21 1.06 -7.04 2.68 
Starting a business efw22 425 -0.24 1.17 -4.19 2.05 
Extra payments/bribes/favouritism efw23 425 -0.36 0.83 -2.39 2.12 
Licensing restrictions efw24 425 -0.24 1.07 -3.05 2.15 
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percent of the 72 percent of the total retained variance and the other three factors 
explained 13 percent, nine percent and seven percent of the retained variance 
respectively (Figure 6.7).  These values were used as weights when combining the 
four factors into the institutional index (𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇).  The resulting aggregate institutional 
index captured large parts of the cross-country variation in the quality of institutions 
and highlights the relative importance of each dimension of market-creating, market-
legitimising, market-stabilising and market-regulating institutions. Details of the 
extracted factors are provided in Table 6.7: Details of factor loadings after varimax 
rotation of Market-Legitimising, Market-Creating, Market-Stabilising and Market-
Regulating Institutions. 
The evidence of correlation was tested using Bartlett’s test of sphericity with 
the null hypothesis that there is no correlation.  The resulting Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) statistic of 0.81 indicates that the sample is more than suitable for factor 
analysis. Figure 6.7 indicates that of the four retained factors, market-stabilising and 
market-regulating provide the least explanation of the retained variance.  The 
market-legitimising (ML), market-creating (MC), market-stabilising (MS) and market-
regulating (MR) factors are interpreted through factor loadings of individual 
indicators’ relative importance to each factor. A loading is the correlation between 
observed variables and factors: higher loadings mean that the indicator is more 
relevant in defining the factor.  Table 6.7 shows each factor’s average loading with a 
relative weight of each indicator in each factor in proportion to its loading.  
Protection of property rights (efw2), reliability of police (efw7), black market 
exchange rates (efw10), capital controls (efw12) and hiring and firing regulations 
have negative coefficients associated with the factor of market-legitimising 
institutions, indicating that these indicators have an inverse impact on the 
performance of the factor market-legitimising institutions. The indicators that exert 
the greater weight on the factor of market-legitimising institutions are foreign 
ownership/investment restrictions (efw11), hiring regulations and minimum wage 
(efw 15), centralised collective bargaining (efw17), hours’ regulations (efw18), 
conscription (efw20), administrative requirements (efw21), starting a business 
(efw22), extra payments/bribes/favouritism (efw23) and licensing regulations 
(efw24).   
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Legal enforcement of contracts (efw5), freedom to own foreign currency 
bank accounts (efw8), hiring and firing regulations (efw16), centralised collective 
bargaining (efw17), hours’ regulation (efw18), conscription (efw20), starting a 
business (efw22) and licensing restrictions (efw24) have negative coefficients 
associated with the factor market-creating institutions, indicating that these 
indicators have an inverse effect on the better performance of market-creating 
institutions.  Judicial independence (efw1), impartial courts (efw2), protection of 
property rights (efw3), military interferences in rule of law and politics (efw4) and 
reliability of police (efw7), have the largest impact on the factor of market-creating 
institutions.  
Military interference in rule of law and politics (efw4), freedom to own foreign 
currency bank accounts (efw8) and capital controls (efw12) have the strongest 
positive impact on the factor of market-stabilising institutions. Legal enforcement of 
contracts (efw5), regulatory restrictions on the sale of property (efw6), foreign 
ownership/investment restrictions (efw11), centralised collective bargaining (efw17), 
hours’ regulations (efw18), conscription (efw20), starting a business (efw22) and 
licensing restrictions (efw24) have negative coefficients associated with the factor of 
market-stabilising institutions, suggesting that these indicators have an inverse 
effect on the better performance of market-stabilising institutions.  
Foreign ownership/investment restrictions (efw11), administrative 
requirements (efw21) and starting a business (efw22) exhibit the strongest positive 
impact on the better performance of the factor of market-regulating institutions. 
Judicial independence (efw1), protection of property rights (efw3), military 
interference in the rule of law and politics (efw4), reliability of police (efw7), freedom 
to won foreign currency bank accounts (efw8), regulatory trade barriers (efw9), 
black market exchange rates (efw10), capital controls (efw12), credit market 
regulations (efw14), hiring regulations and minimum wage (efw15) and hiring and 
firing regulations (efw16) have negative coefficients associated with the factor of 
market-regulating institutions, providing evidence that these indicators have an 
inverse impact on the performance of market-regulating institutions.  
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Table 6.6: Average market-legitimising, market-creating, market-stabilising and 
market-regulating institutional factor indicators, by economy for the 
period, 1991 to 2015 
 
 ML MC MS MR 
Inst. 
Index 
BGD -3.05 0.64 0.52 -1.20 -0.63 
BWA 0.59 1.38 1.64 -0.40 0.42 
EGY 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.31 0.09 
GHA 0.50 0.49 0.46 -0.48 0.18 
IND 0.74 0.98 -1.47 -0.69 0.11 
JAM 0.37 -0.82 0.45 -0.18 0.01 
KEN 0.51 -0.97 0.97 -0.85 0.02 
MWI 0.35 0.31 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 
MYS 0.16 0.69 -1.68 1.31 0.06 
MUS 0.42 -0.07 0.80 0.57 0.19 
NGA 0.85 -0.41 0.11 -0.12 0.14 
PAK -0.90 -1.14 -1.26 -0.19 -0.46 
SLE 0.23 -1.25 0.46 1.45 0.03 
LKA 0.75 -0.51 -1.08 0.01 0.01 
TZA -2.02 -0.43 -0.58 0.46 -0.52 
ZMB 0.19 0.43 0.46 0.01 0.14 
ZWE 0.17 0.50 -0.03 0.01 0.10 
 
Notes: Author’s calculations using data retrieved from (Gwartney et al., 2017) 
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Figure 6.5: Institutional index and real GDP per capita in 1991 for the sample of 17 
selected developing economies 
 
Notes: Data for GDP per capita from World Bank (2017).  Institutional index author’s 
calculations from data retrieved from Gwartney et al. (2017) 
 
Figure 6.6: Institutional index and real GDP per capita in 2015 for the sample of 17 
selected developing economies 
 
Notes: Data for GDP per capita from World Bank (2017).  Institutional index author’s 
calculations from data retrieved from Gwartney et al. (2017) 
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Figure 6.7: Scree plot of eigenvalues of factor loadings after rotation. 
 
Note: Eigenvalues of the four factors that are appropriate for retention.  
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Table 6.7: Details of factor loadings after varimax rotation of Market-Legitimising, 
Market-Creating, Market-Stabilising and Market-Regulating Institutions  
 
Variable ML 
 Weights 
between 
the 
indicator 
and the 
factor MC 
  Weights 
between 
the 
indicator 
and the 
factor MS 
 Weights 
between 
the 
indicator 
and the 
factor  MR 
Weights 
between 
the 
indicator 
and the 
factor 
efw1 0.01 0% 0.77 20% 0.03 1% -0.09 -5% 
efw2 0.06 1% 0.86 23% 0.02 1% 0.23 12% 
efw3 -0.24 -4% 0.38 10% 0.15 6% -0.05 -3% 
efw4 0.10 2% 0.36 9% 0.32 14% -0.02 -1% 
efw5 0.25 4% -0.09 -2% -0.12 -5% 0.13 7% 
efw6 0.27 4% 0.00 0% -0.12 -5% 0.14 7% 
efw7 -0.15 -2% 0.52 14% 0.06 3% -0.16 -8% 
efw8 0.02 0% -0.03 -1% 0.89 38% -0.05 -2% 
efw9 0.02 0% 0.28 7% 0.17 7% -0.18 -9% 
efw10 -0.04 -1% 0.22 6% 0.09 4% -0.08 -4% 
efw11 0.61 10% 0.02 1% -0.03 -1% 0.37 19% 
efw12 -0.25 -4% 0.18 5% 0.73 31% -0.22 -11% 
efw13 0.18 3% 0.28 7% 0.15 6% 0.03 2% 
efw14 0.09 1% 0.23 6% 0.23 10% -0.04 -2% 
efw15 0.78 12% 0.24 6% 0.01 0% -0.09 -5% 
efw16 -0.07 -1% -0.17 -4% 0.06 3% -0.01 0% 
efw17 0.70 11% -0.05 -1% -0.20 -8% 0.18 9% 
efw18 0.68 11% -0.09 -2% -0.06 -3% 0.08 4% 
efw19 0.15 2% 0.04 1% 0.16 7% 0.04 2% 
efw20 0.91 15% -0.15 -4% -0.09 -4% 0.24 12% 
efw21 0.30 5% 0.08 2% -0.15 -7% 0.82 42% 
efw22 0.62 10% -0.28 -7% -0.13 -5% 0.37 19% 
efw23 0.58 9% 0.29 8% -0.04 -2% 0.10 5% 
efw24 0.68 11% -0.08 -2% 0.18 8% 0.22 11% 
 
Notes: Factors were extracted using iterated principal axes method and rotation was 
performed using varimax method.  The weight of factors is based on the amount of variance 
explained by each factor in proportion to the total variance explained by all retained factors.   
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6.4 Summary of results of investigating the influence of 
institutions on the factors of production 
This section presents the results of empirical estimations of the influence of the 
calculated institutional index on percentage changes (in logs) of capital stock and 
labour stock in the 17 selected developing economies for the period 1991 to 2015. 
Table 6.8 provides the correlation coefficient for the panel data sample. It indicates 
that there are extremely weak correlations amongst GDP and labour stock and the 
institutional index (all correlations less than 0.20 in absolute terms), except as 
between 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and GDP.  It is not surprising, considering how 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is calculated that 
it exhibits statistically significant association with real GDP (r(423)=0.87, p=0.00). .  
 
Table 6.8: Pearson correlation analysis of full panel data (GDP per capita, capital 
stock, labour stock, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and aggregate institutional index) 
 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Capital 
stock 
Labour 
stock TFP 
Capital Stock 0.09 (0.06) 1 
  
Labour Stock 0.01 (0.88) 
-0.12* 
(0.01) 1 
 
TFP 0.87** (0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.78) 
-0.01 
(0.80) 1 
Institutional index -0.03 (0.68) 
-0.06 
(0.25) 
-0.05 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.62) 
 
Notes:425 observations for each variable.  p value in brackets. ** Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.9 presents the descriptive statistics of the balanced panel of 425 
observations for each variable in the data sample for the period 1991 to 2015 used 
to conduct these estimations 
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Table 6.9: Descriptive statistics of variables used to test the influence of institutions 
on the factors of production. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
*Institutional Index 425 0 0.32 -1.01 0.95 
*Market-Legitimising 425 0 1.24 -4.78 2.90 
*Market-creating 425 0 1.14 -2.63 5.25 
*Market-stabilising 425 0 1.09 -2.41 2.46 
*Market-regulating 425 0 1.24 -8.73 4.69 
Capital stock 425 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.51 
Labour stock 425 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.06 
 
Notes: * calculated using public data from Gwartney et al. (2017).  Capital stock author’s 
calculation using data on gross fixed capital formation (constant 2010 US$) from (World 
Bank, 2017) and capital depreciation rates from Feenstra et al. (2015).  Data for labour stock 
from World Bank (2017).  Lnsettmort the log of potential settler mortality capped at 250 per 
1000 based on the uncapped potential settler mortality variable computed by Acemoglu et 
al. (2001).  
  
Tests for heteroscedasticity using the Breuschu-Pagan/Cool-Weisberg test 
returned a p-value of 0.02 supporting the rejection of the null hypothesis that the 
error variances are all equal, in favour of the alternative hypothesis that there is 
some evidence of heteroscedasticity. Similarly, the probability value of 0.02 for the 
White’s test suggests that there is evidence of linear heteroscedasticity in the linear 
function of all the independent variables. Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests for 
endogeneity indicate that the aggregate institutional index must be treated as 
exogenous (p-value = 0.24 & 0.24).  
 
6.4.1 Results of investigating the influence of institutions on capital stock 
Hausman test results (p-value 0.00) support the choice of FE estimations for 
investigating the influence of institutions on capital stock in the selected 17 selected 
developing economies. Table 6.10 presents the results of FE estimations of the 
reduced-form equation model that allows for controls, investigating the influence of 
institutions on capital stock.  
Not surprisingly, results in column (1) of Table 6.10 indicate that the lag of 
capital stock is highly statistically significant at the one percent level, exerting a 
positive effect on levels of capital stock within these 17 selected developing 
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economies. Capital stock investment within the selected 17 developing economies 
over time is associated with a positive average increase in capital stock by 42 
percent. The specification including the four institutional factors displayed in column 
(2), indicates that levels of capital stock remains highly statistically significant at the 
one percent level; whereas lagged labour stock takes on a negative coefficient.  
These FE estimations indicate that institutions do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with levels of capital stock for the 17 selected developing economies.  
 The time dummies for 2008, 2011 and 2012 were unexpectedly statistically 
significant and positively associated with accumulation of capital stock. The 
inclusion of year effects in the fixed effect model is meant to capture the influence of 
aggregate trends on the variation of accumulation of capital stock.  The variation 
accounted for by year fixed effect will be common to all the economies in the year.  
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Table 6.10: Results of fixed effect estimation of the influence of institutions on 
capital stock 
 
Dep. Variable  
Capital Stock (log) (1) (2) 
+Institutional Index  0.00 
(1.06)  
+Capital stock  0.42*** 
(18.69) 
0.42*** 
(18.55) 
+Labour stock  0.05 
(0.47) 
-0.00 
(-0.03) 
GDP per capita 0.01 
(0.53) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
+GDP per capita 0.00 
(0.25) 
0.00 
(0.20) 
+Market-legitimising 
   
0.00 
(0.82) 
+Market-creating 
   
0.00 
(0.13) 
+Market-regulating 
   
0.00 
(0.41) 
+Market-stabilising 
   
0.00 
(0.95) 
2008 0.01* 
(2.11) 
0.01* 
(2.13) 
2011 0.01** 
(3.19) 
0.01** 
(3.23) 
2012 0.01** 
(2.82) 
0.01** 
(2.86) 
Constant 
  
0.01*** 
(3.16) 
0.01*** 
(3.08) 
Obs 408 408 
R2 (within) 0.570 0.574 
 
 
 
Notes: t-statistic in brackets *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. +Lag of variable. Coefficients for 
other time- and country dummies not shown. 
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6.4.2 Results of investigating the influence of institutions on labour stock 
Hausman test results (p-value 0.00) support the choice of FE estimations for 
investigating the influence of institutions on labour stock levels in the 17 selected 
developing economies. Table 6.11 presents the results of FE estimations of the 
reduced form equation model that allow for controls, investigating the influence of 
institutions on labour stock.  
Not surprisingly, results in column (1) of Table 6.11 indicate that the lag of 
labour stock is highly statistically significant at the one percent level, exerting a 
positive effect on levels of labour stock within these 17 selected developing 
economies.  As each new worker is added to the labour force within countries over 
the period 1990 to 2015, levels of labour participation positively increase on average 
by 30 percent within these 17 selected developing economies. Lagged capital stock 
is statistically significant at the five percent level but exerts a negative effect on 
labour stock levels.  Within countries, a one-unit investment in capital results in a 
three percent decrease in levels of labour stock within the selected 17 developing 
economies.  The specification including the four institutional factors displayed in 
column (1), indicates that capital could have only a marginally statistically significant 
effect at the ten percent level, but maintains an inverse effect on levels of labour 
stock within the 17 selected developing economies.  With the inclusion of the 
institutional factors, capital maintains an inverse effect on changes in labour stock 
for these selected developing economies, but becomes more statistically significant 
for these changes, at the five percent level. These FE estimations indicate that 
institutions do not have a statistically significant relationship with the levels of labour 
stock in these 17 selected economies.  
Unexpectedly, the time dummy for 1995 were unexpectedly statistically 
significant and positively associated with accumulation of capital stock. The 
inclusion of year effects in the fixed effect model is meant to capture the influence of 
aggregate trends on the variation of accumulation of capital stock.  The variation 
accounted for by year fixed effect will be common to all the economies in the year. 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
Table 6.11: Results of fixed effect estimation of the influence of institutions on 
labour stock 
 Dep. Variable  
Labour Stock (log) (1) (2) 
+Institutional Index 0.00 
(0.27)  
+Labour stock 0.31*** 
(6.26) 
0.30*** 
(6.03) 
+Capital stock -0.03* 
(-2.48) 
-0.03** 
(-2.63) 
GDP per capita (levels) -0.01 
(-1.41) 
-0.01 
(-1.50) 
+GDP per capita -0.01 
(-1.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
+Market-legitimising 
 
-0.00 
(-0.34) 
+Market-creating 
 
-0.00 
(-0.60) 
+Market-regulating 
 
0.00 
(1.51) 
+Market-stabilising 
 
0.00 
(1.31) 
1995 -0.00* 
(-2.00) 
-0.00* 
(-1.97) 
Constant 0.01*** 
(6.11) 
0.01*** 
(6.18) 
Obs 408 408 
r2 0.191 0.204 
 
Notes: t-statistic in brackets *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. +Lag of variable. Coefficients for 
other time- and country dummies not shown. 
 
  
 
 
6.5 Summary of results of testing the influence of 
institutions on productivity 
This section presents the results of empirical estimations of the influence of the 
calculated institutional index on the calculated levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 within the selected 17 
developing economies for the period 1991 to 2015.  Table 6.12 indicates that there 
is evidence of a very weak and not statistically significant correlation (0.04) between 
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the lag of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇.  Similarly, Table 6.12 indicates that there is no statistically 
significant association between the lag of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇.  More specifically Table 
6.12 indicates that there is not a statistically significant relationship between 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 
and the lag of GDP per capita, capital stock or labour stock. Table 6.13 presents 
descriptive statistics of the variables used to test the association between 
institutions and productivity.  
Hausman test results (p-value 0.42) support the choice of RE estimations for 
investigating the influence of institutions on productivity in the 17 selected 
developing economies.  Table 6.14 presents the results of the RE estimations of the 
reduced form equation model that allows for controls. Not surprisingly, results in 
column (1) of Table 6.14 indicate that the lag of capital stock are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 (significance) level and levels of GDP per capita are highly 
statistically significant at the 0.01 (significance) level. However, unexpectedly 
column (1) also indicates that a unit increase in level of capital stock have a 
negative effect (18 percent) on better productivity within the selected 17 developing 
economies. Levels of GDP per capita are positively related to levels of productivity; 
one-unit increase in GDP per capita contributes to a 30 percent increase in levels of 
productivity in these 17 selected developing economies.  The inclusion of the four 
institutional factors (displayed in column (2)), does not change these results. These 
RE estimations indicate that for these 17 selected developing economies, 
institutions do not have a statistically significant relationship with levels of 
productivity.   
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Table 6.12: Pearson correlation matrix of institutional index and the GDP, capital 
stock, labour stock and TFP 
 
Institutional 
Index 
Institutional Index (lag) 0.82** 
(0.00) 
GDP per capita (lag) -0.01 
(0.80) 
Capital stock (lag) -0.06 
(0.26) 
Labour stock (lag) -0.07 
(0.13) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (lag) 0.04 
(0.37) 
 
Notes: p value in brackets. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 408 observations for 
each variable.  
 
 
Table 6.13: Descriptive statistics of variables used to assess the relationship 
between of institutions and productivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: * calculated using public data from Gwartney et al. (2017).  Capital stock author’s 
calculation using data on gross fixed capital formation (constant 2010 US$) from (World 
Bank, 2017) and capital depreciation rates from Feenstra et al. (2015).  Data for labour stock 
from World Bank (2017).  TFP author’s calculation using public data from the World Bank 
(2017).  GDP per capita (Constant 2010 US$) retrieved from World Bank (2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Capital stock 425 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.51 
Labour stock 425 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.06 
TFP 425 0 0.04 -0.26 0.28 
*Market-Legitimising 425 0 1.24 -4.78 2.90 
*Market-creating 425 0 1.14 -2.63 5.25 
*Market-stabilising 425 0 1.09 -2.41 2.46 
*Market-regulating 425 0 1.24 -8.73 4.69 
*Institutional Index 425 0 0.32 -1.01 0.95 
GDP per capita 425 0.02 0.04 -0.22 0.30 
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Table 6.14: Results of random effect estimation of the relationship between 
institutions and productivity 
  Dep. Variable  
TFP (1) (2) 
+Institutional Index -0.00 
(-0.33)  
+Capital stock -0.18** 
(-3.01) 
-0.18** 
(-3.00) 
+Labour stock 0.28 
(1.04) 
0.31 
(1.13) 
+TFP 0.04 
(0.74) 
0.04 
(0.79) 
GDP per capita (levels) 0.30*** 
(6.89) 
0.30*** 
(6.60) 
+GDP per capita -0.02 
(-0.34) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
+Market-legitimising 
 
-0.00 
(-0.61) 
+Market-creating 
 
0.00 
(0.96) 
+Market-regulating 
 
-0.00 
(-0.11) 
+Market-stabilising 
 
-0.00 
(-0.47) 
Constant -0.02 
(-1.65) 
-0.02 
(-1.60) 
Obs 408 408 
 
Notes: t-statistic in brackets *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. +Lag of variable. Time and country 
dummy variables omitted.  
 
 
 
6.6 Robustness checks using Instrumental Variables 
This section presents the results of robustness estimations of the influence of 
institutions on the factors of production, productivity and real GDP for the selected 
17 developing economies, using instrumental variables. Tests for endogeneity 
indicate that the institutional index can continue to be treated as exogenous.  
However, for robustness checks, the institutional index was treated as endogenous 
and instrumented by the lag of the institutional index, the lag of capital stock and lag 
labour stock, lag 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, lag GDP per capita and the log of settler mortality.   
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6.6.1 2SLS results 
Table 6.15 indicates that the lag of capital stock and lag of labour stock are 
moderately and negatively correlated with the institutional index. The lag of the 
institutional index is unsurprisingly  statistically significantly associated with the 
institutional index. . More particularly settler mortality is statistically significantly 
associated with 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇. Table 6.16 reports results from the instrumental variables 
estimation of the effect of a change in the institutional index on the log of capital 
stock, log of labour stock and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. The Table reports the result of testing the 
influence of the institutional index on capital stock using instrumental variables. 
These results indicate that the results of FE are robust to the use of instruments.   
The estimates of the institutional index’s coefficient indicate that the 
institutional index is not statistically significant. Not surprisingly, Table 6.16 indicates 
that a difference in investment in capital is associated with a difference in levels of 
capital of 53 percent.  Unexpectedly, column (1) indicates that with the inclusion of 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 changes in investment in capital has a stronger, but still positive effect on levels 
of capital stock.  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 also exhibits a highly statistically significant and positive effect 
on levels of capital stock.  A unit increase in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is associated with a seven percent 
increase in levels of capital stock within the selected 17 developing economies 
(column 1). While capital stock has a negative (14 percent), yet highly statistically 
significant association with the better performance of TFP (column 3). 
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Table 6.15: Pearson correlation matrix of institutional index and the various 
instrumental variables 
 
Institutional 
Index 
Institutional Index (lag) 0.82** 
(0.00) 
GDP per capita (lag) 0.01 
(0.80) 
Capital stock (lag) -0.06 
(0.26) 
Labour stock (lag) -0.07 
(0.13) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (lag) 0.04 
(0.37) 
Settler mortality (in logs) 0.31** 
(0.00) 
 
Notes: p value in brackets.  **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
 
Table 6.16: Results of instrumental variables estimation of the influence of 
institutions on the factors of production, productivity and economic 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: t-statistic in brackets *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. +Lag of variable. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Capital 
Stock 
Labour 
Stock 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
GDP 
per 
capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
+Institutional Index  
-0.00 
(-1.19) 
-0.00 
(-0.71) 
0.00 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(1.28) 
+Capital stock 
0.53*** 
(25.71) 
-0.02* 
(-2.07) 
-0.14* 
(-2.25) 
0.12 
(1.85) 
+Labour stock 
0.03 
(0.26) 
0.46*** 
(10.81) 
0.17 
0.17 
-0.26 
(-0.82) 
+GDP per capita  
0.03 
(1.60) 
-0.00 
(-0.34) 
0.07 
(1.37) 
0.23*** 
(4.20) 
+TFP  
0.07*** 
(3.38) 
0.01 
(0.90) 
0.04 
(0.75) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
Constant 
0.01*** 
(6.62) 
0.01*** 
(10.01) 
0.00 
(-0.22) 
0.02*** 
(3.61) 
Obs 408 408 408 408 
r2 0.64 0.25 0.02 0.07 
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6.7 Summary and discussion of robustness checks and the 
implications of their results 
The results presented in Chapter 6.6 indicate that the results presented in Chapters 
6.2, 6.4 and 6.5 are robust for including a source of exogenous differences in the 
institutions. That is, institutions can continue to be treated as exogenous and further 
that fixed and random effects estimation methods are valid estimation methods.  
Overall, these results have changed remarkably little with the inclusion of 
instruments.  It also provides evidence that the instrument emphasised by earlier 
empirical work may be insignificant regardless of whether institutions are treated as 
endogenous or exogenous. There is theoretical justification for the empirical validity 
of the use of fixed and random effects estimation methods to construct these 
relationships. This justification is crucial for the validation of the empirical analysis 
required to interpret the estimated coefficients presented in this thesis (Andés & 
Asongu, 2015). Moreover, the objective of this thesis is not only to assess the 
mechanisms through which institutions influence economic growth in developing 
economies, but also to examine which category of institutions is instrumental for 
economic performance.  
Institutions are the explanatory variable of most interest and it is generally 
agreed that they are multidimensional and their definition may be broad (Glaeser et 
al., 2004). The choice of instrumental variable was contingent on the expectation 
that settler mortality rates of 200 years prior would have a positive link with the 
institutional index and the four institutional factors, but not on contemporary 
economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2001).  It would suggest that colonisation or 
the colonisation strategy did not have an enduring effect on the path of institutional 
development.  These results add to the criticisms of Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
argument that colonisation influenced the institutional development of ‘extractive’ or 
‘inclusive’ in these former colonies.  One interpretation of the results of this thesis is 
that the colonisation strategy of over 200 years ago have not had a major or robust 
effect on the institutional differences amongst these selected developing 
economies.  These results suggest that the historical colonialism has little effect on 
the results of this thesis.  
The results in columns (1), (2) and (3) estimate the basic regressions and 
show that both the relationship between settler mortality and institutions and that 
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between institutions and the factors of production and productivity are very similar to 
those in the base regressions.  For example, the 2SLS estimate of the effect of 
institutions on productivity is now -0.00 (s.e. = -0.33) controlling for settler mortality 
(Table 6.16) The FE estimate of the effect of institutions on capital stock was 0.00 
(s.e. = 1.03).  These results suggest that there is some unobserved individual 
heterogeneity within the sample that has some effect on the association between 
institutions and factors of production and productivity, but the results remain 
qualitatively similar as the institutional index coefficient remains not statistically 
significant. This would suggest that country-specific characteristics may have more 
practical and significant implications for institutional development than previously 
considered.  
These results uncovered by these robustness checks are generally qualitatively 
similar to those results of the base regressions in Chapter 6. These results reinforce 
the analysis presented in this thesis on the mechanisms through which institutions 
influences economic performance through its direct effect on factors of production 
and productivity.  
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the empirical results presented and summarised in Chapter 
6 in the context of the extant literature and how these discussions and the results of 
these regression estimations potentially contribute to existing knowledge on the 
relationship between institutions, productivity and the factors of production in 
developing economies. The discussion in this Chapter address the research 
objectives underpinning this thesis: 
1) To calculate levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in 17 selected developing economies; 
2) To calculate an aggregate 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 index (using factor analysis) for 17 selected 
developing economies; 
3) To test for the influence of institutions on factors of production in 17 selected 
developing economies; and 
4) To test for the influence of institutions on productivity in 17 selected 
developing economies.  
 
7.2 Discussion of total factor productivity in the selected 17 
developing economies  
This section will explore the results of investigating the relationship between 
productivity and economic performance in the 17 selected developing economies in 
the context of the existing relevant literature. The literature generally agrees that the 
rate of economic growth is driven by productivity of the factors of production. This 
functional relationship is presumed to lead to increased levels of output. This 
section will extend the relevant literature in the context of the results in Chapter 6.2, 
which tend to support the assumptions about the role of productivity in achieving 
higher rates of economic growth. It is informative to relate the variation of economic 
growth rates with the aggregate growth rates of capital, labour and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. Building 
upon existing empirical studies, this thesis investigated the role of productivity in 
explaining cross-country differences in the levels of output amongst the sample of 
selected developing economies.  It identified the multiplicative contribution of the 
factors of production and productivity to levels of output.  Research hypothesis 1, 
postulates that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 does not account for much of the cross-country differences in 
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national output.  The rejection of this hypothesis supports the view that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 may be 
correlated with capital-output ratio as suggested by Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
7.2.1 The relationship between 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and capital stock and labour stock 
accumulation 
Neoclassical exogenous technological progress comprised of investment in R&D, 
embodied in new capital (Solow, 1957) and any number of hard-to-measure 
components not otherwise accounted for by physical capital and labour (Easterly & 
Levine, 2001), is labour-saving at the firm level, but labour-augmenting at the 
aggregate level. Growth in neoclassical exogenous technical change implies that 
there is more output of goods and services, raising the marginal productivity of 
capital and the profit rate, reducing the effects of diminishing returns to both labour 
and capital. The measure of productivity in the neoclassical growth model is the 
Solow residual – 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.    
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is often found to be as important to economic performance as capital 
accumulation (Easterly & Levine, 2001). To the extent that capital stock is measured 
correctly, approximately 50 percent of income differences amongst economies is 
typically found to depend on capital accumulation, with the remaining half being 
ascribed to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (Battisti, Del Gatto, & Parmeter, 2018).  However, these earlier 
results have primarily focused on developed economies and OECD economies and 
the decomposition of their economic performance. Few empirical studies have 
focused their attention to identifying the role of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in developing economies. This 
thesis provides evidence that this relationship may persist for even developing 
economies, but to a larger degree. The results of this thesis suggest that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 could 
account for a large portion of the variance in economic growth in developing 
economies.  
 This thesis has found evidence that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 could contribute as much as 100 
percent to explaining variance in national output amongst these 17 selected 
developing economies. More particularly, the negative or limited growth of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is a 
critical contributor to the poor economic performance of these 17 selected 
developing economies (Table 6.3). These results find support in Hofman et al. 
(2017) who investigated the role of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 for a sample of developing Latin American 
and Caribbean economies and found that increased levels of ‘idle’ capacity will 
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show up in decreased levels of productivity, resulting in periods of low economic 
performance.  Hofman et al. (2017) suggest that low economic performance could 
be associated with not only slower factor accumulation, but also the misallocation of 
productive resources across the market. These results also find support in 
Yalcinkaya et al. (2017) who found that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 has a greater association with 
economic performance of G-20 economies than fixed capital formation.   
This thesis has also found evidence that these 17 selected developing 
economies continue to depend strongly on capital accumulation, which has resulted 
in persistently low economic growth. One interpretation of these results is that the 
degree of misallocation of factors of production and resources across sectors can 
potentially have a large negative effect on aggregate productivity. These results also 
suggest that increases in the labour force may slow productivity and increases in 
capital may have similar effects. The former suggestion is not new, but the latter 
conjecture about the effect of capital on productivity has not been revisited for 
several years.   
 Urquhart (1959) had suggested that large increases to capital would lower 
its own marginal productivity.  There being little improvement in the productivity of 
capital goods, the cost price of capital goods has increased, potentially doubled, 
while other prices remain unchanged.  This results in only half as much real capital 
being added to the capital stock each year, as would have been added had relative 
prices remained unchanged (Urquhart, 1959). Consequently, the marginal 
productivity of capital has declined each year by the amount it would otherwise have 
declined and since the production function is starting with a large capital stock in 
terms of consumer goods, the real rate of return on a given amount of investment in 
new capital is actually substantially lower.  This concept was more recently 
revisited, though not in depth by (Ling, 2010). 
 Economic theory suggests that an economy with high capital accumulation 
should produce more output compared to economies with low capital accumulation.  
An increase in the population growth rate and labour force stocks can be expected 
to decrease the rate of economic growth through reducing capital per worker and 
the possibility of substation of capital for labour in large percentages. Increasing 
levels of labour stock implies that more capital is needed to maintain an effective 
level of capital stock per worker (Ling, 2010).  Since more capital is being invested 
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to ‘break-even’ the capital-labour ratio, the actual marginal product of capital will be 
lowered, this will contribute to the negative sign of the covariance between capital 
stock and labour stock. 
The Cobb-Douglas production function assumes perfect substitution of skilled 
and unskilled labour (Hall & Jones, 1999). The effect of the increase in the relative 
employment of skilled labour may lead to a fall in the relative marginal productivity 
of labour and increase the relative efficiency of labour.  Changes in the skills of the 
workforce may be associated with an inverse relationship between labour and 
productivity the effect of which may show up in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, as unskilled labour becomes 
less productive.  This would suggest that technology choices may also depend on 
the endowment of the workforce.  Differences in educational achievements or skill 
levels may also show up in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  These results would tend to support the findings of 
Caselli and Coleman (2006) that the skill level of the labour force is positively 
associated with an economies’ incentive to adopt more appropriate technology-
driven production methods to increase levels of output and national income.  The 
results of this thesis would tend to suggest that the abundance of low-cost, unskilled 
labour, de-incentivises firms in developing economies to invest in more technology-
driven production methods.  Thereby contributing to persistently low levels of 
productivity. 
There is no evidence of technological convergence related to productivity 
amongst these 17 economies, as suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). An 
unsurprising result of this thesis’ decomposition of national output of these 17 
selected developing economies is that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 may account for more than 50 percent 
of income differences amongst these economies. These results could be interpreted 
to imply that the contribution of the Hicks-neutral component of productivity is much 
larger compared to the effect of capital accumulation in these selected 17 
developing economies.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to isolate the relative contribution 
of Hicks-neutral productivity using standard parametric techniques and this finding 
has no direct comparison in the extant literature.  This highlights the opportunity for 
further research in this area to better understand the extent to which conventional 
assumptions about the nature of prouctivity are supported by the data.   
 Rodrik (2011) suggests that the differences in productivity between 
developed and developing economies could be attributed to the ability of economies 
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to adopt or imitate more advanced technologies, and that this capacity is influenced 
by the economies’ distance from the technological frontier. Technological capacity 
relates to the quantity and quality of formal R&D, the extent to which an economy 
can turn ideas into new goods and services.  Typically 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is found to be higher in 
high income economies (Caselli & Coleman, 2006).  In constructing labour stock in 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, workers with different educational 
achievements and skill levels are perfect substitutes in production.  This would 
suggest that cross-country differences in productivity may not merely be a matter of 
the skill level of the work force and low levels of productivity; but as assumed by 
both the neoclassical and endogenous economic growth theories, also attributable 
to technical efficiency.  The results of this thesis would tend to suggest that these 
selected 17 developing economies are using labour relatively efficiently allowing for 
capital-skill complementarity.  Skilled-labour economies would be expected to adopt 
more skill-based technologies (Caselli & Coleman, 2006).  While those of the 
selected 17 developing economies that are abundant with unskilled labour may be 
expected to rely on old technology to avoid the loss of efficient use of an abundant 
workforce.  
The model adopted in this thesis allows economies to choose from many 
sources of productivity.  Firms in each economy will choose production methods 
that will make the most efficient use of skilled or unskilled labour. This may suggest 
that the productivity frontier may be country specific, dependent in part on the 
endowment of the workforce (Caselli & Coleman, 2006).  Where incentives to invest 
are low, there is lower buying power and less demand for goods and services. 
Economies with more barriers to the adoption and diffusion of technology may have 
more limited choices of production methods. One of those barriers to adoption and 
diffusion of technology may be the relative availability and skill of the workforce.  
Skilled-labour abundant economies may find it easier to adopt more technology 
driven methods of production.  Conversely unskilled labour abundant economies 
may adopt methods of production that make the most efficient use of its unskilled 
workforce, there may be fewer incentives to invest in new technology, particularly 
the abundant unskilled-labour is low cost.  
There is evidence that these 17 selected developing economies have been 
unable to reach their productivity frontier. This result finds support in the work of 
Irmen (2005) who argue that middle- and low-income economies are unable to 
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reach their technological frontier. One interpretation of these results is that 
differences in incentives to invest in R&D, and the quality of physical capital and the 
effects of vintage capital contribute highly to differences in levels of technological 
progress. Differences in technological progress may be one of the sources of 
differences in levels of national output in these 17 selected developing economies. 
Output in these selected developing economies is capital and labour intensive, there 
is insufficient absorptive capacity to take advantage of any gains from R&D or 
implicit technology in intermediate-goods (Teixeira & Queirós, 2016). Rodrik (2011) 
suggests that developing economies can only reach their productivity frontier 
through ‘active policies that promote diversification and foster structural change 
from low-productivity activities to mostly tradeable higher-productivity activities’ (p. 
4). 
Economic performance in these selected 17 developing economies appears 
to continue to be driven by capital accumulation, possibly on the premise that return 
to physical capital is high and labour is cheap. It does not appear, from the results of 
this thesis that the cost of labour has yet, become sufficiently expensive to 
encourage firms to invest in new technologies to economise on labour. As such, 
there is no evidence that within these selected 17 developing economies, extensive 
growth has evolved to intensive growth, suggesting that these economies are in a 
stationary steady state.  
High-income economies have a comparative advantage in capital-intensive 
and technology-intensive industries (Agenor, 2017).  The neoclassical approach 
presumes that there is a prevailing production frontier common across countries. 
The results of this thesis are in line with the neoclassical framework and supports 
earlier economic growth literature, which asserts that differences in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 levels are 
the main contributors to differences in the growth rate of GDP.  Although 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
growth does not account for a large portion of the average growth of output in these 
17 selected developing economies; sustained negative growth of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 may account 
for much of the variance across these 17 selected developing economies.  
One statistical explanation for this underlying logic is that all changes in 
output growth that are predictable by aggregate output growth are associated with 
aggregate productivity (Baier, Dwyer, & Tamura, 2006). This would suggest that 
variance in aggregate capital and labour stock growth explain a small variance of 
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output growth amongst the sample, and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 explains virtually all the variance of 
output growth across the sample. This presumption only obtains as the correlation 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and the factor inputs are zero.  These estimates assume that the 
there are no unmeasured effects of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 on capital or labour stocks.  All output 
growth will statistically be attributable to productivity, which is consistent with a 
model of exogenous technological growth closer to the model suggested by (Solow, 
1957). 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 does not only represent technological change and need not represent 
technological change at all amongst these selected developing economies. 
Measurement errors in output, capital stock and labour stock may appear in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
growth (Baier et al., 2006). For example, new physical capital with zero marginal 
product (for example a useless road) may increase the measured growth of capital, 
but a marginal product of zero implies that the level of output does not change with 
the addition of new physical capital. The resulting change in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the negative of 
capital’s factor share times the new physical capital. Similarly changes in hours 
worked can show up as reductions in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth. Changes in institutions and 
political regimes can also appear in changes in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  There could be many 
explanations for the changes in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  
 
7.2.2 Possible determinants of productivity for selected developing 
economies 
R&D is known as a measure for innovation capacity; a key element behind the 
technological development and sustainable economic growth in developed 
economies (Ramzi & Salah, 2018).  Innovation has been suggested as a critical 
determinant of productivity growth (Hofman et al., 2017). Innovation is the process 
through which new ideas can become successful products. Moreover, innovation 
can happen anywhere and anytime, not just in a laboratory; and its subsequent 
outcomes can take several forms, from new products, to new processes 
(Schumpeter, 1976). The innovation capacity index set out in the World Economic 
Forum (2018) competitiveness report provides an indication of the degree of 
economic efficiency of an economy. Advanced economies such as the United 
States, Germany and Sweden are the top-three ranked innovation powerhouses of 
the world according to the World Economic Forum (2018).  The competitiveness 
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report highlights that for a vast majority of developing economies, innovation 
capacity continues to remain extremely limited, localised and restricted to only a few 
sectors (World Economic Forum, 2018).   
 An economy’s capacity to innovate depends on the quality of its 
macroeconomic and institutional infrastructures.  Developing economies are 
characterised by their limited capacity for innovation.  The empirical estimations of 
this thesis provide a comparison of levels of economic performance, factors of 
production and productivity for 17 selected developing economies. Consistent with 
existing literature, these selected economies were characterised by low rates of 
economic growth, driven by high levels of capital accumulation. The traditional 
Solow model for deriving 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is based on labour-augmenting technological 
progress driving capital deepening enhancing the marginal productivity of capital 
(Madsen, 2010).  This in turn is presumed to increase the demand for capital. 
However, these relationships are not specifically set out in the standard Solow 
exposition as the capital asset market is not an explicit part of the model.  
 Productivity can be influenced by an economy’s capacity to innovate by 
adopting new ideas, methods or products more quickly.  Innovation is a complex 
process that appears to begin with the generation of ideas, from R&D (Ramzi & 
Salah, 2018), and from investment in education (Krueger & Lindahl, 2001) and the 
intensity of competition (Ezzeddine & Hammami, 2018) and from international 
technology transfer (Coe et al., 2009).  The productivity of the stock of knowledge 
and innovation increases because of both local and international spill overs. 
Innovation enhances economic productivity if it can reach the desired markets and 
achieve commercial success. Any factor inhibiting the process of idea generation, 
can inhibit an economy’s capacity to increase levels of productivity. These selected 
17 developing economies have yet to record a significant increase in expenditure in 
R&D as a percentage of GDP.  Unfortunately, there is a paucity of data on the level 
of R&D investment as a percentage of GDP in these 17 selected developing 
economies.  The data that is available on R&D expenditure highlights that for the 
period 2000 to 2015, low- and middle-income economies’ expend on average one 
percent of GDP on R&D (World Bank, 2017).  Conversely, high income economies 
spend on average two percent of GDP on R&D for the same period (World Bank, 
2017).  
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7.2.2.1 Research and development as a determinants of productivity for 
developing economies 
Developing economies are still reliant on technology transfer from foreign 
investment and imports to increase levels of innovation. The negligible efforts in 
R&D contribute to persistently poor technological progress with limited capacity for 
innovation (Ramzi & Salah, 2018).  The limited infrastructure and funding for R&D 
continue to oblige developing economies to look for alternatives to innovation 
through international technology transfer.  International technology transfer is also 
crucial for innovation either through trade in intermediate and capital goods of high-
tech products or inward foreign investment.  Openness to trade and environments 
attractive for foreign direct investment can encourage domestic producers to 
improve the quality of output and increase opportunities for technological progress 
as well as the local R&D efforts and the innovation process (Coe et al., 2009).  In 
this context trade openness can facilitate access to advanced economies’ stock of 
knowledge and increases the market share of local firms (Grossman & Helpman, 
1991).  This can enable the developing economy to exploit increasing returns to 
scale and avoid excessive activities in the research sector by devoting a larger 
share of capital to R&D.  China is an example of an economy that has been able to 
benefit from the use of technology embodied in equipment and intermediate goods 
to push their innovation by imitation (Maryam & Jehan, 2018). 
 
7.2.2.2 Competition as a determinant of productivity in developing economies 
Competition contributes to productivity when firms can attract the limited pool of 
highly skilled workers with new sets of skills required to cope with the pace of 
innovation.  The lingering presence of poorly performing firms within the product 
market contributes to the trapping of valuable resources in unproductive activities.  
Structural settings that limit competition amongst firms in the product market; for 
example, barriers to entry and exit the resource or product markets, contribute to 
persistent skills mismatch (OECD, 2018).  Competition incentivises firms to invest in 
innovation, building upon existing stock of innovations (Aghion & Howitt, 2006).  
More competition could increase the incremental profits that firms can earn by 
innovation. Conversely, less intense competition in the product market could make it 
easier for firms to earn profits without having to incur the expense of innovating. A 
148 
 
leader firm in a market that has a technological lead over its rival, may not be under 
the same pressure to continue to innovate (Aghion & Howitt, 2006). Similarly, 
increased entry and increased threat of entry, could enhance innovation and 
productivity growth through quality-improving innovation from new entrants, and 
innovation by the incumbent in response to the threat of being driven out by a 
potential entrant (Aghion, Burgess, Redding, & Zilibotti, 2005).  An agile and 
dynamic private sector can increase productivity through testing new ideas and 
creating innovative products and services. Incentives for this type of behaviour may 
be encouraged through successful economic systems that are resilient to 
technological shocks.  
 
7.2.2.3 Education as a determinant of productivity in developing economies 
Finally, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) suggest that education matters for catching-up 
through innovation, the further an economy is from the technological frontier.  
Different types of education spending lie behind innovative activities.  This includes 
spending in primary and secondary and tertiary education.  Each level of education 
would have a different influence on levels of productivity. Tertiary education 
investment should have a more significant effect on an economy’s ability to make 
leading edge innovations, while primary and secondary education may be more 
likely to make a difference in these selected developing economies in terms of their 
ability to implement existing (frontier) technologies. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) 
argue that primary and secondary education would tend to promote imitators rather 
than innovators; whereas tertiary education is critical for producing innovators. For 
an economy to move closer to the technological frontier, there should be increased 
investment in education.  
For the period 2004 to 2013, low income economies spent on average 16 
percent of total government expenditure on education and middle-income 
economies spent on average 15 percent of total government expenditure on 
education (World Bank, 2017).  For the same period, high income economies spent 
on average 13 percent of total expenditure on education (World Bank, 2017).  Of 
these amounts, for the period 2010 to 2013, low income economies spent on 
average 50 percent on primary education, 26 percent on secondary education and 
18 percent on tertiary education; and the only available data for middle-income 
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economies is 18 percent of government expenditure spent on tertiary education; 
high income economies spent on average 25 percent on primary education, 38 
percent on secondary education and 23 percent on tertiary education (World Bank, 
2017). Inequalities in access to education may have decreased, however the failure 
of developing economies to catch-up with advanced economies, suggests that there 
are underlying differences in the quality of education that may have a greater 
implication for the capacity and pace of productivity. 
 
 
7.3 Discussion of the aggregate institutional index and four 
institutional factors in the sample of 17 selected 
developing economies 
This section will discuss the results of the factor analysis exercise used to calculate 
the aggregate institutional index and the market-creating, market-legitimising, 
market-regulating and market-stabilising institutional factors. The extant literature 
agrees that institutions are multi-dimensional. There are statistical limitations to 
using diverse indicators of institutions in a single regression framework, as strong 
correlations among indicators contribute to the risk of multicollinearity (Siddiqui & 
Ahmed, 2013).  Existing studies have attempted to mitigate against this risk by 
using different indicators separately in different equations (Acemoglu et al., 2001) or 
aggregate different indicators using simple averages (Knack & Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 
1995; Hall & Jones, 1999).  For this reason, factor analysis was conducted to 
reduce the effect of correlations amongst the various indicators and not only create 
a weighted aggregate index, but also construct four factors to measure institutions.  
 
7.3.1 Aggregate institutional index 
The aggregate institutional index is an aggregate cross-national index. The factor 
analysis exercise identified four factors consistent with the extant literature.  The 
first factor is interpreted as explaining market-legitimising institutions (ML), the 
second factor is interpreted as market-creating institutions (MC), the third is 
interpreted as market-stabilising institutions (MS) and the fourth explains market-
regulating institutions (MR).  According to the factor analysis, ML was the largest 
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contributor in the Institutional Index, with a contribution of 22 percent. MC, MS and 
MR contributed 13 percent, nine percent and seven percent respectively. The 
aggregate institutional index measures the strength of these four sets of institutional 
factors.   
 These four institutional factors are important for providing public goods such 
as protection of private property rights and the enforcement of contracts  (Rodrik, 
1999) and perform market supporting functions such as build resilience to shocks, 
facilitate socially acceptable burden sharing (Siddiqui & Ahmed, 2013), reduce 
transaction costs, encourage innovation and facilitate complex economic 
interactions (Das & Quirk, 2016).  ‘Institutional voids’ exist when there is a lack of or 
inefficient institutions (Liu, Vahtera, Wang, Wang, & Wei, 2017, p. 516). Resilience 
includes the measure of the economy to minimise the risk of a financial meltdown 
and ability of resources to adjust to external shocks. Many of the institutions that 
support markets are publicly provided, and their effectiveness will be an important 
determinant of how well markets functions. The quality of regulatory governance will 
affect regulatory outcomes (Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, & Parker, 2007). Building effective 
institutional infrastructure is not merely an issue of design of institutional 
instruments, but also the quality of supporting regulatory institutions and capacity 
and their capacity to support R&D and productive activities within the economy.  
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Table 7.1: Correlation of Institutional Index, Institutional Factors and World 
Governance Indicators 
 Institutional 
Index 
Market-
Legitimising 
Market-
Creating 
Market-
Stabilising 
Market-
Regulating 
Institutional Index 1     
Market-Legitimising 0.81 1    
Market-Creating 0.39 -0.08 1   
Market-Stabilising 0.37 0.05 0.10 1  
Market-Regulating 0.17 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 1 
Control of Corruption 0.39 0.23 0.30 0.13 0.12 
Government 
Effectiveness 0.25 0.17 0.27 -0.08 0.08 
 
Political Stability and 
Absence of  
Violence/Terrorism 
0.38 0.16 0.25 0.32 0.17 
Regulatory Quality 0.24 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.10 
Rule of Law 0.32 0.20 0.30 0.01 0.07 
Voice and 
Accountability 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.24 0 
 
 
7.3.2 Market-legitimising institutional factor 
The market-legitimising institutional factor focuses on providing social protection 
and insurance, redistribution and managing conflict (Rodrik, 2003).  Rodrik (1999) 
argues that deep social divisions during ‘weak’ institutions of conflict management 
results in magnified costs of exogenous shocks (for example, deteriorations in the 
terms of trade) and triggers distributional conflicts. Such conflicts reduce productivity 
of factor inputs by delaying adjustments in fiscal policies and key relative prices 
(real exchange rate or real wages), and generates uncertainty contributing to the 
diversion of resources from productive activities. Intuitively, it is sensible to interpret 
this factor as a measure of those institutions that insure the market against 
idiosyncratic risks such as, market co-ordination failure among different factions 
within the economy. Decisions to change wage controls, import tariffs, government 
spending or levels of taxations can have distributional consequences, depending on 
the severity of underlying social conflicts within the society. These distributional 
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consequences could result in paralysing the economy from the effects of foreign-
exchange bottlenecks, import compression, debt crises and ‘bouts of high inflation’ 
(Rodrik, 1999). Rodrik (1999) used the index of democratic institutions and ICRG 
quality of governmental institutions to proxy for institutions of conflict management. 
 Foreign ownership/investment restrictions, hiring regulations and minimum 
wage, centralised collective bargaining, hours’ regulations, conscription, 
administrative requirements, starting a business, extra payments/bribes/favouritism 
and licensing regulations load heavily on the market-legitimising institutional factor. 
These institutions warn potential ‘winners’ of social conflict that their gains will be 
limited and assures the ‘losers’ that they will not be expropriated (Rodrik, 1999).  
Market-legitimising institutions tend to increase incentives for social groups to 
cooperate by reducing the payoff to socially uncooperative strategies.  Social 
conflict institutions create a level playing field and enhance internal security, 
contributing to increased incentives to participate in the market. Farole et al. (2010) 
contend that formal market-legitimising institutions are necessary to bring structure 
to the interaction between preferences and actions of satisficing individuals.  
  
7.3.3 Market-creating institutional factor 
The market-creating institutional factor focuses on institutions that provide public 
goods such as justice and law, for protecting property rights and reducing 
transaction costs by enforcing contracts. These institutions are critical for the 
creation of the market (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003). North and Thomas (1973) 
and North and Weingast (2000) argue that secure and stable property rights were 
key to the development of modern economic growth. Yet, formal property rights are 
meaningless unless they confer control rights to investors. Legislation may be 
unnecessary or insufficient to secure control rights and require supporting 
legislation, private enforcement, custom and tradition to be effective.  These 
supporting formal institutions and informal norms may be distributed more narrowly 
or more diffusely than property rights (Rodrik, 2000). 
 The market-creating institutional factor loads heavily on judicial 
independence, impartial courts, protection of property rights, military interferences in 
rule of law and politics and the reliability of police.  These indicators all tend to 
measure the quality and capacity of the legal system or consequences and 
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reflections of such quality and capacity. Rodrik et al. (2004) used the rule of law as 
a proxy for market-creating institutions.  Similarly, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
used executive constraint as a proxy for property rights institutions and legal 
formalism for contracting institutions in order to separately estimate their effects on 
long-run economic growth. Unexpectedly, the market-creating institutional factor 
constructed from this factor analysis exercise is weakly correlated to the WGI 
estimation of the rule of law (0.30) and government effectiveness (0.27) (Table 7.1).  
This is not sufficient to disregard the interpretation of this dimension as a measure 
of the institutional quality of market-creating institutions.  Ideal proxies of market-
creating institutions should capture the cost of enforcing private contracts and define 
the relationship between the state and its subjects and provide the legal framework 
for the enforcement of private contracts (Bhattacharyya, 2009). 
 The EFW measure of judicial independence and impartial courts sufficiently 
provide estimations of the impact of the judiciary in enforcing private contracts. 
Similarly, the EFW measure of military interference in rule of law and politics and 
the reliability of police provide an estimation of the relationship between the state 
and its subjects in relation to the enforcement of the legal framework.  Finally, the 
EFW’s measure of the protection of property rights estimates the level of control 
over private property. The combination of these institutions can reduce the cost of 
protecting property rights and strengthen contract enforcement.  These institutions 
may also incur high externalities that may be only fully captured at the national level 
(Siddiqui & Ahmed, 2013). 
 
7.3.4 Market-stabilising institutional factor 
The market-stabilising institutional factor focuses on institutional indicators that 
measure an economy’s resilience against macroeconomic shocks, with the potential 
to impact inflationary pressure and help avert financial crisis.  Moderate or 
predictable inflation and sustainable public budgets reduce uncertainties within the 
resource and product markets, influence investor expectations for returns and 
increase business confidence, all of which can contribute to increasing productivity. 
These institutions feed into economic growth through numerous channels, including 
the reduction of uncertainty and encouraging investment and other productive long-
run accumulative behaviour (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003). These institutions could 
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take any number of forms, from central bank policies to avoid inflation during 
financial crisis or acting as lender of last resort. Similarly, fiscal policies could be 
market-stabilising institutions. Das and Quirk (2016) measured market-stabilising 
institutions through average inflation rate, four-year inflation volatility, which 
indicators this thesis argues, do not directly measure institutions. Das and Quirk 
(2016) argue that average inflation rates and four-year inflation volatility can be 
used to measure the ex-post performance of market-stabilising institutions.  
 Unexpectedly, military interference in rule of law loaded heavily on this 
market-stabilising institutional factor. Not surprisingly, the freedom to own foreign 
currency bank accounts and capital controls did load heavily on the market-
stabilising institutional factor. It is noteworthy that some of the indicators that load 
heavily on the market-regulating institutional factor (legal enforcement of contracts 
and foreign ownership/investment restrictions and starting a business) and market-
legitimising institutional factor (centralised collective bargaining, hours’ regulations, 
conscription, and licensing restrictions), have an inverse effect on the better 
performance of market-stabilising institutional factor. One interpretation of these 
results may be that macroeconomic stability may require overriding social stability 
and social cohesion in favour of the redistribution of resources.  Macroeconomic 
stability can reflect the extent to which the economy’s public sector can provide 
appropriate counter-cyclical measures and invest in projects that the private sector 
cannot finance. Yet this interpretation would suggest that economies faced with 
large social inequalities and potentially volatile social conflict outcomes, may find 
that enforcing market-stabilising institutions can aggravate these social conflicts in 
favour of bridging tensions amongst market forces.  
 
7.3.5 Market-regulating institutional factor 
The market-regulating institutional factor focuses on institutions that not only 
support the effective functioning of the market-creating institutional factor, but also 
helps to eliminate or minimize institutional and policy rents (Brou & Ruta, 2013).  
The primary role of market-regulating institutions is to ensure an undistorted 
institutional environment that promotes efficient markets (Jalilian et al., 2007). 
Information asymmetry can contribute to imperfect regulation. Efficient market-
regulating institutions support good governance that balances accountability, 
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transparency and consistency (Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2007). Accountability would 
require regulatory agencies to be accountable for the consequences of their actions, 
to operate within their legal powers and to observe the rules of due process when 
making decisions.  Transparency requires regulatory decisions made in a manner 
that is open to interested parties.  Consistency leads to certainty for investors, 
reducing the cost of capital and providing incentives to invest.  
 The market-regulating institutional factor loads heavily on foreign 
ownership/investment restrictions, administrative requirements, and starting a 
business. These indicators most resemble the measure of market-regulating 
institutions defined by Rodrik and Subramanian (2003).  They envisage market-
regulating institutions as those rules, structure and arrangement that a society 
effectively enforces upon itself in response to situation where its markets are known 
to fail.  They include institutions that help minimise market idiosyncratic risk to 
economic growth and employment.  
EFW estimations of foreign ownership/investment restrictions measure those 
formal institutions that regulate international capital flows and foreign ownership of 
companies.  The EFW estimations also attempt to measure those formal institutions 
that regulate the administration of permits, regulations or reports issued by the state 
and measures their burdensomeness. Market-regulating institutions quantifies 
regulatory and bureaucratic efficiency. Bureaucratic efficiency measures the 
strength and expertise of bureaucrats and how they govern political fluctuation 
without extreme interruptions in government services or policies (Siddiqui & Ahmed, 
2013). Bureaucrats act as agents of government and in the absence of efficient 
checks on these agents, there could develop diversions of State rents to these 
bureaucrats (Brou & Ruta, 2013), which contribute to the increased cost to monitor 
and collect taxes and the cost of corruption, rewarding people through patronage 
rather than on ability. Higher regulations to start a business and administrative 
requirement could result in barriers to entry in favour of established businesses 
earning higher profits through monopolistic rents, earned in part from government 
licenses, policies and directives.  
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7.4 Discussion of the association between the institutional 
index and four institutional factors on changes in 
capital and labour stock 
This section will present a discussion of the results of the estimation of the 
relationship between institutions and changes in capital and labour stock in the 17 
selected developing economies. This section deals with results relating to three 
main issues: (i) the link between institutions and incentives to invest in capital stock; 
(ii) the link between institutions and incentives to increase labour stock; and (iii) 
whether there is a category of institutions that is most relevant for incentives to 
invest in capital or labour stocks.  All three issues are addressed by the significance 
of estimated coefficients.  The null hypothesis of issues (i) and (ii) is that there is no 
association between institutions and incentives to invest in capital and labour 
stocks. The null hypothesis of the third issue is that there is no specific category of 
institutions that are relevant for incentives to invest in capital or labour stocks.  A 
rejection of either of these null hypotheses is not a rejection of the importance of 
institutions for incentives to invest, but may be an indication that within these 
economies, there does not exist the appropriate institutional infrastructure that 
would support these relationships.  
 
7.4.1 Discussion of the association between institutions and capital stock 
The neoclassical model argues that as economies develop, capital accumulation is 
subject to diminishing marginal effects. Over time extensive economic growth 
should be eroded, leading to more investment in labour-augmenting technology, 
leading to intensive economic growth (Agenor, 2017). Neoclassicism has long 
downplayed the significance of institutions as it continues to explain economic 
growth primarily by reference to the production function that includes the two factors 
of production (capital and labour) and utility functions that depict levels of utility 
associated with different input choices (Ugur, 2010).  This comparatively institution-
free perspective of the disparity in cross-country economic performance fails to 
consider the potential influence of different market and non-market institutions that 
coexist with markets and how they interact and whether cross-country differences in 
the rate of economic growth may be related to differences in institutional 
characteristics of national economies. 
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7.4.1.1 Accumulation of physical capital 
Sustained rates of capital accumulation have indeed continued to be a key feature 
of the economic experience of developing economies (Schatz, 1968).  The scarcity 
of capital should lead to higher rates of return on capital in developing economies.  
This should result in these developing economies being able to attract capital, to 
access disembodied technology from the import of machinery and equipment to 
increase output and catch up with their developed counterparts (Blomstrom, Lipsey, 
& Zejan, 1994).  This thesis has already discussed that the contribution of 
productivity growth in the process of increasing levels of output is modest and may 
even be negligible (Chapter 6). This thesis has also already identified that the 
increase of the production factors, especially capital, is far more important for 
economic growth in these economically less developed economies (Chapter 6). The 
correlation between the institutional index and the four institutional factors and the 
factors of production are zero. This suggests that the changes in levels of capital 
accumulation may be interpreted in isolation of any unmeasured influence of 
institutions on capital stock.  
The underlying logic of this result may be that for these selected developing 
economies, institutions are not acting as mechanisms for encouraging investment in 
capital.  These results find support in Hall et al. (2010) who found that there are 
appropriate institutions that can exhibit an influence on the potential returns to 
investment in rent-seeking activities that plunder the wealth of others, through 
pressing for political action and misuse of the system for lawsuits, in their 
investigation of the role of institutions in the accumulation of human and physical 
capital in 96 developed and developing economies.  In particular they suggest that 
physical capital is most responsive to market-creating institutions that secure 
property rights, ensure unbiased contract enforcement and permit market prices and 
profits and losses to guide economic activity (Hall et al., 2010).  
An alternative interpretation is that over time, the efficiency of investment is 
being eroded, because of redistribution or investment in capital that had zero 
marginal effect (for example, useless roads or idle factories).  These factors may 
also contribute to weakening of the quality of capital, diminishing their marginal 
benefits for the economy. The less efficient investment results in the sustained 
deterioration of the quality of capital, having adverse effects on economic growth for 
these 17 selected developing economies. This would suggest that these selected 
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developing economies may not have the appropriate institutional structures to 
support the efficient regulation of markets or to overcome the deficiencies of 
information asymmetry or incomplete markets and externalities arising from 
disparities in income and wealth distribution within these economies.  
 
7.4.1.2 Significant year effect 
In 2007, the global financial markets were hard hit from the collapse of the US 
housing sector.  This was followed by the 2011 ‘Black Monday’ US and global stock 
market crash following the Standard and Poor’s downgraded credit rating of the US 
sovereign debt, the effects of which continued to affect the European financial and 
stock market, through to 2012.  Pre-2008 developing economies would have 
benefited from the developed-economy boom, characterised by increased export 
revenues and higher commodity prices (Lin, 2008).   The increased export revenue 
and higher commodity prices would have contributed to increased inward FDI and 
remittances from abroad.  Average exports as a share of middle- and low-income 
economies’ GDP experienced steady growth from 2000 (27 percent) to 2007 (31 
percent), but fell sharply by 2009 (25 percent) post the 2008 global financial crisis.  
Similarly, inward FDI as a share of GDP in middle- and low-income economies 
increased from two percent in 2000 to four percent in 2007.  Net inflow of FDI as a 
share of GDP subsequently returned to its 2000 level by 2009 (two percent).  These 
transfers would be particularly important sources of capital investment for labour-
abundant, resource-poor economies.  
 During the pre-2007 period developing economise also experienced average 
annual GDP growth of 6.4 percent (2000 – 2007) (World Bank, 2017).  The growth 
rate peaked at 8.6 percent in 2007, with all developing regions close to or exceeding 
five percent growth (World Bank, 2017).  By contrast, average annual GDP growth 
for 1990 to 2000 only reached three percent and in the period 2008 to 2015, 
average GDP growth was five percent (World Bank, 2017). The growth in 
developing economies during 2000 to 2007 resulted in the emergence of 
vulnerabilities from a combination of abundant investment capital and rapid growth.  
By 2007, the rapid economic growth will have contributed to capacity constraints 
and the increasing cost of resources, including labour stock.  
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 The 2007 global financial crisis would have contributed to a substantial 
reduction in imports by developing economies, while these selected developing 
economies were expanding their trade capacity to these selected developing 
economies. Particularly in cases of commodity and exporters, the sharp decrease in 
export volume would have been accompanied by a fall in prices and terms of trade, 
cutting into earnings from export (Lin, 2008). The surge in FDI projects over 2000 to 
2007 would mean that many investment projects would have already begun and be 
underway.  Sharp decreases in investment would have resulted in either: i) projects 
not being completed, resulting in unproductive and capital investments, leaving 
national financial institutions with non-performing loans; or ii) completed projects 
contributing to excess production capacity, adding to the risk of deflation, from 
decreased global export demand.  
 The epicentre of the global financial crisis was the US and Europe, and 
these economies attracted the most attention for policy responses at an institutional 
level.  Developing economies needed to respond by strengthening their 
macroeconomic policies that build resilience to external shocks from falling demand 
in the markets of developed economies.  The zero parameter estimate of 𝛽𝛽 
suggests that these 17 selected developing economies did not have sufficiently 
appropriate or flexible institutions to stave off the global bank lending and stock 
market contagion effect from 2007, 2011 and 2012.  
This thesis does not reject the null hypothesis 2 that postulates that there is 
no association between national institutional infrastructure and differences in levels 
of investment in physical capital stock in developing economies.  This suggests that 
institutions do not matter for investment in capital stock in these selected developing 
economies meaning that these selected developing economies do not have 
appropriate institutions that define ‘a set of payoffs to political/economic activities’ 
that encourage productive activity (North, 1990, p. 11) or ensure macroeconomic 
management to allow scope for policy responses to global market shocks (Rodrik, 
2008a). 
 
7.4.2 Discussion of the relationship between institutions and labour stock 
This thesis does not reject the null hypothesis 2 that postulates that there is no 
association between national institutional infrastructure and differences in levels of 
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investment in physical capital stock in developing economies.  This suggests that 
institutions do not matter for investment in labour stock in these selected developing 
economies. Not surprisingly, capital stock has only a marginally statistically 
significant inverse effect on changes in labour stock for these selected developing 
economies. For the regression estimates in this thesis it is assumed that labour is 
homogeneous within an economy. For each unit increase in capital, labour stocks 
decrease by three percent in these selected 17 developing economies. These 
results would suggest that over the period 1991 to 2015, an economies’ capital-
labour ratio will increase, but not as the result of higher levels of productivity 
(Chapter 6.3) but possibly because of increased investment in capital that has a 
zero-margin effect.  
 
7.4.2.1 Accumulation of labour stock 
These results support the neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function 
assumption that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is equal to 
unity (Solow, 1962a). However, this thesis has found evidence that capital 
investment may not create employment in these 17 selected developing economies.  
A possible implication of this contention is that measures to stimulate investment 
may have an important role to play in increasing unemployment in these selected 
developing economies (Stockhammer & Klär, 2011).  Moreover, measures to 
improve the quantity of the labour force, or the efficient use of the labour force may 
lead to higher unemployment rates if they are accompanied by more investment in 
physical capital (Stockhammer & Klär, 2011; Agenor, 2017). These findings find 
support in Heller and Stephenson (2014) who found that market-creating institutions 
that protect private property and regulate free-market activity with minimal 
government intervention have a strong positive association with higher labour force 
participation rates and employment-population-ratios.  The zero coefficient for the 
institutional index and the categories of institutions would suggest that in these 17 
selected developing economies, there are not sufficiently appropriate market-
creating institutions that support labour force participation.   
The zero parameter estimate of 𝛽𝛽 could be evidence that where rules do exist, 
they may be counterproductive, imposing excessive controls or insufficient controls 
required for complex economic exchanges taking place on the resource market 
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(Aaron, 2000).  A further interpretation of these results is that the existing institutions 
are not effectively enforced. The effectiveness and enforcement of institutions 
affects economic agents, governments and firms within the market and influence the 
amount spent on transactions and transformation of the factors of production. 
Typically, as labour costs increase, firms look to substitute capital for labour, 
contributing to high capital to labour ratios. Generally this would lead to a more 
efficient use of labour and less labour stock would be required. Amongst these 
selected 17 developing economies, the average capital to labour ratio is 2 percent, 
suggesting that there is minimal gain from productivity and suggests that these 
economies will tend to have lower real wages (cost of labour is low) (Hall & Jones, 
1999). The pattern of labour-intensive production amongst these 17 selected 
developing economies has remained broadly unchanged over the period 1991 to 
2015. At the same time, they continue to face significantly slow economic growth. 
One interpretation of these circumstances is the inability of these selected 
developing economies to induce a shift in their production structure to defend 
against their lack of capacity to meet the needs of fast-evolving international product 
markets where the emphasis is on innovation and product differentiation (Agenor, 
2017). These selected developing economies appear to have been caught in low-
wage labour-intensive production, with low levels of mature industries, innovation or 
technology-intensive industries.  
Some literature explains these deficiencies in terms of diminishing returns to 
physical capital (Solow, 1956), exhaustion of low-cost labour and imitation gains 
and insufficient efficiency (Glass, 1999). Specialisation in low-skilled-intensive 
activities, may prevent a low-income economy from providing sufficient incentives 
for workers to invest in education.  This in turn reduces the chance of promoting 
broad-based productivity from innovation and a more efficient labour force, it also 
reduces firms’ incentives to invest in R&D (Agenor, 2017).  These distorted 
incentives could contribute to the misallocation of labour skills to sectors that offer 
higher wages. Many of these arguments are compatible with the evidence that the 
economic slowdowns in these 17 selected developing economies may be the result 
of not only their distance from the technological frontier, but productivity slowdowns 
(Chapter 6.3). Yet these arguments differ in terms of the reasons for these 
slowdowns and consequently what type of institutions may be most appropriate to 
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encourage productivity growth.  This may suggest that these arguments are in fact 
complementary rather than substitutionary.  
  
 
7.5 Discussion of the association between institutions and 
productivity in the selected 17 developing economies 
Growth encouraging institutions should restructure the environment in which the 
combination of the factors of production is accelerated (Ugur, 2010). The extant 
literature agrees that institutions may influence economic growth by encouraging the 
adoption of new technologies and increasing the rate at which capital is combined 
with labour (Jones & Romer, 2010; Hédoin, 2012).  In particular, Anderlini, Felli, 
Immordino, and Riboni (2013) contend that ‘technology and legal rules are bound to 
coevolve’ (p. 937), suggesting that there is a feedback relationship between 
technology and institutions. This assumption makes technological change 
endogenous, arising randomly proportional to the rate of R&D investment.  It is 
expected that R&D is more strongly connected to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in economies where enabling 
institutions are more developed (Fuglie, 2018). This occurs as the process of 
knowledge creation and diffusion depends on the appropriate institutional structure 
that themselves are the outcome of advances in knowledge creation and diffusion 
(Andés & Asongu, 2015). The relative importance of innovation and R&D as drivers 
of productivity have been well researched and affirmed in many empirical studies 
(Petrakos et al., 2007). As discussed in section 6.3.2 the innovation process is 
complex and can be generated in part from R&D, investment in education, 
competition and international technology transfer.  All four sources of innovation 
depend on appropriate institutional infrastructure that enables firms to exploit 
opportunities offered by global markets for knowledge and innovation spill overs 
(Maryam & Jehan, 2018)  
 
7.5.1 Institutions and R&D 
As discussed in Chapter 6.3 a fundamental challenge to increasing levels of 
productivity in these 17 selected developing economies is their inability to harness 
the benefits of knowledge creation or diffusion.  Investment in R&D in these 
economies is weak or non-existent and they are unable to harness implicit 
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technological progress from imported intermediate goods.  The results of this thesis 
highlights that the institutional infrastructure of these 17 selected developing 
economies are more likely to affect behaviour in ways that do not provide incentives 
for productivity-enhancing activities.  These results find support in North (1991) who 
suggests that institutional constraints that define ‘a set of payoffs to 
political/economic activities’  (p.11) do not encourage productive activity.  One 
interpretation of these results may be that within these economies, there is an 
absence of institutions that could be significant determinants of productivity. This 
lends support to the suggestion that there are specific types of institutions which 
could potentially stimulate, rather than impede the adoption of new technologies and 
the efficient formation of productive capital (Tylecote, 2016).  
 Macroeconomic and institutional factors explain the pace of technological 
progress. Wang (2010) identified three hypotheses on the determinants of R&D 
investment: i) intellectual property rights (‘IPR’); ii) technology transfer; and iii) 
income growth.  IPR is considered an incentive to innovation, rewarding R&D by 
enabling innovators to retain profits generated from the patents of their new 
innovation (Schumpeter, 1976).  Patent protection is a way of promoting creation of 
new technology, rather than mere imitation.  IPR provides the inventor with a 
temporary monopoly on the invention and a guarantee of a durable income that can 
make future R&D financing stable and sustainable.  Patent protection can also 
increase product market shares for owners of new goods and prevent the threat of 
imitators entering the product market (Ramzi & Salah, 2018).  IPR can also be used 
to facilitate the diffusion and transfer of new knowledge in a competitive product 
market (Romer, 1990a).  The benefits of R&D increase only if the benefits of patent 
protection are not unduly delayed (Ezzeddine & Hammami, 2018).   
The more robust the IPR institutions, the stronger are incentives to file 
patents; the more patents that are granted, the more permission will be sought by 
innovators that want to build on existing knowledge (Crosby, 2000). Varsakelis 
(2001) assessed the impact of national culture, openness and patent protection 
framework on R&D investment in 50 economies of varying degrees of economic 
development. Varsakelis found that patent protection is the most important factor 
affecting the intensity of R&D (Varsakelis, 2001).  Later, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) 
investigated the impact of IPR protection on innovation in 64 developing economies 
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and found that innovations in developing economies increase with increasing IPR 
protection.   
The institutional framework can reduce private investors’ ability to 
appropriate returns on their investment through a variety of mechanisms: 
contractual incompleteness, hold-up problems, corruption, lack of property rights 
and poor contract enforcement (Rodrik, 2008a).  Institutional gaps can result in 
reducing or eliminating incentives for capital accumulation and technological 
progress. Unsupportive institutional frameworks may deter relationships among 
economic actors within the product market, which may result in static misallocation 
of resources that penalise private investors and distortions from capital investments 
with zero marginal returns. Institutional frameworks can limit, reduce or eliminate 
these types of ‘taxes’ on transactions.  Strong innovation presumes the appropriate 
institutional framework that allows the creation of new knowledge and strikes the 
balance between protection and diffusion of new ideas.  
 The unexpected negative sign of the aggregate institutional index and the 
four institutional factors may be evidence that institutions have created monopolies 
for economic actors within these selected 17 developing economies that rather than 
contribute to diffusion and transfer of new knowledge, are constraining investment in 
knowledge and technological creation and diffusion (Yifu Lin & Nugent, 1995).  
Innovator’s profits can diminish in highly competitive product markets where there 
are high levels of imitation (Arrow, 1962). While IPR through patent protection can 
act as a stimulus for firms to invest in R&D, greater protection does not always 
increase motivations to innovate and could instead encourage more imitation 
(Ezzeddine & Hammami, 2018).  The effects of IPR institutions within these 
economies may be conditional on the complementarity of institutions within the 
system that provide access to knowledge and technology and protects against high 
and volatile inflation or external shocks to innovation and enable innovators to profit 
from creating new knowledge, rather than rewarding imitators.   
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7.5.2 The relationship between institutions and capital investment and 
productivity  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 can increase the capital-labour ratio, which grows faster because of increased 
savings and investment from higher real output.  This ever-increasing investment 
capacity, cannot be matched by increasing the speed of the growth of the labour 
force.  Solow (1962b) concedes that technological change can only occur through 
both investment in new plant and equipment and through ‘disembodied’ 
technological change from existing factors, but asserts that technological progress 
embodied in new capital is more important. Technological change is similar in 
nature to any investment process. It requires time and adjustment that is not 
instantaneous (Solow, 1957; Arrow, 1962; Solow, 1962b; Arrow, 1969; Fagerberg, 
1987; Romer, 1990a). Future and current technological change depends on past 
investment in technology; current technology reflects past technological choices 
(Romer, 1990a).   
 Solow (1962b) presented a new technique for studying the role of capital 
formation in economic growth. His fundamental assumption was that technical 
progress is ‘built into’ machines and other capital goods and that this built in 
technical progress must be taken into when making empirical measurements of 
capital.  This presumes that new investments are characterised by the most modern 
technology and the capital that forms as a result does not change in qualitative 
terms over its remaining life (Solow, 1962b). It is expected that investment would 
augment capital and labour stocks towards increasing future productivity (Barrell et 
al., 2010).  The results in Colum (1), Table 6.14 highlight that increased capital 
accumulation may be associated with decreasing levels of productivity. Capital 
accumulation may be hindered by relatively high prices of (mostly imported) capital 
goods, because of an industrial policy of import substitution.  High custom tariffs and 
interest rates induce high relative prices of capital goods contributing to the 
reduction of the capital-labour ratio and resulting in a reallocation of labour (Asfaw, 
2015). The result in Table 6.14 may be further evidence of investment in machines, 
capital goods, obsolete foreign technologies or infrastructure that has a zero-
marginal product.  
 Considering the low investment in R&D in developing economies, they 
become more reliant on international technology transfers as determinants of R&D.  
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These international technology transfers may occur through either trade in 
intermediate and capital goods of high-tech products or inward foreign investment.  
Openness to trade and environments attractive to inward FDI can encourage 
domestic firms to improve the quality and opportunities for technological progress 
and R&D efforts and innovation (Coe et al., 2009).  Trade openness facilitates 
access to advanced economies’ stock of knowledge and can potentially increase 
domestic firms’ share of the product market (Grossman & Helpman, 1991).  This is 
one way for developing economies to exploit increasing returns to scale and avoid 
extravagant activities in the research sector by allocating a larger share of capital 
investment in investment in technology encapsulated in equipment and intermediate 
goods.    
During the period 1991 to 2015, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
experienced great political instability.  Simultaneously, they were in the midst of 
launching various economic liberalisation programmes that were slowed by the 
political instability that contributed to increased uncertainty and rent-seeking 
behavior.  The effect of the political instability and institutional instability improved by 
2015 and since 2016, all four countries have reported significant growth.  Since 
2009, Sri Lanka has reported on average a growth rate of 5.8 percent per year 
(World Bank, 2017).  In 2016, the World Bank reported that Bangladesh reported 
one of the fastest rates of productivity growth from 1995 (average 2.7 percent per 
year, second to China. Berggren et al. (2012)  maintains that to improve institutions, 
they must go through a process of change.  This change can only be accomplished 
through periods of institutional experimentation.  These countries were going 
through a transitional period of top-down institutional change (Brousseau et al., 
2011), driven by government reformers seeking policy implementation.   
These results find support in Berggren et al. (2012) who suggest that the 
economic environment is continuously evolving.  During periods of institutional 
change there may be periods of instability, and may be associated with periods of 
lower growth in the short- and medium-run (Berggren et al., 2012). Credibility of 
changes in institutional quality must be earned and there will often be a time lag 
between institutional change and when that change will exert an impact on 
economic activity (De Haan, Lundstrom, & Sturm, 2006). 
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During the period under review, the high- and middle-income countries in 
this sample would have had to deal with the effects of the disturbances to their 
financial systems resulting from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Central banks in 
these countries would have responded to these shocks in a variety of ways, in some 
cases beyond their traditional frameworks. Suggesting that market-stabilising 
institutions are heterogenous across the sample and countries would have 
individual responses to shocks to their economies that allow them to widen their 
operational parameters, while constraining their degrees of freedom of their central 
banks.  As these shocks are often times unexpected threats, these results would 
also suggest that country responses may be more contemporaneous to address 
evolving systematic risks outside of the normal, providing some measure of country-
specific discretion that reflects market and institutional structures and the relative 
country-specific risk. 
 Developing economies are expected to be capital scarce, with assets 
accumulated by investment within the economy rather than from foreign financial 
assets.  High-yielding domestic assets in resource-rich developing economies would 
imply rapid aggregate economic growth (Collier, 2010).  Likewise, the return on 
assets from domestic asset accumulation becomes dependent on the domestic 
investment process.  If these economies may be capital scarce, the investment 
process may not be able to deliver high returns. As asset accumulation increases 
from increased investment, these selected developing economies may encounter 
both managerial and physical bottlenecks that depress marginal returns to capital 
(Collier, van der Ploeg, Spence, & Venables, 2009).  This may also contribute to 
their inability to capitalise on the technology embodied in equipment or intermediate 
goods.  To address this issue, developing economies need a strategy for absorbing 
investment.  This strategy could include appropriate institutions that not only smooth 
investment but raise the overall average rate at which investment can be productive.  
 
7.6 Contribution to knowledge 
7.6.1 Total factor productivity in the 17 selected developing economies 
There is a dearth of studies that explore the factors that influence technological 
progress in developing economies, especially economies that may be connected by 
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historical conventions and events.  The rejection of null hypothesis 1 (there is no 
association between differences in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and differences in levels of output in 
developing economies) supports the neoclassical economic growth theory that the 
factors of production only explain a small portion of the differences in output across 
economies.  These results give emphasis to the power of differences in levels of 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in these 17 selected developing economies.  The limited infrastructure and 
funding for R&D and innovation continue to oblige these selected developing 
economies to look for alternatives to technological progress through technologies 
transferred from foreign investment.  
It is important to understand the characteristics of the technological 
capacities of these economies. This thesis contributes to closing this gap in the 
existing knowledge.  The extant literature has identified several factors that 
contribute to productivity.  These include investment in training (Pedrini, 2017), R&D 
investment (Romer, 1990a; Sequeira et al., 2017), political stability (Tavares & 
Wacziarg, 2001) and institutional quality (Hall & Jones, 1999; Dias & Tebaldi, 2012). 
The results of this thesis, combined with the low rates of economic growth in these 
17 selected developing economies contradict the contentions of Kumar and Russell 
(2002) that technological progress has a greater effect on economic performance in 
relatively wealthy economies than less developed economies. Instead, the results 
highlighted in this thesis support the original neoclassical contention that 
productivity is a large contributor to economic performance.  
Solow (1957) initially found that physical capital accumulation only 
accounted for approximately 12 percent of output growth per hour worked in the 
United States for the period 1900 to 1949.  While 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth accounted for the 
remaining 88 percent.  More recent empirical work by Lee and Hong (2012), 
Eberhardt and Teal (2013), Manuelli and Seshadri (2014), Bergeaud, Cette, and 
Lecat (2017) and Yalcinkaya et al. (2017) have similarly found that national output is 
most responsive to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 growth. Low-income economies tend to have a comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive industries. These studies focused primarily on the 
effect of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in developed economies.  This thesis expands their findings to 
developing economies suggesting that the contribution of capital and labour to 
explain differences in national output are dwarfed by the effect of the unexplained 
residual.   
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This is in contrast to the critiques by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) of the 
neoclassical theory of the importance of the residual to economic growth.  
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) found that the residual had all but disappeared in 
their study, which was based on a strict application of the neoclassical theory of 
productivity.  Their study provided an alternative perspective on how much output 
growth could be explained by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and how much could be explained by capital 
formation. Conversely, this thesis provides evidence that capital accumulation along 
neoclassical lines has not led to a switch into a regime of endogenous technical 
change as past capital accumulation has not rendered labour sufficiently expensive.  
This seems consistent with arguments by Aghion and Jaravel (2015) that in the 
long-run an economy with a low rate of innovation will continue to fall further behind 
the frontier. Aghion and Jaravel (2015) argue that an economies’ absorptive 
capacity is crucial for technological catch up, particularly when an economy is 
further from the technological frontier.   
Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that many factors can contribute to 
persistently low levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in these selected 17 developing economies, including 
the structure of competitive markets, increases in government regulation or 
disruptions in private markets. There is evidence that sustained decreases in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
are not atypical for these selected developing economies for the 25-year period, 
1990 to 2015.  It may be anachronistic to conclude that this is merely a 
phenomenon of a business or economic cycle.  
 
7.6.2 The aggregate institutional index and four institutional factors in the 17 
selected developing economies 
The factor analysis exercise to calculate the aggregate institutional index and 
identify the four institutional factors has provided an alternative method to the 
traditional use of including diverse indicators to proxy institutions in a single 
regression or the use of simple averages to calculate aggregate indicators.  The 
results of the factor analysis in this thesis adds a new argument to the critiques by 
Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013) of the previous parsimonious methods used to construct 
indices to measure institutional qualities.  These critiques find support in earlier calls 
by Glaeser et al. (2004) that ‘most indicators of institutional quality used to establish 
the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually 
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unsuitable for that purpose.’ The use of factor analysis not only permits the isolation 
of correlation effects amongst the indicators, but standardising the indicators 
transforms the data to a comparable scale that can prevent giving an indicator with 
a larger range a weight of 100 in the analysis. Standardising the institutional 
indicators equalises the range and data variability, which effect is further reduced by 
the factor analysis.  
 
7.6.3 The association between the institutions and capital stock and labour 
stock in the selected 17 developing economies 
The findings of this thesis add to the critique of the neoclassical argument that the 
mobilisation of the right quantity of savings and investment may lead an increase in 
the rate of aggregate economic growth rates, leading to a higher equilibrium growth 
path.  This prediction of convergence can only be conditional on homogeneity of 
savings rate, labour force growth rates and productivity.  These assumptions are 
further challenged by the results of this thesis.  This thesis also suggests that there 
is the possibility of heterogeneity in other dimensions which may be of significance 
to growth in developing economies, such as the quality of their institutional 
structure. This thesis contributes to arguments by Eicher and Leukert (2009) for the 
importance of the possibility of an impact of institutions on the accumulation of 
capital and labour stocks, thereby contributing to economic growth in developing 
economies. The results of this thesis also suggest that there is less reliance on the 
lowering of transactions costs in exchange transactions through formal property 
rights and enforcement of contracts.  Appropriate institutional frameworks are 
required to provide adequate social safety nets and labour market activation as well 
as provide opportunities to access life-long learning, digital technologies, innovation, 
finance and entrepreneurship. More particularly, institutions that support the 
reduction of information asymmetries in the labour market and ensure more 
effective training or subsidies to employers, aimed at increasing skill levels.  
Instead, what may be required are appropriate institutional structures that 
ensure that the continued capital accumulation in these selected developing 
economies has full effect.  It can hardly be denied that for capital accumulation in 
these selected developing economies to have full effect it must be accompanied by 
additional inputs of labour, improvement in technology and other improvements in 
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the economic environment.  More particularly, what may be required are more 
flexible institutions that provide these selected developing economies with the 
mechanisms to respond to global macroeconomic shocks.  There is evidence that 
developing economies may be more financially integrated than previously thought 
and it is necessary that national institutional infrastructure is able to meet the 
demand and respond to shocks from decreased export revenue, FDI and encourage 
increased public investment and enhance credit supply in the economy.  
This thesis also supports the argument that not only do institutions matter for 
economic growth, but different sets of institutions may matter for economies at 
different levels of development (Eicher & Leukert, 2009).  For these selected 17 
developing economies one channel to improve the factors of production, increase 
access to and investment in technology and improve the economic environment is 
the adoption of institutional structures that protect against coordination failure within 
the market, regulate the distribution of the factors of production and protect the 
market against external shocks, minimise abuse of market power, internalise 
externalities and deal with information asymmetries. 
 
7.6.4 The association between institutions and productivity in the selected 
17 developing economies  
These results would support the argument that institutions may affect economic 
growth through its effect on: i) transaction costs; ii) predictability of economic 
relationships; and iii) information asymmetries. This is in line with North’s 
‘institutions as rules of the game’ approach, which is principally focused on how 
institutions shape the incentive structure within the economy. This approach 
assesses the mechanisms of unequal exchange and exploitation, externally-induced 
economic and political distortions as determinants of the divergent development of 
productivity paths between developed and developing economies (Ugur, 2010).  
The persistent economic growth slowdowns coincide with the point in the economic 
growth process where it is no longer possible to increase productivity by shifting 
additional labour from low-productivity industries to high-productivity sectors and 
where gains from importing foreign technology diminish (Eichengreen, Park, & Shin, 
2018). In fact, the results from this thesis suggest that the institutions within these 
selected developing economies may be enabling the persistence of monopolistic 
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power within the market that contributes to increase inefficient use and distribution 
of innovation and knowledge.  More particularly, these results lend support to the 
argument that productivity is not independent of capital as suggested in the 
neoclassical economic growth model.  It may even suggest that contrary to the 
neoclassical economic growth model, productivity may be endogenous, arising in 
response to investments in R&D and knowledge creation (Romer, 1990a).  
There is no evidence that the difference in categories of institutions has any 
statistical significance for changes in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 for this sample of economies.  The 
absence of statistical significance is more telling for this sample.  It further supports 
the suggestion that these economies lack the appropriate institutions that could 
influence productivity and thereby economic performance.  These findings support 
the suggestion by Liu et al. (2017) that institutional voids can lead to poorly 
functioning or underdeveloped resource and product markets.  Institutional voids 
contribute to the increase of transaction costs arising from increased regulatory and 
bureaucratic burdens, increased costs of enforcing contracts, increased costs of 
protecting and insuring private property and the effects of corruption.  Firms faced 
with these institutional voids may find alternative ways of dealing with the resulting 
missing or poorly developed markets, which could divert their resources away from 
adopting or creation of new technology or investing in productive activities.  
Alternatively, there is strong evidence of statistically significant links between 
capital stocks and productivity.  The negative coefficient of capital stock not only 
supports the suggestion that there exists monopolistic power within the market that 
increases inefficiency and diverts resources from being invested in innovation or 
new knowledge (Comin, 2010).  This suggests that technology may not be a public 
good within these selected developing economies and more particularly, knowledge 
and technological progress is not free for use by all businesses within these 
economies.  Further that knowledge and technological progress is not independent 
of either capital or labour as suggested by the neoclassical economic growth model 
(Solow, 1994). Labour productivity can be improved from higher capital per unit of 
labour and increased productivity.  This would reflect firms’ ability to produce more 
output by better combining of inputs, through new ideas, technological innovations 
as well as process and organisational innovations, including new business models.  
 
173 
 
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Comprehending the determinants of aggregate economic performance is critical in 
understanding how to increase levels of productivity and output in middle- and low-
income economies.  This thesis has sought to extend this discussion with regard to 
identifying the mechanisms through which productivity and institutions affect 
economic performance of middle- and low-income economies.  This thesis firstly 
investigated the relationship between productivity, measured as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and national 
output measured as real GDP.  It investigated the relative importance of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in the 
economic performance of selected middle- and low-income economies.  This thesis 
has sought to fill the gap in the lack of empirical consensus on the effect of 
productivity on economic performance in developing economies.  
 Secondly, this thesis sought to augment existing literature on the association 
between institutions and economic performance in developing economies by using 
alternative estimation methods.  For the most part, existing studies have used 
reduced-form models that have been developed on the assumption that institutions 
are endogenous. Furthermore, extant empirical literature has focused on the 
importance of institutions of property rights and contract enforcement in creating 
incentives for investment in the market.  This thesis has expanded this area of 
research not only by using factor analysis to calculate an institutional index and four 
institutional factors, but has expanded the institutional indicators that have been 
included in the model.  This thesis has investigated the mechanisms through which 
market-creating and market-deepening institutions influence long run accumulation 
and distribution of the factors of production and levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in middle- and low-
income economies using fixed and random effects estimation methods.  
 The results in Chapter 6 highlight the importance of both 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and institutions 
for long run economic performance of middle- and low-income economies.  They 
add to support to the argument for the move away from investment and 
accumulation in the factors of production for increasing levels of output towards 
increasing income per capita for middle- and low-income economies. More 
particularly, the findings and discussions in Chapter 4 lend support for the 
neoclassical economic growth theory that differences in exogenous 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 accounts 
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for the differences cross-country economic performance.  The results and 
discussion also suggest that institutions may be considered exogenous for empirical 
estimations of the influence of institutions for long-run economic performance.  The 
remainder of this Chapter will provide a summary of the key findings of this thesis, 
highlighting the limitations of the study and areas for further research.  
 
8.2 Key findings 
8.2.1 The association between productivity and economic performance in 
developing economies 
Chapter 2 highlighted the relevance of productivity for increasing levels of output, 
towards achieving higher levels of economic growth.  Neoclassical economic growth 
theory posits that productivity is one of the components of the amorphous ‘black 
box’ called 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, which is traditionally used to measure levels of productivity and 
technological progress.  Predominantly, earlier studies have considered the 
hypothesis that cross-country differences in economic performance are dependent 
on differences in labour productivity and the productivity of capital.  Capital has 
always been treated as a very important factor for the development of 
underdeveloped economies.  Productivity has only slightly contributed to increased 
production.  Yet developing economies remain capital scarce and labour abundant. 
Section 6.3 emphasises the importance of productivity to explain differences in the 
economic performance of developing economies.   
 This thesis has rejected the null hypothesis that there is no association 
between 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and economic performance in developing economies. Quite to the 
contrary, this thesis finds evidence that suggest that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is highly statistically 
significantly associated with increases in national output of developing economies. 
Persistently low levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 seemingly account for the persistently low levels of 
economic growth in the sample of selected developing economies. There is also 
evidence that the limited infrastructure and funding for R&D and innovation in 
developing economies continues to oblige these selected developing economies to 
rely on continued capital accumulation to increase levels of production.  
 This thesis finds support for the arguments that the competitive structure of 
the resource and product markets and the absorptive capacity of developing 
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economies contribute to levels of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  As these selected developing economies 
continue to drift further away from the technology frontier, they may find it harder to 
catch up, because they lack the absorptive capacity to take advantage of 
technological spill overs and firms lack the incentives to invest in more efficient 
ways of production, during abundant low-cost labour.  Table 8.1 summarises the 
key findings of investigating the relationship between productivity and economic 
performance in the selected developing economies.  
 
Table 8.1: Key findings on the association between productivity and economic 
performance in the sample of selected developing economies 
Research Question Key Literature Hypothesis Key Findings 
To investigate the 
association between 
productivity and 
economic 
performance in 
selected developing 
economies 
Solow (1957, 
1962b); 
Easterly and Levine 
(2001); 
Hall and Jones 
(1999); 
Caselli and 
Coleman (2006); 
Hofman et al. 
(2017); 
Yalcinkaya et al. 
(2017) 
 
There is no 
association 
between 
differences in 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 
differences in 
levels of output 
in developing 
economies.  
− 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is highly 
statistically 
significant at the 
five percent level.  
 
− Holding capital 
stock and labour 
stock constant, a 
unit increase in 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is associated 
with a 100 percent 
increase in 
national output 
amongst the 
sample of 17 
developing 
economies.  
 
− 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 levels in the 
sample 17 
developing 
economies are 
persistently low 
with an average 
growth of 0 
percent per year. 
 
 
8.2.2 The role of institutions in economic performance in developing 
economies 
Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of institutions for increasing levels of 
accumulation and productivity towards achieving higher levels of economic growth. 
Table 8.2 summarises the key findings of the investigation of the role of institutions 
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for the accumulation of physical capital and labour and increasing levels of 
productivity for the sample of 17 selected developing economies.  The results of this 
thesis suggest that what is more important for economic performance in developing 
economies are flexible institutions that can respond to not only external shocks, but 
changes in demand from developed economies, than ‘good’ or ‘inclusive’ or 
‘efficient’ institutions. 
 The findings from this thesis confirm the findings of earlier empirical 
investigations into the influence of institutions on economic performance, but goes 
further, by identifying the mechanisms through which institutions indirectly influence 
economic performance in developing economies.  The results confirm that 
institutions that increase investment in education and health care, indirectly 
influence productivity through the promotion of skills and knowledge creation, 
contributing to the diffusion and adoption of new technology and processes.  
Further, that institutions that are aimed towards enhancing credit supply in the 
economy, increasing public investment and supporting expansionary budget policies 
contribute to ensuring a flexible institutional infrastructure that can respond 
effectively to external shocks to its macroeconomic stability.  Likewise, institutions 
that establish social policies to respond to the impact of macroeconomic crisis, such 
as safety nets for households affected by the ‘fall out’ of the resource market, are 
important to ensure social protection and insurance, redistribution and management 
of social conflict.  
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Table 8.2: Key findings on the role of institutions for economic performance in the 
sample of selected developing economies 
Research Question Key Literature Hypothesis Key Findings 
To investigate the 
role of institutions in 
economic 
performance in 
selected developing 
economies 
North (1991);  
Hall and Jones 
(1999); 
Rodrik (2005, 
2008a);  
Hall et al. (2010); 
d'Agostino and 
Scarlato (2012); 
Aisen and Veiga 
(2013);  
Dequech (2013); 
Heller and 
Stephenson (2014); 
Agenor (2017)  
 
− There is no 
association 
between 
national 
institutional 
infrastructure 
and 
differences in 
levels of 
investment in 
physical 
capital stock 
in developing 
economies 
 
− There is no 
association 
between 
national 
institutional 
infrastructure 
and 
differences in 
levels of 
investment in 
labour stock 
in developing 
economies 
 
− There is no 
association 
between 
national 
infrastructure 
and 
differences in 
levels of 
productivity in 
developing 
economies.  
− Institutions are 
important for the 
accumulation of 
capital and labour 
stocks in 
developing 
economies.   
 
− Appropriate 
institutional 
frameworks are 
required to 
provide adequate 
social safety nets 
and labour market 
activation to 
provide 
opportunities for 
increased 
productivity and 
levels of output.  
 
− Flexible 
institutions are 
more important for 
long run economic 
performance of 
developing 
economies, than 
‘good’ or 
‘inclusive’ 
institutions, to 
deal with 
contagion effects 
of being 
integrated with the 
global economy.  
 
 
8.3 Contribution to practice and policy 
This thesis contributes to existing literature in three different ways.  Firstly, it adds to 
the limited existing empirical discussion of the role of productivity for economic 
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performance among developing economies.  Much of the discussion of the role of 
productivity and technological progress on economic performance has centred on 
OECD and developed economies, unfortunately leaving behind scarce evidence of 
this relationship between productivity and technological progress and economic 
performance within developing economies.  Secondly, this thesis employs factor 
analysis to create an institutional index and institutional factors.  While some 
aspects of the influence of institutions on economic growth have been investigated 
in other studies, there continues to be questions about the choice and aggregation 
of institutional indicators.  This has resulted in the call for the use of much more 
robust techniques to quantify institutions.  
Thirdly, the persistent slow economic growth and the lack of productivity 
convergence has brought to light the relevance of empirical research into the 
influence of institutions and productivity on economic performance in developing 
economies. One motivation of this work is the ongoing debate on whether there are 
categories of institutions that are more relevant for economic growth, premised on 
the argument that certain political and economic conditions are particularly 
propitious for economic growth.  Moreover, how market-creating institutions, such 
as enforcement of property rights, the rule of law, enforcement of contracts; market-
legitimising institutions that regulate social conflict and market-stabilising institutions 
that protect against external shocks impact investment decisions and the ability of 
these economies to access and distribute factors of production, technology and 
knowledge in developing economies.  
Subsequent to the global financial crisis a number of uncertainties and risk 
continue to loom for developing economies. There continues to be a high level of 
policy uncertainty, clouding prospects for world trade, development aid and global 
investment and productivity. This coupled with rising geopolitical tensions contribute 
to the intensified tendency towards more unilateral and isolationist policies. Those 
developing economies that may have more open capital markets remain vulnerable 
to increased risk aversion, disorderly tightening of global liquidity and sudden capital 
withdrawal.  These weak demand and lower capital investment conditions have all 
contributed to the continued low levels of productivity in developing economies. 
Key takeaways from developments since the period of data collection (1990 
to 2015) are that: i) many commodity-dependent exporting developing economies 
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have continued to be hard hit by declining export prices and weakened demand 
from the developed economies, experiencing significant growth slow-down that has 
largely carried on into 2018; and ii) developing economies that are less dependent 
on commodity exports have benefited from price movements including reduced oil 
import bills.  Those commodity dependent developing economies may continue to 
suffer the effects from short-term economic vulnerabilities due in part to weaker 
demand for commodity exports.  This underscores the need for a better 
understanding of how institutional adjustments and adjustments in productivity could 
strengthen fiscal and external positions of these economies.  
 
 
8.3.1 Contribution to practice 
Overall, this thesis adds to the extant empirical literature that argues that the quality 
of institutions has a significant absolute effect on economic performance in 
developing economies. Consistent with earlier research, this thesis has found 
evidence that supports the contention that ‘institutions matter for economic growth’ 
(Das & Quirk, 2016).  Institutions indirectly determine economic performance 
through their direct impact on efficiency and intensity of production and investment 
in the factors of production. More importantly, this research finds evidence that 
institutional development may not be path dependent.  There is no evidence that the 
historical origins of institutions influence their current quality or current levels of 
economic performance of developing economies.   
 This thesis builds upon existing literature to develop a coherent framework 
for understanding which institutions matter most for economic performance of 
developing economies.  It attempts to explain the dynamic linkages between 
institutions and long-run economic performance of developing economies that share 
an institutional origin.  The findings address the question of whether the 
development of institutions with a shared origin is path dependent. This adds to 
criticisms of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2001) who argue 
that differences in colonisation strategies provide a more practical or significant 
implications for institutional development than country-specific characteristics. 
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 The findings of this thesis confirm that institutions affect long-run economic 
performance for developing economies through their direct impact on productivity.  
The results also allude to the argument that the positive effect of the interaction 
between institutions and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 may be hindered by a lack of absorptive capacity to 
take advantage of gains in education or technology. The results are particularly 
important when considering the returns to investment in education for developing 
economies.  These findings provide evidence of the arguments by Mankiw, Romer, 
and Weil (1992) that higher levels of capital-labour ratio may lead to higher levels 
output by increasing incentives to acquire technology to make labour more efficient. 
This suggest that the technological frontier can only be achieved through the 
support of institutions that encourage and provide incentives for investment in 
training and education, R&D and new labour-saving technology. Confirming the 
critical role of institutions as ‘rules of the game’ to fill the gaps in the market (North, 
2016). 
 This thesis contributes to existing literature on the critical role of productivity 
for economic performance.  There is evidence that differences in national output are 
determined by how efficiently and intensely the factor inputs are converted in the 
production process (Comin, 2010).  The aggregate neoclassical production function 
is driven by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  For these 17 selected developing economies there is evidence 
that cross-country differences in output may be due to differences in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  The large 
coefficients could be evidence that measurement errors in output, capital stock and 
labour stock may appear in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (Baier et al., 2006).  This could include physical 
capital with zero marginal product, changes in hours worked or changes in 
institutions and political regimes.  This highlights the need for further research in this 
area to better isolate 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and the extent to which conventional assumptions about 
the nature of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 are supported by the data and current parametric estimation 
techniques used to calculate 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. Governments must pay attention to institutional 
environments as a factor of productivity.  
 
8.3.2 Contribution to policy 
There is evidence that developing economies may be more financially integrated 
than may have previously been thought. Three policy implications have emerged 
from the investigation undertaken in this thesis.  First, institutions may be strongly 
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linked to economic performance in developing economies. After accounting for the 
effect of the proximate determinants of economic growth, parameter estimates 
associated with the exogenous component of institutions, extracted by factor 
analysis are found to have no statistical significance for the accumulation of physical 
capital, labour or productivity in these selected developing economies.  The 
absence of statistical significance can be interpreted to mean that the poor 
economic performance of the proximate determinants within these selected 
developing economies may be attributed to the lack of relevant institutions that can 
appropriately support the efficient functioning of the resource and product markets 
in these selected developing economies.  Moreover, the results suggest that the 
critical lever to inform policymakers to ignite long-run economic growth is the quality 
of institutions that encourage efficient allocation and use of capital and labour.  
Institutions that not only encourage capital investment, but efficient capital 
investment that will contribute to productive activities.  
 Continued declines in commodity prices in 2015 – 2018 may require 
commodity exporting developing economies to consider tempering existing 
institutional infrastructure to support increased domestic demand or increasing 
access to financial support from multilateral financial institutions.  To achieve 
increased national output objectives, commodity exporting developing economies 
may need to adjust their market-deepening institutional infrastructure to include 
support to boost domestic revenue mobilisation and achieve diversification into new 
export products that could replace lost commodity revenues.  
 The results of this thesis also highlight that among these selected 
developing economies, holding the proximate determinants constant, productivity 
depends on investment in capital stock. The unexpected negative coefficient of 
capital stock suggests that there may be existing monopolies within these 
economies that constrain the absorptive capacity of these economies to take 
advantage of gains from R&D or implicit technology from imports (Teixeira & 
Queirós, 2016).  Economic performance in these selected developing economies 
continues to be primarily capital driven.  It suggests that the return to physical 
capital is high during the low-cost labour-intensive production.  The persistent low-
cost labour discourages investment in new technologies contributing to the negative 
and low levels of productivity.  Not surprisingly, low levels of productivity account for 
a large proportion of the variance in economic performance as these economies are 
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unable to take advantage of economies of scale or more efficient combination of 
capital and labour to increase output levels.  
 The importance of labour for economic growth in developing economies, is 
well recognised.  Levels of health and education, are found to have a positive and 
robust relation to the efficiency of the labour force.  If labour is to be regarded as 
efficient, it is necessary that the institutional infrastructure contribute to increasing 
the endowment per worker to offset any reduction in productivity.  Technological-
advance can be embodied in labour-increasing progress, enabling increased levels 
of production in the same way as if more labour were used.  In the absence of short-
term high-tech capacity, developing economies may be stalled unless they are able 
to develop complementary capacity of an educated workforce. These 
complementary capacities will require an increase in the quality and quantity of 
schooling and health care for the labour force.  This could increase the chance of 
developing economies to be able to adapt technological spill over to meet their 
needs and constraints, increasing their opportunities for innovation towards 
increased levels of productivity.  
  These results would suggest that there is room for the development of all 
four categories of institutions identified in this thesis – market-creating; market-
legitimising; market-regulating and market-stabilising.  There is evidence to suggest 
that market-legitimising, market-regulating and market-stabilising institutions 
designed to regulate and legitimise the market, impose roles within the market and 
constrain inefficiencies have a significant impact on levels of factor accumulation 
and productivity.  These results would support the call for strengthening market-
legitimising and market-stabilising institutions that protect against coordination 
failure within the market, regulate the distribution of the factors of production and 
protect the market against external shocks, minimise abuse of market power, 
internalise externalities and deal with information asymmetries in developing 
economies, to improve factor accumulation, increase access to and investment in 
technology and improve the economic environment. 
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8.4 Limitations to research 
This thesis has utilised well-known and reliable methodologies to test the various 
research hypotheses.  The resulting interpretations of these findings provide relative 
comparisons of cross-country growth impacts of productivity and institutional quality. 
There are limitations in terms of the quantification of institutional quality that make it 
difficult to make conclusive pronouncements in terms of the results. These are 
limitations that can provide areas for further research. 
 The first limitation is the availability of reliable information for many of the 
economies included in the sample. This research has utilised up to date data from 
the World Bank, Penn World Tables and the Economic Freedom of the World Index. 
Many countries have been omitted from this study because there was no data 
readily available for all indicators from any source. A larger sample size may allow a 
more accurate representation of characteristics of the population of developing 
economies that share historical institutional origins (there are over 55 former British 
colonies) (Marcoulides, 1993). This thesis was only able to select a sample of four 
low-income economies from a possible population of 20 low-income economies. 
This could potentially result in over-estimated standard errors (the standard 
deviation of the sampling distribution). Larger sample sizes increase power and 
decrease estimation error (VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). Consequently, there is 
room for further research projects to collect and collate reliable data from a wider 
cross section of countries, particularly lower middle- and low-income countries on 
their macroeconomic and institutional environments.  
 Secondly, endogeneity remains an issue in the study of institutions.  This 
thesis has found evidence that the institutional index calculated using factor analysis 
was not econometrically endogenous and could be treated as exogenous for this 
research. Yet the existing literature maintains that institutions are theoretically 
endogenous.  The results in this thesis that the institutions parameter was not 
econometrically endogenous could be indicative of the way the indicators were 
collected.  The variables were derived from the Economic Freedom of the World 
Index.  The data is primarily the result of survey results, which are the respondents’ 
subjective ex-post perception of how the rules and norms impacted exchange 
transactions. These types of responses may not always elucidate whether the rules 
and norms provided incentives to engage in exchange transactions or whether they 
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the rules or norms were adapted to enable the exchange transactions to take place. 
While this type of retrospective measure of the effectiveness of institutions may be 
useful, it does not answer the question of whether institutions are truly endogenous.    
Many of the existing empirical studies have proceeded with their 
investigation on the premise that their institutional parameter is endogenous and do 
not implement diagnostic tests to predetermine if this is in fact so. This thesis has 
attempted to address the issue of potential endogeneity using factor analysis to 
estimate parameters that express the relation between the indicators, mitigating 
against the subjectivity of the Economic Freedom of the World Index and the 
researcher’s subjective judgements on the choice of which indicators to include in 
this research. Moreover, the factor analysis deals with issues of multicollinearity. 
This thesis has also tested for the robustness of this approach, using 2 stage least 
squares with instrumental variables.  Yet this may not be conclusive evidence that 
the issue of endogeneity may be reduced through factor analysis.  There is certainly 
room for further research on the most appropriate methods of removing potential 
endogeneity issues and further research to examine the effect of removing 
endogeneity on the interpretation of results.   
The third limitation lies in the omitted variable bias. This thesis has not 
controlled for the effect of other potential determinants of economic performance; 
geography, culture or trade. The primary aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
relationship between 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and institutions and their effect on national output in 
developing economies. While this thesis recognises that geography is another deep 
determinant of economic performance, and the role of international trade as a driver 
of productivity change (Rodrik et al., 2004), they are beyond the scope of the 
current research.  This thesis may be extended by controlling for the effect of 
geography and international trade on the interaction of institutions on productivity 
and output. This type of further research could explore whether these parameters 
operate additively or interact with institutions. This research could also be extended 
to identify how the different categories mitigate or enhance the effect of other deep 
determinants.  
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8.5 Areas for further research 
There are some questions that the analysis in this thesis could not address.  
Institutions are predominantly treated as a ‘black box’ and the results of this thesis 
suggest that improving the quality of the institutions in these selected developing 
economies could result in significant gains in income per capita.  However, these 
results do not point to the concrete steps that are necessary to lead to an 
improvement in these institutions.  Institutional features, such as their enforcement, 
equitable implementation and applicability can be interpreted as an equilibrium 
outcome (Acemoglu et al., 2001) associated with some more fundamental features 
of informal norms, such as the distribution of power within the society, which cannot 
be easily changed.  A more detailed analysis of the effect of the more fundamental 
informal norms will be an appropriate area for further study to examine how they 
impact the enforcement and application of more formal rules that more readily 
influence economic performance.  
 The contention of this thesis is that formal institutions cannot be fully 
examined apart from the innovations and social norms that underlie them. 
Institutions critically underpin the ‘rules of the game’ which help shape the 
complementarity or substitutability of the factors of production toward productive 
activities. Static juxtapositions of institutional forms have predominantly disregarded 
the fact that functionally equivalent institutions can take different forms.  In the long-
run it is the elementary informal norms that may be likely to drive the sustainable 
outcomes of formal institutions. The elements of economic performance are 
dynamic, complex and volatile, and require both country specific formal and informal 
rules and norms that contribute to reducing transaction costs and contagion effect of 
cross-border activities, thereby increasing the opportunity for economic growth 
among developing economies.  
 Secondly, the lack of good indicators prevents this thesis from fully 
examining the direction of causality in the relationship between institutions, the 
factors of production and productivity. The scarcity of annual institutional indicators 
and data on capital stock investment means that many developing economies were 
omitted from this thesis.  Given the limitations of data availability, there continues to 
be a paucity of studies that examine these relationships for developing economies. 
There is room for the development of more appropriate means of data collection. 
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Further study of the interrelationship among institutions, productivity and the 
factors of production in developing economies at both the micro and macro level 
can contribute to reinvigorating international business research by providing 
mechanisms by which scholars can confront the complexities that characterise the 
role and status of developing economies in the ever changing and volatile global 
economy.  It is hoped that the framework presented in this thesis has taken this 
research one step further in that direction.  
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Appendix A: Index of institutional indicators used  
 Type Definition Source 
Judicial independence Informal 
Comprised of responses to the World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report question: ‘Is the judiciary in your country 
independent from political influences of members of government, 
citizens or firms.’ 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report  
Impartial courts Informal 
Comprised of responses to the World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report question: ‘the legal framework in your 
country for private businesses to settle disputes and challenge the 
legality of government actions and/or regulations is inefficient and 
subject to manipulation, or is efficient and follows a clear and neutral 
process.’ Ratings from the World Bank's Governance Indicators were 
used for any missing values from primary data sources since 1995. 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report  
World Bank's World Development 
Indicators 
Protection of property rights Formal 
Comprised of responses to the World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report question: ‘Property rights, including over 
financial assets are poorly defined and not protected by law or are 
clearly defined and well protected by law.’ 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report  
Military interference in rule of law and 
politics Informal 
Comprised of data from the International Country risk Guide Political 
risk Component G, Military in Politics: ‘A measure of the military's 
involvement in politics’.  Data from the World Bank's Governance 
Indicators were used where values were missing from the primary 
data source since 1995. 
PRS Group, International Country Risk 
Guide 
World Bank, Governance Indicators 
Legal enforcement of contracts Informal Comprised of data from the World Bank's Doing Business of the time and money required to collect a debt.  World Bank, Doing Business 
Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real 
property Informal 
Comprised of data from the World Bank's Doing Business of the time 
measured in days and financial costs to transfer ownership of 
property that includes land and warehouses.  
World Bank, Doing Business 
Reliability of police Informal 
Comprised of data from Global Competitiveness Report question: ‘To 
what extent can police services be relied upon to enforce law and 
order in your country?’ 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report  
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 Type Definition Source 
Freedom to own foreign currency bank 
accounts Informal 
 
Comprised of data from Global Competitiveness Report question: ‘To 
what extent does the incidence of crime and violence impose costs 
on businesses in your country?’ 
International Monetary Fund, Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions 
Sound Money Formal 
 
Focuses on the importance of money and relative prices stability in 
the exchange process. It refers to money with a relatively stable 
purchasing power across time, which can reduce transaction costs 
and facilitate exchange. Comprised of data on money growth - 
average annual growth of money supply 
World Bank's World Development 
Indicators 
International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics & 
Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions 
United Nations National Accounts 
 Regulatory trade barriers Formal 
Comprised based on data from: 
(1) Global Competitiveness Report on tariff and non-tariff barriers and 
whether their impact on the ability to import goods to compete in 
the domestic market; 
(2) World Bank's Doing Business on the non-money cost of 
procedures required to import a full 20-foot container of dry goods 
that do not contain hazardous or military items.  
 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 
World Bank, Doing Business 
Black market exchange rates Informal Based on the percentage difference between the official and the parallel exchange rate.  
MRI Bankers' Guide to Foreign 
Currency 
Foreign ownership/investment 
restrictions Formal 
Based on data from the two questions from the Global 
Competitiveness Report: 
(1) ‘How prevalent is foreign ownership of companies in your 
country?’ 
(2) ‘How restrictive are regulations in your country relating to 
international capital flows?’ 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 
Capital controls Formal 
 
Based on the International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions data on up to 13 
types of international capital controls.  
International Monetary Fund, Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions 
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 Type Definition Source 
Freedom of foreigners to visit Formal 
 
Measures the percentage of economies for which visas are required 
from foreign visitors. It reflects the freedom of foreigners to travel for 
the purpose of both tourists and for short-term business 
Robert Lawson and Jayme Lemke 
(2012). Travel Visas. Public Choice 
154, 1-2-; 17-36. 
Credit market regulations 
Formal 
and 
Informal  
Comprised of data on: 
(1)    ownership of banks - the percentage of bank deposits held in 
privately owned banks 
(2)    private sector credit - measures the extent of government 
borrowing relative to borrowing by the private sector 
(3)    interest rate controls/negative real interest rates - data on credit-
market controls and regulations 
World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey & World 
Development Indicators 
James R. Barth, Gerard Capiro and 
Ross Levine (2006).  Rethinking Bank 
Regulation: Till Angels Govern. 
Cambridge University Press 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 
International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics  
Hiring regulations and minimum wage Formal 
Data from the World Bank's Doing Business based on the "Employing 
Workers’ section, comprised of three sub-components –  
(1) whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks;  
(2) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and  
(3) the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time 
employee to the average value added per worker  
 
World Bank, Doing Business 
Hiring and firing regulations Formal   
Based on the Global Competitiveness Report survey question: ‘the 
hiring and firing of workers is impeded by regulations or flexibly 
determined by employers’ 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 
Centralized collective bargaining Informal Based on the Global Competitiveness Report question: ‘wages in your country are set by a centralised bargaining process’ 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 
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 Type Definition Source 
Hours Regulations Formal 
 
Based on the World Bank's Doing Business, ‘Rigidity of Hours Index’, 
which uses five components on whether:  
(1) there are restrictions on night work;  
(2) there are restrictions on holiday work;  
(3) the length of the work week can be 5.5 days or longer;  
(4) there are restrictions on overtime work; and  
(5) the average paid annual leave is 21 working days or more. 
World Bank, Doing Business 
Mandated cost of worker dismissal Formal 
Based on the World Bank's Doing Business, data on the cost of the 
advance notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due 
when dismissing a redundant worker with 10 years tenure.  
World Bank, Doing Business 
Conscription Formal 
Measures the use and duration of military conscription. Economies 
with longer conscription periods received lower ratings. In economies 
where conscription is never used, though possible was rated 10. 
Economies without military conscription were rated 10. If mandated 
national service included clear non-military options, the country was 
rated 5. 
International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, The Military Balance  
War Resisters International, World 
Survey of Conscription and 
Conscientious Objection to Military 
Service 
Administrative requirements Formal 
Based on the Global Competitiveness Report survey question: 
‘Complying with administrative requirements (permits, regulations, 
reporting) issued by the government in your country is (i) 
burdensome, (ii) not burdensome’ 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 
Starting a  business Informal 
Comprised of data from the World Bank's Doing Business on the 
amount of time and money required to start a new limited liability 
business.  
World Bank, Doing Business 
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 Type Definition Source 
Extra payments/bribes/favouritism Informal 
 
Based on the Global Competitiveness Report questions: 
(1) ‘In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with - 
import and export permits; connection to public utilities; annual tax 
payments; awarding of public contracts; getting favourable judicial 
decisions?’ 
(2) ‘Do illegal payments aimed at influencing government policies, 
laws or regulations have an impact on companies in your 
country?’ 
(3) ‘To what extent do government officials in your country show 
favouritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding 
upon policies and contracts?’ 
World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 
Licensing restrictions Formal 
Based on the World Bank's Doing Business data on the time in days 
and financial costs to obtain a license to construct a standard 
warehouse.  
World Bank, Doing Business 
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Appendix B continued 
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Appendix C: Trend of market-legitimising, market-creating, market-stabilising and market-regulating institutional factors 
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Appendix D: Capital Stock - Full fixed effect estimation results with time-dummies 
 (1) (2) 
 Capital Stock Capital Stock 
L.Institution Index 0.00389  
 (1.06)  
   
L.Labour Stock 0.0496 0.0435 
 (0.47) (0.41) 
   
L.Capital Stock 0.423*** 0.422*** 
 (18.69) (18.55) 
   
GDP per capita 0.00827 0.00869 
 (0.53) (0.55) 
   
L.GDP per capita 0.00395 0.00329 
 (0.25) (0.20) 
   
year==  1992 -0.00168 -0.00132 
 (-0.39) (-0.31) 
   
year==  1993 -0.00303 -0.00272 
 (-0.71) (-0.63) 
   
year==  1994 -0.000529 -0.000193 
 (-0.13) (-0.05) 
   
year==  1995 -0.0000390 0.000281 
 (-0.01) (0.07) 
   
year==  1996 -0.00342 -0.00279 
 (-0.81) (-0.63) 
   
year==  1997 0.00263 0.00296 
 (0.62) (0.69) 
   
year==  1998 -0.00475 -0.00443 
 (-1.13) (-1.03) 
   
year==  1999 -0.00114 -0.000818 
 (-0.27) (-0.19) 
   
year==  2000 -0.000552 -0.000234 
 (-0.13) (-0.05) 
   
year==  2001 0.00181 0.00197 
 (0.43) (0.44) 
   
year==  2002 0.0000866 0.000330 
 (0.02) (0.08) 
   
year==  2003 0.00121 0.00136 
 (0.29) (0.32) 
   
   
year==  2004 0.00199 0.00208 
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 (0.47) (0.48) 
   
year==  2005 0.00181 0.00195 
 (0.43) (0.46) 
   
year==  2006 0.00447 0.00462 
 (1.05) (1.08) 
   
year==  2007 0.00722 0.00724 
 (1.70) (1.70) 
   
year==  2008 0.00889* 0.00901* 
 (2.11) (2.13) 
   
year==  2009 0.00485 0.00485 
 (1.15) (1.14) 
   
year==  2010 0.00633 0.00650 
 (1.48) (1.51) 
   
year==  2011 0.0136** 0.0141** 
 (3.19) (3.23) 
   
year==  2012 0.0120** 0.0123** 
 (2.82) (2.86) 
   
year==  2013 0.00565 0.00587 
 (1.33) (1.35) 
   
year==  2014 0.00337 0.00342 
 (0.79) (0.79) 
   
L.Market Legitimising  0.000848 
  (0.82) 
   
L.Market Creating  0.000104 
  (0.13) 
   
L.Market Stabilising  0.00101 
  (0.95) 
   
L.Market Regulating  0.000282 
  (0.41) 
   
Constant 0.0104** 0.0103** 
 (3.16) (3.08) 
N 408 408 
r2 0.570 0.571 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix E: Labour Stock - Full fixed effect estimation results with time-dummies 
 (1) (2) 
 Labour Stock Labour Stock 
L.Institution Index 0.000463  
 (0.27)  
   
L.Labour Stock 0.307*** 0.296*** 
 (6.26) (6.03) 
   
L.Capital Stock -0.0262* -0.0278** 
 (-2.48) (-2.63) 
   
GDP per capita -0.0103 -0.0109 
 (-1.41) (-1.50) 
   
L.GDP per capita -0.00165 -0.00287 
 (-0.22) (-0.38) 
   
year==  1992 -0.00107 -0.00101 
 (-0.54) (-0.51) 
   
year==  1993 0.000129 0.000139 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
   
year==  1994 0.000573 0.000613 
 (0.29) (0.31) 
   
year==  1995 -0.00398* -0.00394* 
 (-2.00) (-1.97) 
   
year==  1996 0.000151 0.000765 
 (0.08) (0.37) 
   
year==  1997 -0.000528 -0.000482 
 (-0.27) (-0.24) 
   
year==  1998 0.00134 0.00137 
 (0.68) (0.69) 
   
year==  1999 -0.00165 -0.00161 
 (-0.83) (-0.80) 
   
year==  2000 -0.000108 -0.0000762 
 (-0.05) (-0.04) 
   
year==  2001 -0.000123 -0.000833 
 (-0.06) (-0.41) 
   
year==  2002 -0.000207 -0.0000555 
 (-0.10) (-0.03) 
   
year==  2003 0.000671 0.000977 
 (0.34) (0.50) 
   
year==  2004 0.000967 0.00106 
 (0.49) (0.53) 
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year==  2005 -0.000779 -0.000483 
 (-0.39) (-0.24) 
   
year==  2006 -0.00157 -0.00112 
 (-0.79) (-0.56) 
   
year==  2007 -0.00212 -0.00198 
 (-1.07) (-1.00) 
   
year==  2008 -0.00203 -0.00203 
 (-1.03) (-1.03) 
   
year==  2009 -0.000982 -0.00111 
 (-0.50) (-0.56) 
   
year==  2010 -0.00348 -0.00360 
 (-1.74) (-1.80) 
   
year==  2011 0.000926 0.000994 
 (0.46) (0.49) 
   
year==  2012 0.000229 0.000227 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
   
year==  2013 0.00297 0.00285 
 (1.49) (1.42) 
   
year==  2014 -0.00243 -0.00266 
 (-1.22) (-1.33) 
   
L.Market Legitimising  -0.000162 
  (-0.34) 
   
L.Market Creating  -0.000222 
  (-0.60) 
   
L.Market Stabilising  0.000644 
  (1.31) 
   
L.Market Regulating  0.000475 
  (1.51) 
   
Constant 0.00938*** 0.00954*** 
 (6.11) (6.18) 
N 408 408 
r2 0.191 0.204 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix F: TFP - Full random effect estimation results with time-dummies 
 (1) (2) 
 TFP TFP 
L.Institution Index -0.00192  
 (-0.33)  
   
L.Labour Stock 0.282 0.311 
 (1.04) (1.13) 
   
L.Capital Stock -0.175** -0.175** 
 (-3.01) (-3.00) 
   
L.TFP 0.0404 0.0431 
 (0.74) (0.79) 
   
GDP per capita 0.304*** 0.297*** 
 (6.89) (6.60) 
   
L.GDP per capita -0.0167 -0.0208 
 (-0.34) (-0.42) 
   
year==  1992 0.000321 -0.000609 
 (0.03) (-0.05) 
   
year==  1993 0.00918 0.00847 
 (0.72) (0.66) 
   
year==  1994 0.00799 0.00715 
 (0.63) (0.56) 
   
year==  1995 0.00569 0.00491 
 (0.45) (0.38) 
   
year==  1996 0.0214 0.0187 
 (1.69) (1.45) 
   
year==  1997 0.00465 0.00389 
 (0.37) (0.31) 
   
year==  1998 -0.000660 -0.00152 
 (-0.05) (-0.12) 
   
year==  1999 0.00268 0.00184 
 (0.21) (0.14) 
   
year==  2000 0.0125 0.0118 
 (0.99) (0.93) 
   
year==  2001 -0.00204 -0.00387 
 (-0.16) (-0.30) 
   
year==  2002 0.00880 0.00720 
 (0.69) (0.56) 
   
year==  2003 0.00486 0.00462 
 (0.38) (0.36) 
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year==  2004 0.0231 0.0235 
 (1.81) (1.83) 
   
year==  2005 0.00992 0.00989 
 (0.78) (0.77) 
   
year==  2006 0.0162 0.0167 
 (1.27) (1.30) 
   
year==  2007 0.0145 0.0150 
 (1.14) (1.18) 
   
year==  2008 0.000357 0.000270 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
   
year==  2009 0.00549 0.00609 
 (0.43) (0.48) 
   
year==  2010 0.0206 0.0205 
 (1.61) (1.60) 
   
year==  2011 0.0174 0.0167 
 (1.36) (1.30) 
   
year==  2012 0.0190 0.0186 
 (1.49) (1.46) 
   
year==  2013 0.0202 0.0206 
 (1.59) (1.60) 
   
year==  2014 0.00907 0.00964 
 (0.71) (0.75) 
   
L.Market Legitimising  -0.000941 
  (-0.61) 
   
L.Market Creating  0.00166 
  (0.96) 
   
L.Market Stabilising  -0.000831 
  (-0.47) 
   
L.Market Regulating  -0.000180 
  (-0.11) 
   
Constant -0.0159 -0.0155 
 (-1.65) (-1.60) 
N 408 408 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
